Roman Conquests, The Danube Frontier - Dr Michael Schmitz

 

In the week leading up to the Christmas break, I finished reading another book in the series from Pen & Sword Books, covering Roman Conquests, with this particular volume focussed on the Danube Frontier and written by Dr Micheal Schmitz.

Pen and Sword Books - Roman Conquests

If this series of books might be of interest, I also reviewed Roman Conquests - Britain by Dr Simon Elliott back in early October, see the link below.

JJ's Wargames - Roman Conquests, Britain, Dr Simon Eliott

I well remember greeting the publication of this book with great anticipation at the time as I was well into my Romano-Dacian project and eagerly in search for as much information and historical input that I could find to inspire and inform that work and so I signed up for a pre-publication pre-order, with the book being promoted as authored by Philip Matyszak who wrote the volume covering Roman Conquests in Macedonia and Greece.

The last unit added to my Romano-Dacians was a cohort of legionaries back in September 2019 and work remains to finish off the other half of this collection. I love this hobby!

A frustrating delay in the publication followed, during which I took a break from my Romano-Dacians to refresh my palette for my AWI collection followed by a distraction into the Age of Sail, and so I have had this particular book on my pile of reading material since its publication in 2019.

Thus in preparation for a return to work on my Romano-Dacians, I thought I would grab some inspiration from Michael Schmitz's work and refresh my knowledge around Roman activity of this particular frontier

The back of the dust jacket summarises what the book is designed to offer:

Narrates the campaigns to conquer Pannonia, Moesia, Thrace, as well as the great wars against Dacia and their allies.

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Describes and analyses the forces, strategy and tactics of both the Romans and their adversaries.

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Discover how Roman Legionaries modified their equipment to minimise the effect of the deadly Dacian falx.

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Illustrated with maps, photographs and stunning colour paintings.

So my thoughts after reading the book is that if you know absolutely nothing about Roman warfare in this particular part of their Imperial frontier that started to become front and centre of Roman strategy in the wake of the first civil war and the rise of Julius Caesar, through to the Marcomannic War or Northern War fought by Marcus Aurelius and beyond, heralding the collapse of the Western Empire, then this book will really set you up with all the key history points and facts required to get an understanding of what this frontier was all about.

Personally, I only partially added to what I already knew from my other reading and improved upon that with the chapters covering the early campaigns of Caesar, Augustus and Tiberius with the latter being of particular interest setting up as it does the formation of the pre Dacian conquest under the Flavian dynasty (Vespasian, Titus and Domitian) and the factors that led to the decision by Trajan to solve that particular problem by a total annexation of Dacia under a Roman Governor.

Likewise the chapters covering the Marcomannic Wars, first and second, fleshed out a clearer understanding of what is known amid the academic historical speculation adding to other recent reading from sources such as the Ancient History magazine that produced a very interesting edition covering the warfare from this particular period.

I think Michael Schmitz makes a very compelling case in underlining why the rise of a united Dacia, with all its individual tribes coming together under one supreme leader, first under Burebista and subsequently under Decebalus, together with its access to superior weaponry and tactical know how provided by Roman deserters and that it was not just another barbarian confederation unable to keep its troops in the field for long before the need to service its agrarian economy interceded its need to oppose a Roman invasion, makes it very clear why it was such a threat to Roman security.

Improved head and arm protection on display in combat with Dacians and their deadly falx - Radu Oltean

These factors alone put it at the top of the Roman 'hit-list' but then added to when an opportunistic, cunning and militarily able leader like Decebalus took charge looking to build a wider confederation of local allies along the Danubian frontier only reinforced the need for Rome to find a final solution.

Of course the huge gap in our knowledge of this war is that Trajan's own history of it is lost to us save about eight words of introduction announcing where he moved to at the beginning of the war, and thus we are left with a lot of educated guesswork from the wonderful Trajan's column, probably sculpted by artisans who had never seen a Dacian or indeed a Roman army in battle panoply; partially mediated by perhaps a more reliable portrayal of the armies on the Adamklissi Monument, depicting Roman Legionaries in all the different types of armour they possessed together with the improvements to arm and head protection not illustrated on the column.

I think for me, the most thought provoking parts of this book is Schmitz's emphasis on the 'what ifs' and the implied challenges the Dacians presented. Namely, what if a more coordinated response from Dacia's allies in the form of the Sarmatian and German tribes had been formulated to oppose Trajan, mixed in with the undoubted use of Roman know-how that sadly is a point of conjecture alluded to by the sight of Dacians firing ballista at advancing Roman legionaries from the walls of their fortresses on Trajan's Column.

As a wargamer of this period, I am still not sure any rule set I have come across adequately or sympathetically quite captures how a Dacian army operated in the field, with a mix of Roman technology, more armoured troops, heavy falxes as a shock weapon added to your typical warband army as seen on the German frontier, supported by bow and kontos armed Sarmatian cavalry, which is basically what I have produced.

Romans falling in with a Dacian wagon convoy during the Moesian winter offensive in Trajan's Dacian War - Radu Oltean

The fact is that the Dacians were quite able to beat and destroy Roman armies on their home soil and that potential has to be there on the table-top to make sure the Roman player knows he faces a significant challenge to his all conquering legionaries.

On that point as well, Schmitz highlights the fact again and again, as illustrated on Trajan's column, that Decebalus seems to have forced Trajan to relegate his legionaries to an elite body of engineers building bridges, forts and roads in the wake of the real fighting spearhead, his auxiliaries, and German tribal allies carrying wooden clubs; better suited to fighting in the broken terrain of the Dacian mountains, as Decebalus wisely avoided battle in the lowland plain fronting the Danube and pulled back into his mountain stronghold to contest the few passes that allowed access to his capital, Sarmizegatusa. 

In fact the only occasion we see the legionaries in action is at the end of the campaign as Trajan uses them to storm the Dacian fortress in testudo formation.

My other key area of interest, covered by the book, is the Marcomannic Wars fought across and around the Roman province of Dacia against those same German tribes from Trajan's time, the Marcomanni and Quadi, plus a few others together with free Dacians and of course the Sarmatians. 

Again Schmitz does a good job of thought provoking with the limited information available together with a very handy review of the Roman generals that fought alongside Marcus Aurelius and his co-emperor Lucius Verus, adding some useful comments about their abilities which can only help inform those ratings on a wargames table.

I have always thought these wars would make a nice extension to the Dacian collection, with the added problems imposed on my Romans of too few troops and the occasional man dropping dead from the Parthian plague and causing the loss of even more troops. 

That together with snowy terrain and Romans facing of against Sarmatian heavy cavalry, what's not to like?

Ok so this book does the job it lays out on the cover, with a good look at the key Roman campaigns fought in this area, up to the final collapse of it and the abandonment of trans-Danubian Dacia in around 271-272 AD, less than two-hundred years after Trajan had completed its conquest.

Rome likely expended more blood on this frontier over the centuries than practically any of the others and given the threat it posed in terms of access into northern Italy by land or across the Aegean by sea, it is clear why its possession and control was so important to the Empire.

I  enjoyed reading this book and know I will refer to it for inspiration around table-top games I intend to play with my own collection, but I can't end without highlighting a few niggles and caveats that occurred to me whilst doing so.

The text is plagued with numerous mis-prints that become slightly tedious as you find yourself going back over a sentence that does not make sense due to an annoying typo. Even when preparing this review and referring to the dust cover notes, I found one there, which I corrected for this post but actually is written as follows;

Describes and analyses the forces, strategy and tactics of the both the Romans and their adversaries.

Come on Pen & Sword, this is sloppy from a professional publisher like yourselves that fulfil a very important role in publishing military titles for the general reader and our hobby and does a disservice to the work of some very interesting authors such as Dr Schmitz.

In addition, yes the book does come complete with six black and white line drawn maps of the region which is very much appreciated considering the track record of some military publishing today, but they seemed to me to be rather generic in the various towns and sites indicated on them, with many of those mentioned in the text not placed on any of the maps to help illustrate where the heck the reader was being pointed to.

The Dacians took full advantage of the terrain by constructing blocking positions on mountain sides and valleys - Radu Oltean.

Finally, yes the book does come with stunning colour artwork but, I noted with a wry smile, that said artwork was taken from another great book covering the Dacian Wars by Radu Oltean, a treasure among my library and kindly autographed by Radu after ordering it directly from him back in 2015.

I can't recommend this book more strongly and would be a good read alongside Schmitz, if you have the slightest interest in the Roman wars against Dacia and I note this is Volume I so I hope we will get a second volume in time, oh and there is more of Radu's inspiring artwork in this book. 

JJ's Wargames - Dacia The Roman Wars, Volume One

Roman Conquests, The Danube Frontier is 162 pages which includes:

Contents

List of Illustrations

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Chapter 1. Illyricum: The Push Towards the Danube

Chapter 2. Julius Caesar

Chapter 3. Octavian's Illyricum

Chapter 4. The Danube as the Northern Frontier

Chapter 5. The Pannonian Uprising of AD 6 to 9

Chapter 6. The Dacians: an Emerging Empire

Chapter 7. The Flavian Danube

Chapter 8. Trajan's Dacian Wars

Chapter 9. Hadrian

Chapter 10. The War of Many Nations

Conclusion: 'The Best Defence is a Good Offence'?

Notes

Select Bibliography 

Index

Maps include (Dacia, the Danube theatre in relation to the wider Roman Empire, Illyria, Pannonia, The Western Empire, Thrace)

My copy of the book is in hardback and has a list price of £19.99 UK / $39.35 US but I note at the time of writing can be purchased from around £14 to £15.

I quite like this series of books based on the two I've read and I think are a useful resource if the area covered is a theatre of interest to you.

That's it for now, as I'm off to prepare for a Christmas break with friends and family, and I will post my annual Christmas Eve greeting to readers tomorrow followed hopefully by a post covering some Xmas gaming fun enjoyed in the holiday and my annual year end review.

A Sensory History of Ancient Warfare, Reconstructing the Physical Experience of War in the Classical World - Conor Whately

 

When I saw this title on the new listings from Pen & Sword I was really intrigued and thrilled to get it as a birthday present and moved it rapidly to the top of my 'to read' stack of books that occupies a discreet section of my book shelf.

The back of the dust jacket lists the reasons for that intrigue thus:

• An ambitious new approach to the subject of ancient warfare.
• Assesses the evidence for what ancient battles and sieges would have looked, sounded, tasted, smelled and felt like to its participants.
• Re-examines the contemporary testimony of ancient historians, poets and artistic representations, as well as the evidence of both traditional archaeology and reconstruction/re-enactment.
• Case studies examined in detail are: Cinaxa (401 BC); Issus (333 BC); Cannae (216 BC); Jerusalem  and Masada (66-74 AD); Strasbourg (357 AD); Edessa (544 AD). 

One of the really interesting aspects of historical wargaming for me and others is developing, through our games, a different insight into the issues that faced the commanders and their men engaged in the struggle we are attempting to replicate on the table and part of that understanding starts with an appreciation of what the situation looked like from the man on the ground being Alexander the Great inspiring his men before the Battle of Issus with encouraging words whilst passing direct orders to subordinates, to the poor bloody infantry standing in the front line, shield braced for impact and preparing to face the ultimate challenge in the life of most human beings, faced with the terrible prospect of mortal combat with the enemy up close and personal.

Having a clear understanding of the challenges faced by each soldier, at each level of command within an army, better still described by them as near to the time of the action that they were able to record their experiences of that action, the more likely we are able to reflect those experiences in the game we produce and thus start to appreciate why events may have unfolded in the way they did.

Thus with the other aspects of the hobby such as reading accounts, walking the terrain, looking at the insights that modern day re-enactors can bring, we can use these perspectives to feed into a more appreciative experience around the wargames table.

So it was with a cautious level of interest that I approached this title as an opportunity to perhaps fill a gap in the literature surrounding the experience of warfare in the ancient world that is better represented in other periods, such as John Keegan's 'The Face of Battle' published in 1976 and a book I read several years ago now or Paddy Griffiths 'Forward into Battle'.

Interestingly Whately highlights the particular impetus for his book as being The Smell of Battle, the Taste of Siege: A Sensory History of the Civil War by Mark Smith a similar tome that covered the assault on Fort Sumter in Charleston, the sights of First Bull Run, the smells of Gettysburg, hunger at Vicksburg, and the close quarters of the submarine H.L. Hunley. He then goes on to state when considering a similar study for the ancient period;

"Digging deeper might seem problematic, for Smith was able to draw on a body of evidence that we do not have in antiquity, namely early photographs, newspaper reports and personal diaries, among others. Yet, despite these seeming limitations, we have extensive accounts of warfare, and some of the striking and useful pieces of evidence include the historical epics )Homer's Iliad), Latin histories (Livy's Ab Urbe Condita), later  classicizing histories (Procopius' Wars), and military manuals (Maurice's Strategikon)."

Noting that with the aforementioned studies, their focus in the main is on generals at the expense of the common soldier, and indeed with little or no inclusion of the experience of women and children and the day to day life of civilians, he highlights other sensory sources such as papyrological, legal and material evidence, looking at foodstuffs and the trade in animals, thus giving a sense of the foods people were eating and the animals they were in daily contact with; this evidence contributing to building a picture of the living conditions of the soldiers and their diets, mixed with the topography of a given theatre and its associated weather patterns, adds in to the sensory picture of what warfare would have been like for the 'Common Grunt'.

My own picture of the Epitaph of Marcus Caelius, first ranking Centurion of the 18th Legion who died in the Varian disaster aged 53 and referenced by Whately in his introduction to the book describing the likely battle in the Teutoburg Forest from the view point of the Roman soldiers engaged in that battle.
JJ's Wargames - Xanten LVR Archaeological Park & Roman Museum

The book then launches into an introduction that attempts to portray firstly the experiences of the common Roman soldiers to their commanders, faced with fighting in the Teutoburg Forest, rain soaked, hungry, weighed down with their kit under constant attack or threat of attack from close assault and missile fire, eventually overwhelmed as much by fatigue as by the enemy as they slipped around on muddy ground trying to hack their way through a forest whilst staving off an ever more confident foe.

This first description rather sets the tone for the book presenting the reader with a description of the other seven battles and sieges, based on the literary accounts and sources described with the author filling in the missing bits and attempting to 'cross the T's and dot the I's'.

In his introduction Whately attempts to define what a 'Sensory History' looks like when he describes the structure of Smith's American Civil War book, noting that in it, he divides the book into five chapters to help understand one particular engagement through the lens of the five physical senses; recounting one chapter devoted to the sounds of the Battle of Fort Sumter (April 1861) or the visual impact in another chapter covering the Battle of First Bull Run (July 1861).

As his Teutoburg Forest account illustrates, and he readily acknowledges, the same kind of sensory accounts in the ancient world don't exist and thus the prose has to turn to conjecture.

An example of the difficulty of writing a book like this is exemplified by the listing and detailing of the various sources for describing Alexander's battle with Persian King Darius in 333 BC, ranging from Plutarch, Justin, Polybius, Diodorus, Curtius and Arrian and the mosaic from Pompeii.

Here we have accounts written in the first, second and third centuries AD no doubt relying on other previous and perhaps first hand sources now lost to history and with four of the aforementioned authors, Plutarch, Justin, Diodorus and Curtius 'short of technical military material'.

Lucius Flavius Arrianius (Arrian) the Greek historian, and Roman commander who fought the Alans, one of the more accomplished military sources.

Perhaps the most compelling source is Arrian who was at least an accomplished general and author of the short tract on tactics, famous for his defeat of the Alans in the second century AD, and describes the Battle of Issus in detail which Whately goes through, but rightly pointing out that;

'Unfortunately, despite the battle's fame, the contradictory details found in the different accounts make reconstruction difficult' 

And so the reader is left to consider what follows with that very important caveat, which is educated guesswork at best; interesting yes, but not entirely satisfying in terms of moving our understanding much further forward other than conjecture.

Apart from the enjoyable aspect of reading the detail about certain battles that I had a top line familiarity with prior to reading this book and enjoying the accounts that were pieced together from sometimes opposing sources, I can't say I was convinced by the attempt at building the sensory picture.

The fundamental difficulty I have with the book is that it seems to me to fall down at the hurdle that Whately highlights himself in his introduction, namely the lack of primary source evidence, and in his 'Acknowledgements' section of the book when he refers to an exchange on Twitter which posed the question 'could this kind of work be done about the ancient world given the source limitations?'

Thus we are left with an account that, frankly, I could probably assess myself based on my own extensive reading of other periods of military history, mixed in with the usual diet of 'sandal and swords' fiction that I like to read anyway to supplement the lack of such first hand primary accounts that very much feed the imagination when I'm working on other period collections.

Perhaps I'm being a little harsh and that my perspective is slightly coloured by my disappointment at what the dust jacket boldly declares as an ambitious new approach. Yes the book is definitely ambitious, but I remain unconvinced about the 'new approach' and until we have the unlikely discovery of the diary of an ordinary optio in the ranks of your typical Augustan legion, giving me the real life first hand insight into ancient warfare, similar to the accounts of Peninsular War veterans outlined below, I think I will remain unconvinced.

The artwork of Peter Dennis in Osprey's, The Jewish Revolt, really appear to capture well the experience and likely look of  the sensory experience of combat, with the siege of Jerusalem and Masada both featuring in the text.

To perhaps better exemplify my point and to further extend Whately's consideration of Mark Smith's Civil War account, and the lack of similar classical ancient sources you can look at the wealth of primary accounts from an earlier period of military history before even photographic evidence and the wonderful first hand accounts left by British and some French veterans of the Peninsular War, devoid of any poetry or attempts to influence a political master, but simply telling the reader what they saw and experienced in the face of battle, descriptions that we simply lack for the classical period.

These are accounts that I used to help me construct a very focussed look at recreating the Battle of Talavera for my own Talavera 208 project:

Lieutenant Girod de l'Ain of the 9me Legere is quoted describing the attack of the British light cavalry into the Northern Valley as seen from his position on the lower slopes of the Sierra de Segurilla as his regiment skirmished with General Bassecourt's Spanish infantry;

"this was a charge by some English cavalry, that we saw arrive from afar like a hurricane, it was a regiment of dragoons charging in order of battle and launched full tilt... We observed this line of enemy cavalry, incapable of manoeuvre, following a single direction so blindly, that we shouted with one voice: 'They are deserting, they are deserting!' But soon saw one of our regiments of legere (the 27me Legere) which, marching in column close to an isolated house, found itself in the path of this cavalry; not having time to form square, it threw itself around the house, with their backs against the four walls; the square thus found itself naturally formed, and the more solid ... The English line extended well beyond both sides, to right and left ... the two wings no longer master of their horses ... continued on their course straight ahead, always flat out. We then saw a line of French cavalry, which stationed in the rear, came up at the 'petit trot' before the English cavalry; it was the brigade of General Strolz, composed of the 10eme and 26eme Chasseurs a Cheval. We anxiously wondered what would happen when these two lines of cavalry met; but the shock did not last long: we saw the English line pass through the French line, without stopping or losing their formation; we only had time to notice a few sabres flash in the air and the smoke of some pistol shots... but soon our chasseurs remounted and, a little shaken, launched themselves at the gallop in pursuit of the English dragoons, which only stopped in the waters of the Alberche, where they were all taken prisoner."

The attack by General Lapisses's  French I Corps, 2nd Division at Talavera

Ensign Aitchison of the 3rd Guards recalled the attack;
"The French came on over the rough and broken ground  ..... in the most imposing manner and with great resolution."

A French officer described the first line of columns attack;
"The French charged with shouldered arms as was their custom. When they arrived at short range, the English line remained motionless, some hesitation was seen in the march. The officers and NCOs shouted at the soldiers, 'Forward March; don't fire'. Some even cried 'They're surrendering'.  The forward movement was therefore resumed; but it was not until extremely close range of the English line that the latter started a two rank fire which carried destruction into the heart of the French line, stopped its movement and produced some disorder. While the officers shouted at the soldiers 'Forward: Don't Fire' the English suddenly stopped their own fire and charged with the bayonet. Everything was favourable to them; orderliness, impetus, and the resolution to fight with the bayonet. Among the French on the other hand, there was no longer any impetus, but disorder and surprise caused by the enemy's unexpected resolve. Flight was inevitable."

And finally 

Ensign John Aitchison of the 3rd Guards described the effects of French artillery fire and the troops response to it;

"a tremendous cannonade - shot and shells were falling in every direction - but none of the enemy were to be seen - the men were all lying in the ranks, and except in the very spot where a shot or shell fell, there was not the least motion - I have seen men killed in the ranks by cannon shots - those immediately around the spot would remove the mutilated corpse to the rear, they would then lie down as if nothing had occurred and remain in the ranks, steady as before. The common men could be brought to face the greatest danger, there is a spirit which tells me it is possible, but I could not believe that they could be brought to remain without emotion, when attacked, not knowing from whence. Such however was the conduct of our men I speak particularly of the Brigade on 28th July, and from this steadiness so few suffered as by remaining quiet the shots bounded over their heads."

I applaud Conor Whately for his attempt with this book, but the constraints he and other ancient scholars work under in this particular area of military history when attempting to extract the detail similar to the level that we have in the accounts above, makes this book's ambitions a very high bar to pass and one that I felt it missed despite the effort.

In addition I think the contribution made by re-enactment groups that have worked really hard at trying to recreate the dress, living conditions, food and other aspects of walking a day in the caligae of your average Roman soldier as with the Ermine Street Guard group, and others, for example, have offered more of the understanding and insight that the classic sources struggle to match.

The other area that I feel offers the kind of opportunity this book attempts to develop is the gradual translations of the tablets being found on Hadrian's Wall at Vindolanda where the kind of 'first hand' insights that the classical world lacks are starting to be revealed, and I hope and look forward to a book compiling the best finds to help give a comprehensive look at that world through them. Perhaps that book exists and I've missed it!

The tablet above is a letter of appeal from a civilian to a governor seeking redress for a beating received at the hands of a subordinate.
Translation:
" he beat(?) me all the more.......goods...or pour them down the drain(?). As befits an honest man(?) I implore your majesty not to allow me, an innocent man, to have been beaten with rods and, my lord, inasmuch as(?) I was unable to complain to the prefect because he was detained by ill-health. I have complained in vain(?) to the beneficiarius and the rest(?) of the centurions of his unit. Accordingly(?) I implore you mercifulness not to allow me, a man from overseas and an innocent man, about whose good faith you may inquire, to have been bloodied by rods as if I had permitted some crime."
JJ's Wargames - British Museum, Part Two, The Romans

Finally in terms of fictional accounts to help bridge this large gap, I can think of no better recommendation that picking up copies of Adrian Goldsworthy's Vindolanda series of fictional accounts of life in first century Britain and the exploits and adventures of Centurion Flavius Ferox which I think now number three books in the series and very enjoyable reads; with all the scholarly input that Dr Goldsworthy is able to weave into them with the inclusion of a detailed note at the back of each book outlining the known historical record that underpins his fictional account.

A Sensory History of Ancient Warfare is published by Pen & Sword Books and is 175 pages which include:

Acknowledgements

List of Illustrations

Introduction

Part I: The Greek World

Chapter 1 The Battle of Cunaxa (401 BC)

Chapter 2 The Battle of Issus (333 BC)

Part II: The Roman World

Chapter 3 The Battle of Cannae (216 BC)

Chapter 4 The Sieges of Jerusalem (70 AD) and Masada (72-74 AD)

Part III Late Antiquity

Chapter 5 The Battle of Strasbourg (357 AD)

Chapter 6 The Siege of Edessa (544 AD)

Conclusion

Notes and References

Bibliography and Further Reading

Index

The fact that I sincerely applaud Conor Whateley's attempt at composing a 'Sensory History' is demonstrated by my reading it cover to cover and really enjoying reading about the battles described and the unique aspects surrounding them, together with the sources relied upon to do that. For that aspect alone I enjoyed it and include it as a useful resource and addition to my Ancient's book collection, but in terms of its declared objective of presenting a sensory historical account of them, I remain unconvinced, but tentatively look forward to other new insights going forward from perhaps other yet undiscovered sources.

My copy of 'A Sensory History of Ancient Warfare' is in hard back and has a list price of £19.99, but at the time of writing can be picked up for a little as £11.00 

Roman Conquests, Britain - Dr Simon Elliott

One of my birthday presents this year was this new book by Dr Simon Elliot recounting the narrative of the incomplete Roman conquest of Britain from Julius Caesar's initial 'reconnaissance in force' in 55-54 BC through the campaigns of expansion and pacification that followed the Claudian invasion of 43 AD.

I was looking for such a book as this, which would bring my understanding of the Roman invasion and occupation of my home island up to date, and to accompany my planned exploration of some of the key sites in the UK on my 'bucket list' and to perhaps include others after reading it.

As I've mentioned in previous reviews of ancient history book titles, I always approach them with a certain caution in that from previous experience one is never sure that the read is going to offer much new in its insights or end up just being a rehash of previous sources of which the primary ones become fewer and fewer the further back you go, that mixed with a generous portion of so called 'educated guesswork and speculation' that seems to constitute a lot of the discourse in this area until archaeological finds come along and upset the apple cart.

The cover on this book, beautifully illustrated by Dominic Allen and published by Pen and Sword, boldly states on the back of the dust jacket;

'Offers a clear narrative and analysis of the Roman conquest from Julius Caesar's failed incursions (55 and 54 BC) to the Claudian Invasion (43 AD) and the subsequent campaigns of expansion and (never completed) pacification.'

'Analyses the weapons, equipment, organisation, leadership, tactics and strategies of both the Romans and their British foes, and how each attempted to adapt.'

'Draws on the very latest historical research and archaeological finds.'

'Well illustrated with colour photos and colour artworks.

Dr Elliot is described as;

'an award winning and best selling historian, archaeologist, author, broadcaster, Honorary Research Fellow at the University of Kent, Trustee of the Council of British Archaeology, Ambassador for the Museum of London Archaeology, Guide Lecturer for Andante Travels and President of the Society of Ancients....'

I have to say I enjoyed the read and it does pretty much what it says on the cover and, given my earlier points about limited source material, gave me a solid understanding of the key periods illustrating well the unique aspects of Britain in the Roman Empire; for example, how long it took the invaders to occupy and pacify the territory they took from the Claudian invasion in 43 AD to Agricola's campaign in the north that culminated in the Battle of Mons Graupius in 83 AD, a period of forty painfully slow years of expansion compared with Julius Caesar only taking eight years to conquer the far larger territory of Gaul.

The process of the Roman invasion and gradual occupation of Britain is well illustrated in this map
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Roman.Britain.campaigns.43.to.84.jpg

The progress of this 'stop-start' occupation is explained well and I certainly came away with a very good understanding of the the critical factors that enabled the Romans to make the progress they did against an enemy that, in the main, chose not to meet them in open battle but resorted to guerrilla tactics designed to wear down their opponents and attack their supply lines.

This campaign winning factor was the creation of the Roman fleet or 'Classis Britannica' that was able to take full advantage of Roman command at sea by dominating the British coast and riverine routes in support of Roman advances, never too far away from their support to rapidly move troops, bring up supplies and land scouting forces ahead of the main thrusts, that kept the enemy off balance and in retreat until forced to make a stand and suffer the likely consequences.

How kids of my generation had the Roman invasion of Britain illustrated in the children's magazines of the time 'Look and Learn' and 'Tell me Why'.

The challenges of pacification are also well discussed and the evidence that supports the known and suspected uprisings that kept the Romans occupied behind their forward line often as much as before it, with archaeology on key Roman military structures showing evidence of ditches dug forward and behind in these periods of unrest, only for the rearward defences to be removed later along with the threat that caused their construction.

After reading this book, my urge to get on and finish my Romano-Dacian collection is reignited, which must say something of what a good read I found it to be.

As an example and with a personal particular interest in the Principate era and the Trajanic-Hadrianic time of the occupation I found the chapter covering the always dangerous period of change from one emperor to the next very interesting, covering the relatively peaceful time of Trajan as he focussed his efforts on Dacia and later Parthia dying in Syria and with Hadrian at his side.

Elliot references the Historia Augusta for this period when it states that;

'the Britons couldn't be kept under control  . .'

and quotes the Roman rhetorician Marcus Cornelius Fronto writing to his former pupil, Marcus Aurelius in the AD 160's, stating that the heavy casualties suffered by the Romans in the Rome-Parthian War at that time were comparable to those suffered at the beginning of Hadrian's reign.

Among the evidence he puts forward to support the ferocity of this British uprising includes the funerary monument to Titus Anneus, a centurion of the I Tungrorum auxiliary cohort in the vexillation fort of Vindolanda referencing him being killed ' . . . in the war.', together with one of the recently excavated tablets, specifically number 164 remarking on the ' . . . nasty little Britons. [Brittunculi]'

He goes on to state that the troubling level of the insurgency, which he quotes Moorhead and Stuttard as describing it 'threatening the very survival of the province', and required the creation of a special task force, with a tombstone to Titus Pontius Sabinus, Primus Pilus (Senior Centurion) Legio III Augusta, recording his being seconded by the Emperor Hadrian to command an emergency task force called the 'expeditio Britannica.' which included vexillations from three legions, based in Germania Inferior  (legio VIII Augusta, legio XXII Primigenia and legio VII Gemina); which if troops were also drawn from his own legion may have amounted to an expeditionary force of some 4,000 men, supported by auxiliaries as mentioned on an altar in Maryport, Cumbria to Marcus Maenius Agrippa commander of cohors I Hispanorum, an auxiliary cavalry regiment attached to the expeditionem britannicam by Hadrian.

York (Eboracum) and Chester (Deva Victrix) figure large in the later attempts
at Roman pacification of Britain, both of which I visited
and looked at the evidence of their Roman past
JJ's Wargames - The Yorkshire Museum, York
JJ's Wargames - Deva Vicitrix, Roman Chester, Part One

Elliot speculates as to who might have been causing the trouble, with the Brigantes, only recently pacified, put forward as prime candidates, with the raising of auxiliary troops from this region of northern England for service overseas a likely reason for revolt, but trouble north of the border, later to be consolidated with the construction of 'Hadrian's Wall', was always a threat and cannot also be discounted and it seems likely that the trouble may have overwhelmed the local garrisons which may explain the disappearance of legio IX Hispana, and the intervention of Centurions Sabinus and Agrippa.

For any wargamer interested in the Roman period of ancient history and in the British occupation, all this detail of suspected uprisings and revolts is glorious stuff to feed any thoughts and ideas for modelling a collection to recreate these potential clashes and I found my imagination running riot with ideas as I read Elliot's accounts of what is thought was going on in these islands at specific periods of that occupation.

The campaign that should have completed the final occupation of Britain and led to the invasion of Ireland in time, but never fulfilled after Agricola was recalled to Rome
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Agricola.Campaigns.80.84.jpg

Intermixed with the narrative is a generous inclusion of the latest archaeological finds that support the conclusions and the evidence on the ground illustrating Roman activity at any given time given the level of construction that followed and preceded Roman activity from roads and town construction to marching camps and military impedimenta left in their wake.

There is a lot in this book and the journey through the various periods, and the many emperors and Roman commanders, might be mind blowing to the casual reader with only a partial knowledge of Roman history, and I would recommend a listen to Mike Duncan's old podcast 'A History of Rome' for a good grounding in the places and people involved in its long-long history and which will make all the names covered in this book much more familiar.

That said I thoroughly enjoyed the read and, as I read to inform and inspire my hobby, came away with lots of ideas and inspiration and would recommend it to similarly inclined pursuers of our hobby.

The last 'really big' Roman resurgence campaign was led by Septimius Severus in what would be described today as a campaign of 'shock and awe' and stabilised the north for another ten years after its conclusion.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Roman.Britain.Severan.Campaigns.jpg

There is however one gripe I have with the book, and it's a familiar one, but an example that stands out in my mind as a classic transgressor. You would think that a book covering the Roman invasion and incomplete occupation of mainland Britain would have included at least one map, perhaps just to illustrate some of the key places mentioned.

As a reader who is native to these isles and who has travelled among them quite extensively even I found reference to certain obscure towns in and around the northern border of England and Scotland new to me and my heart goes out to readers who are not familiar with the layout of Britain, but who have a strong interest and desire to know more.

The Romans would go on and on developing their defences in Britain in the face of continual uprisings and invasions illustrated by the octagonal tower in York, built in the later occupation.

Even putting this post together required me to source the excellent colour map from Wikipedia seen above to illustrate the extent of Roman military operations covered in this title from the Claudian invasion in 43 AD to the Agricola invasion of Scotland in 77 AD and a similar map included in this title would have been very much appreciated.

As the President of the Society of Ancients and a wargamer himself, if his collection of Severan Roman figures included as part of the collection of colour plates is to be considered as illustrative, I would have thought the inclusion of at least a few maps would have been a high priority given the bane of the hobby this part of our reading often includes, and I feel a bit like Nelson calling for more frigates and the want of them, please, please, please, Pen & Sword and other publishers, will you start to put this omission right and get appropriate maps included in your titles.

Rant over on that particular irritation and back to the book contents and the final conclusion to this book that draws on a theme I made in my last book review looking at the Two Battles of Copenhagen in 1801 and 1807 and drawing the comparison of government led misappreciation of the threat a potential enemy presented with that conflict and the later Invasion of Iraq in 2003 and indeed Churchill's decision to bombard the French fleet in Mirs-el-Kabir in 1940, both with distinct similarities to this previous conflict with Denmark.

In his conclusion to the decision by Romano-British elites to expel Roman tax collectors in the 5th century, effectively detaching themselves from an overstretched empire, quoting Zosimus;

'The barbarians caused such suffering among the inhabitants of Britain . . . that they revolted from the Roman Empire. They no longer recognised Roman law, but reverted to their native customs. So the Britons armed themselves and took many risks to ensure their own safety and keep their town free from barbarian attacks.'

He goes on to liken this to the first 'British Brexit' and the defining characteristic of the Roman occupation that underpins Britain's very distinctive relationship with the rest of Europe, part of it but separate and that as well as the roads, towns and borders that separate the home nations of Britain being a left over aspect of the incomplete Roman occupation, the fact that English is as much a German based language as it is Latin has also come to define these islands in relation to its European neighbours and illustrates how we are still living with the consequences of our Roman past today.

A very interesting and thought provoking comparison to modern times, with not exactly the same circumstances but certainly with a similar rhyme, to quote Mark Twain.

Roman Conquests Britain by Simon Elliott is 229 pages which includes the following:

Introduction

List of Tables 

1. The Legions of the Roman Principate

2. Known Auxiliary Cohorts and Alae of the mid-late 2nd century AD

3. Regional Fleets of the Roman Principate

14 Black and White Plates, 16 Colour Plates

Chapter 1: The Roman Military in the Republic and Empire

Chapter 2: Britain in the Late Iron Age

Chapter 3: Julius Caesar and Britain

Chapter 4: The Claudian Invasion of Britain

Chapter 5: Early Conquest Campaigns AD 43 - AD 61

Chapter 6: Later Conquest Campaigns AD 62 - AD 193

Chapter 7: Septimius Severus in Scotland

Chapter 8: Later Campaigns in the Far North

Conclusion

Timeline of Roman Britain

List of References and Bibliography

Index

The book is hardback and published by Pen & Sword and has a cover price of £19.99 but a quick glance on the net shows the title selling from £14.50 to £15.00.

The Two Battles of Copenhagen 1801 and 1807, Britain & Denmark in the Napoleonic Wars - Gareth Glover

 

Well it's only taken me four years to get there, but I've finally got around to reading Gareth Glover's (GG) 'The Two Battles of Copenhagen', this after attending his presentation back in 2018 at Crusade in Penarth announcing the publication of his then new book by Pen & Sword (see link below for my 2018 show report).

JJ's Wargames - Crusade 2018

Before reading Gareth's book I wanted to first read, Danish historian, Ole Feldbaek's 2001 account of the First Battle of Copenhagen that he published in time for the bicentenary of the battle best remembered perhaps as one of Lord Nelson's famous victories, but very much giving a Danish perspective and as GG makes reference to this work in his own account I was glad that I read them both in that order, thus able to recall the various comments in the former book that are referred to and I would definitely recommend interested students of this battle to do the same.

If you have not seen my review of 'The Battle of Copenhagen 1801' by Ole Feldbaek from last year, then follow the link below.

JJ's Wargames - The Battle of Copenhagen 1801

So with my continuity announcement complete, on with my review which to my mind picks up very much from my previous read, but very much coming from a British perspective and from a former Royal Naval officer who has sailing experience in the Baltic, bringing a practical knowledge that relates to the accounts from the time and GG's book is written very much in the tone that I think the two battles were and are seen from a British perspective, as ones that it would have been much better had they not occurred, with absolutely no sense of satisfaction at the death and destruction wrought, or in the neutralising of the Danish fleet.

The first chapter entitled 'Walking the Tightrope of Neutrality' neatly lays out the diplomatic and military situation that influenced Danish strategy at the end of the Great Northern War in 1721, which saw Denmark and Sweden with their power and influence irrevocably reduced to second rate behind that of Prussia and Russia, the two dominant powers in the Baltic region; and with Denmark having to balance her stance between defending her possessions such as Norway against the acquisitive gaze of her old enemy Sweden and the tension on her southern European mainland borders with her possession of the north German state of Holstein.

With Prussia not being a naval power of any consequence, control and influence in the Baltic was a constant source of intrigue and squabbling between the three other Baltic states, really only put to one side when threatened by outside influence, as Denmark, Sweden and Russia tried to work for the common good whilst desperately trying to overlook the severe lack of trust between all of them which inevitably caused a breakdown in the attempts at alliances, termed 'leagues' and a return to rancour and occasionally war.

A Danish merchantman passes a Spanish Pink - Antione Roux
Danish overseas possessions in the 18th century supported a growing and successful merchant fleet trading in high value goods, never viewed as a serious mercantile threat by Britain 

Added to this local diplomatic minefield, Denmark also had her overseas interests to manage with islands in the West Indies (St Thomas, St John and St Croix) purchased from France in 1733, trading posts on the Gold Coast of West Africa (Fort Frederiksburg, purchased from Sweden, Ossu Castle and Frederiksburg) together with trading posts set up in the Indian subcontinent (Trankebar in Tamil Nadu and Frederiksnagore, north of Calcutta) that supported a growing merchant fleet trading in particularly high value goods, much to the irritation of British merchants, but allowing Danish merchant houses and the government to enrich themselves through the eighteenth century, gaining a grudging forbearance from British competition.

Denmark's strategically important position astride the entrance to the Baltic via The Sound made the precarious tightrope of neutrality even more so if Britain should perceive a threat to her naval dominance.
http://www.historyofwar.org/Maps/maps_copenhagen1.html

As far as the Baltic was concerned, Denmark's position, at its entrance from the North Sea, gave her a strategically important position to exert control on traffic, in and out, and although Britain had traditionally shown little interest in the area as long as its merchant fleet retained free access, this became a more serious issue as the indigenous supply of wood in Britain, for ship building, diminished as demand started to soar and a greater reliance was placed on overseas imports, including other naval store items such as hemp and pitch, the best sources of which came from Norway and Sweden for wood and Russia and Poland for the great masts together with hemp and pitch.

Tensions grew further with the Seven Years War that saw Sweden and Denmark favour Britain's arch-enemy France, counterbalanced with a fifty-year trade agreement between Britain and Russia from 1734, that is until Russia and Britain found themselves on opposing sides, but with the mutually beneficial trade of wool for ships stores seemingly preventing a cold war turning hot.

However the tension with Sweden and Denmark saw the first flowering of so called 'armed neutrality' as the two nations came together out of fear for their merchantmen being stopped on the high seas by British men of war by sending a large combined squadron into the North Sea to protect their merchants and in turn send a very strong message to Britain.

Andreas Peter Bernstorff, Danish Foreign Minister 1784-1797

The growing issue that would fester and become a casas belli was that the British were becoming increasingly aware of 'neutral' ships being used by their enemies to circumvent their naval blockades designed to starve their enemies into submission and destroy their commerce. 

The Danes however saw nothing wrong with this subterfuge, which became an increasingly lucrative trading opportunity and armed response in defence of such trade only served to ramp up tensions still further, with the implied threat to Denmark's legitimate trade network by a massive British naval supremacy that could clearly overwhelm any of the individual navies in the Baltic.

Thus in GG's first chapter the road to war becomes clearly mapped out with both sides looking to find ways of either 'turning a blind eye' in the case of Britain, already with her hands full fighting other major European naval foes and desperate to maintain her supply route to stores for her navy and the Danes keen to take advantage of an opportunity and assert their sovereignty whilst avoiding going so far that Britain would feel compelled to take action against them.

The crisis would reach 'fever-pitch' in 1797 with the death of Danish statesman and foreign minister Peter Bernstorff, who had consistently managed to restrain the 'hawks' in the Danish government led by the Crown-Prince and Regent, Frederick, later King Frederick VI and consistently refused the use of escorted Danish convoys which he rightly believed would provoke the British, but with the appointment of his nephew, Christian Bernstorff on his death that year, the Crown Prince's demands were met and escorted convoys were commenced, putting them on, as one Danish historian has described, 'a collision course with the world's most powerful navy'.

Danish frigate Freya 40-guns under Captain Peter Krabbe and a convoy of six merchantmen intercepted off Ostend by a British squadron of five warships led by the 28-gun frigate Nemesis under Captain Thomas Baker

On the 25th July 1800 the Danish frigate Freya under Captain Peter Krabbe and a convoy of six merchants were intercepted off Ostend by a squadron of five British warships led by the frigate Nemesis under Captain Thomas Baker, with the former under strict instructions not to stop if instructed to for inspection by the British.

Firing commenced and after a half hour exchange of broadsides the Freya struck having lost two dead and five wounded with the British having four killed and several wounded and the convoy was taken to the Downs anchorage off Deal.

The Freya and her convoy were later restored to the Danes, but in response the Emperor of Russia, Czar Paul used the incident as a pretext for renewing the 'league of armed neutrality' between the Baltic states of Denmark, Sweden and Russia thus setting off the series of events that would see a British fleet off Copenhagen the following year under orders to neutralise the Danish fleet and assert British freedom of navigation into the Baltic.

The book then recounts the lead up to and the actual Battle of Copenhagen with GG looking at the difficulties of rapidly putting together an expedition to Copenhagen that ideally would have had a large army component to allow Vice-Admiral Sir Hyde Parker the flexibility of a joint naval and army operation to complete his mission; indeed First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord St Vincent advocated landing 10,000 troops to attack and destroy the Danish naval base with the view that a bombardment from a few bomb vessels was unlikely to break Danish resolve, but it seems the government could not muster or support such an operation, an error that would become all too obvious as events would prove.

The complexities of the naval aspects of the operation are well considered as GG explains the issues that had to be overcome in terms of navigation in shallow waters, with the draft of ships over 74-guns making navigation problematic in seas that were also very often becalmed or with light winds, that left large sailing warships vulnerable to attack from swarms of Danish gunboats; to the need for the Admiralty to find 'Baltic specialists', having not operated with a British fleet in the area for over seventy-five years, which prompted the appointment of Parker because of his recent experience planning an expedition there in 1790 during the last crisis to occur.

The choice of the cautious, solid and dependable Hyde-Parker also prompted the appointment of his subordinate and a 'fighting admiral', Vice-Admiral Nelson fresh from his successes at Cape St Vincent in 1797 and the Nile in 1798.

The Battle of Copenhagen seen from the Danish city, April 2nd 1801 - C.A. Lorentzen
The battle can be seen raging in the King's Deep before the entrance to Copenhagen 

Finally the operation was working to a very strict timetable to allow the British to force the Danes into compliance with British terms, before the Russians or Swedes could come to their aid, with the fleet assembling off Yarmouth in late February 1801, and the plan to take advantage of ice free seas in mid-March whilst leaving the Russian fleet still frozen in its more easterly anchorages.

In the consideration of the planning of the attack GG exposes the significant weak point in it, in that the lack of a significant landing force exposed the weakness of the navy, unable to accurately or significantly damage the naval base, or strong enough to sail into its harbour and engage, close up, its shore batteries and fortifications, with the implications of limited options to manoeuvre and with the only real hope of neutralising the Danish fleet by its coming out to meet the Royal Navy in an open water sea battle, something very unlikely.

It is here that GG disagrees with Ole Feldbaek's assertion that the orders were to destroy or remove the entire Danish fleet and its stores, with the 1801 expedition nothing like on the scale of the later 1807 one, which did indeed have those orders and with the 1801 expedition being much more limited in scope to removing the Danes from the League of Armed Neutrality either by negotiation or by force, fair means or foul, thus allowing the British fleet safe passage into the Baltic without having a sizable enemy fleet in its rear, and I must say I find his assessment very compelling.

Nelson's letter to the Crown Prince that opened the negotiated end to the First Battle of Copenhagen in 1801.
‘…Lord Nelson has directions to spare Denmark when no longer resisting but if the firing is continued on the part of Denmark Lord Nelson will be obliged to set on fire all the floating batteries he has taken, without having the honour of sparing the brave Danes who have defended them ….’

From this point the book, having set up the reasons for war and the plan of action, takes the plot forward through the actions leading up to the first battle of Copenhagen, and its eventual climax having seen the British fleet demolish the line of floating batteries and old dismasted Danish ships moored among them, not without a significant casualty bill themselves, but clearly masters of the King's Deep; and throughout GG's narrative, the driving force force and determination to overcome of Nelson's will, shines through in distinct contrast to the frustratingly uncertain and inconstant Hyde-Parker and the Danes looking to delay and put off every demand made on them, in sheer desperation that a Swedish or Russian relief force would appear over the horizon.

As GG goes on to explain, the victory achieved by Nelson in 1801, was incomplete and indecisive and the British fleet only just got away with it in that the Danes lost their reserve fleet but were left with an operational fleet and the final negotiations were still in play as the news arrived of the death of Czar Paul that completely removed the pressure on the Danes to continue the struggle or for the British to assert their naval dominance further into the Baltic, heralding a period of five years of relative harmony.

The final result was effectively a 'technical knockout' for the British, with as Ole Feldbaek stating in his assessment that the League of Armed Neutrality had failed because it was neither armed or neutral, and as GG states clearly, explains why the British government felt compelled to send a much larger force only six years later.

The whole situation in Europe was to change dramatically with the rise of the Emperor of the French, Napoleon Bonaparte, crowned by the Pope in 1804 and his speedy demolishing of all the crowned heads of Europe who opposed his expansion of the French borders, eventually seeing him astride the River Tilsit negotiating his ongoing relationship with the Russian Empire and leaving Britain standing alone in opposition.

Emperor Napoleon and Czar Alexander agree the Treaty of Tilsit on the 7th July 1807

Yet again Denmark found herself in a very difficult corner caught between the struggle of Britain and Napoleonic France and with her neutrality hard pressed as she sought desperately not to give the former any reason for a return visit but as a consequence defying Napoleon's demand that she close the port of Husum in Schleswig to British packet boats connecting Britain to the European postal system that allowed the transit of illicit trade deals, communication with British agents and reports on French operations.

On this occasion however Denmark and the King found themselves more sympathetic to Britain, having a very clear dislike of French dominance and with the correspondence of the Danish Prime Minister, Christian Bernstorff to his envoys abroad betraying his dislike and rejoicing in news of any French reverses, and with the Crown-Prince, in a letter to his brother-in-law, Duke Frederick Christian of Augustenburg, declaring that if Napoleon insisted on Denmark closing her ports to Britain, that she would regard Britain as her natural ally.

But it was over the detention of neutral shipping that tensions between Denmark and Britain would again rise dramatically with 35 Danish merchants taken in 1805, with all but three later released by the Prize Court, 150 in 1806 and a further 31 in the early months of 1807 and very few released, but with the Danes protesting vehemently, their continued practice of selling false papers and concealing prohibited cargoes severely undermined their case with the British authorities.

Interestingly it was an innocuous report to George Canning the British Prime Minister in early June 1807 from Lord Pembroke, the new British Ambassador to Vienna that would start the crisis that would cause the British to finally react, when he wrote about his journey to his new posting and described his landing at Memel to proceed to Copenhagen before the land journey to Austria, and having taken a tour of the Danish shipyards and defences, reporting that they were fully prepared and as many as twenty Danish warships were 'fit to go to sea with all their stores &c named and numbered'

Later evidence would suggest that what he actually saw was Danish ships 'mothballed' with all their stores ready to be embarked in quayside warehouses and in fact Danish records show that in the first six months of 1807 only three ships of the line, two frigates and three brigs had been fitted for sea service; talk about history repeating itself with my mind immediately recalling the Iraq conflict in 2003 and British Prime Minister Tony Blair's 'Dodgy Dossier', justifying another, perhaps less justifiable, invasion by British forces.

Copenhagen under British bombardment on the night of the 4-5th September 1807 seen from Christianhaven

However the ball was rolling and in an existential war such as Britain faced against Napoleon in 1807 , the supposed threat that the French Emperor could potentially lay his hands on twenty Danish warships to enable him to once again threaten Britain with invasion was enough to put plans into operation to neutralise that threat once and for all, with yet more historical similarities springing to mind as another British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill was understandably forced to order a similar neutralising of the French fleet in 1940 at Mirs-el-Kebir, with the threat of a German acquisition.

As attributed to Mark Twain, 'History never repeats itself, but it sure does rhyme!'

With the set up for war outlined GG then takes the story forward with the second Battle of Copenhagen, which more than made up for the deficit of the former operation and conducted with breath-taking speed as the British cabinet discussed options for sending the fleet (later confirmed as 21 ships of the line and 71 smaller naval vessels) on the 10th of July 1807 to its arrival off Copenhagen by the 15th August and with a force of 18,000 troops landed on the 16th August at the small fishing village of Vedbaek, some twelve miles north of Copenhagen.

The demand issued to the Danish authorities explained that France's increased influence on mainland Europe now meant that Denmark's ancient policy of neutrality could no longer be maintained. Therefore the British were determined to remove the Danish fleet to a place of safety, well beyond the reach of Napoleon, and promised the fleet would be returned in the same condition as soon as a general peace was agreed.

William Fadden's Map of the British Positions during the Siege of Copenhagen 23rd August - 6th September 1807
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Topographicalmapsiegeofcopenhagen1807.jpg

Speed was of the essence in such an operation and with equally breath-taking secrecy, leaving the Danes totally unprepared or unaware of the operation, practically until British troops started landing, with the race on to force a capitulation to British demands before a French force could be mustered under the guise of providing relief of the Danish capital, and with the usual practice of Danish delay and obfuscation the use of indiscriminate bombardment of civilian property to force a capitulation by the Danish military.

A section of a contemporary map showing Kioge south of Copenhegen

The Danes quite naturally fought back as best they could with attacks on British siege batteries by Danish gunboats working close into shore and a force of 7,000 militia (North and South Landvaern and 150 cavalry) assembled at Kioge on the 23rd August, roundly defeated by Major-General Sir Arthur Wellesley and the British reserve, with some 1500 militiamen made prisoner.

However despite their best efforts the Danes was forced to capitulate and the necessary articles were signed at 2am on the 7th September, with the British pledging to evacuate Copenhagen and the whole of Zealand within six weeks.

GG states the damage to Copenhagen was immense, with official Danish reports listing some 305 dwellings and one church having been completely destroyed and thousands more receiving some damage, with Rifleman Green quoted after, being shocked by the destruction;

'I was astonished to see the havoc our bombardment had made. Whole streets lay in ruins; churches burnt down; and we had work to get through the streets to the dock-yard, and to go on board, our road being blocked up with bricks, stones, tiles and timber.'

The British troops were indeed appalled by the destruction caused, reflected in their horror of the destruction as described by Captain Leach;

'Callous and insensible must he have been who could have walked through the streets and witnessed the horrors occasioned by the bombardment, and the misery inflicted on thousands of the unoffending inhabitants, without bitterly regretting that our government should have considered it necessary to adopt such rigorous methods.'

The Danish fleet was removed and partially built vessels destroyed in situ, with any salvageable timbers also taken causing an economic collapse in the country leaving Britain with a strengthened hand in the Baltic, with the anger of Russia short lived and reversed with Napoleon's march on Moscow five years later. 

The Gunboat War of 1808-09 saw Denmark wage war on British and Allied convoys in and out of the Baltic using a large and powerful fleet of inshore gunboats supported by sea-going privateers.

The Danes reacted by allying themselves to the fortunes of the French Emperor and clung on to his favour even when events suggested that the time was right for changing sides and joining Sweden and the other European allies in resisting and later destroying the Imperial Napoleonic project; engaging in the Gunboat War of 1808 to 1809 as she replaced her ocean going fleet with a large one of inshore gunboats, backed up by sea-going privateers designed to attack and harass British and allied merchant convoys into and out of the Baltic, and a serious threat to even the largest and most powerful ships in the right conditions.

The Danish threat forced the British to maintain a large fleet in the Baltic during the summer months resorting to convoy tactics that were not completely fool-proof but keeping losses at an insignificant level with as an example 2,210 merchantmen escorted in and out of the Baltic between June and November 1809 without a single loss to enemy action.

Denmark would be the very last of Napoleon's allies to abandon his cause in 1814, signing a peace treaty with Sweden and Britain on the 14th January at Kiel.

In his overview, GG describes the tragedy that;

'. . . pitted two like-minded, independent thinking, feisty and determined peoples, who are both at their best when their backs appear to be against the wall and who recognise these similar traits within each other . . . and few Britons celebrated or enjoyed the victories they gained at Copenhagen.'

'Perhaps these two episodes can best be described as unfortunate family squabbles, that are now best understood for what they were - necessary evils - and forgiven . . . Britons and Danes are kindred spirits and long may it remain so.'

The Two Battles of Copenhagen 1801 and 1807 is 277 pages and consists of the following:

List of Plates (24 Colour pictures of artwork, places and items relating to the battle in the centre of the book).

List of Maps:

Fadden's Map of the Great Belt dated 1807

Map of the Sound dated 1812

Area around Copenhagen from Franz Reilly Map of 1796 (simplified)

Plan of Copenhagen as it looked in 1800

The Attack on Copenhagen, April 2nd 1801

Contemporary map of Copenhagen in 1807, the dark area in the north-western corner representing the area destroyed by fire.

Heligoland and the North German Coast - section of the Thompson Map.

Introduction

1. Walking the Tightrope of Neutrality

2. The Drums Beat 'To Arms'

3. The British Mobilisation

4. Parker Delays

5. Denmark Prepares

6. The Die is Cast

7. The Battle of Copenhagen

8. Battle Continues

9. Winning the Peace

10. Five Years of Relative Harmony

11. Rapid Escalation

12. The Cabinet Deliberates

13. The Fleet Forms

14. The Fleet Arrives in the Sound

15. Danish Preparations

16. British Troops Land

17.The Battle of Kioge

18. The Bombardment

19. The Aftermath

20. Danish Losses Further Afield

21. The Gunboat War, 1808-1809

22. The Swedish Question

23. The Final Years

Overview

Visiting the Scenes Today

Appendices Relevant to the Battle of Copenhagen 1801

Appendices Relevant to the Siege of Copenhagen 1807

Bibliography

Index

I thoroughly enjoyed reading this book and Gareth Glover has an easy-to-follow style of prose that I found developed the story in a logical flow that made picking the book up each time a pleasure to read.

As well as the history the later sections provide some really useful information for those interested in visiting the scene themselves and as someone likely to do so in the next few years I can see this book coming along for the trip.

The Two Battles of Copenhagen by Gareth Glover is published by Pen & Sword books and retails at £25.00 in hardcover but can be obtained at the time of writing anywhere from between £6 for a used copy to £18 for a new one.

Other sources relating to this review:

https://milhist.dk/major-danish-warships-built-holmen-shipyard-1692-1744/

https://www.britishbattles.com/napoleonic-wars/battle-of-copenhagen/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Copenhagen_(1807)

http://www.admiralnelson.info/Copenhagen2.htm

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_K%C3%B8ge

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_Dossier

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_on_Mers-el-K%C3%A9bir