Showing posts with label Books. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Books. Show all posts

Saturday, 27 February 2021

The Medieval Fighting Man: Costume and Equipment 800 to 1500 - Jens Hill and Jonas Freiberg


Some reference books end up becoming turn to ones whenever I'm getting stuck into a painting project, so much so that the book very often ends up perched somewhere close to my painting desk as a ready reference whilst working out the look and detail on a particular sculpt and the best colours to use to bring out the detail.

Last week I added to my collection of books that have started to fall very much into that select group of ready references, namely the Europa Militaria Specials series of Osprey sized paperback books covering the military dress of a particular era or theme as presented by some of the best re-enactment groups around.


The book in particular is 'The Medieval Fighting Man' which is currently on offer from the Naval and Military Press for just £2.99 which is a must buy price in my opinion and when I received it I had intended just to refer to it for this brief review but then I remembered the other books I have in this series that would deserve equal recommendation for the same reason and ones I have used regularly when painting up my collections of Saxons and Vikings and Romans.



The fact of the matter is that these groups of reenactors have made a large contribution to the archaeological evidence that supports how we portray these warriors from such a long time ago in that they have taken a lot of trouble to recreate their equipment and dress and then, when worn, have helped a lot in the understanding of how these warriors may well have worn the gear functionally; rather than simply based on educated guesswork and contemporary illustrations from artists who may never have fought in the gear they portrayed and were getting their information from those who had or had witnessed these warriors in action.


Needless to say this extra information adds to the way modern wargaming figures are now sculpted and the look we can create with our table-top armies, but these pictures of the way the reenactors carry the equipment and the look of it hanging on the body, not to mention the colour of the equipment and dress can really help those of us who want to capture that look in our figures.

My Romano-Dacian collection is about two thirds complete and I have finished my Saxon-Viking collection but may end up adding to it at some time and I have a very large collection of Perry 28mm Wars of the Roses to yet get started on and so these books will feature very much in my projects as they come under the brush.


The sample pictures included here in this post are taken from my latest addition and like the other two on the Romans and Vikings are lavishly full of colour photos like these which are invaluable to the figure painter.


The late medieval selection features these shots of the typical men at arms and poleaxe armed foot knight and there are similar illustrations covering the look of these men across the era from late Viking, the Crusades, and 13th, 14th and 15th century European armies from knights to the common soldier and armed citizen troops, with some great pictures of typical weaponry ideal for working out how to paint that particular crossbow mechanism or arrow shafts painted with a red oxide pigment mixed with linseed oil to protect them from the elements.

The Medieval Fighting Man is 96 pages and consists of the following sections:

Preface
Acknowledgements

Viking Warrior - 8th to 9th Centuries
Carolingian Landowner - Early 9th Century
Scandinavian Trader - 9th to 10th Century
Viking Warrior - Late 10th Century
Norman Miles - 11th to 12th Century
Infantry Serjant - Second Half of 12th Century
Knight Templar of the Third Crusade, 1190
Castellan Knight and Foot Soldier - 13th to 14th Century
Crossbowman - Mid 13th Century
The Longbowman - First Half of the 14th Century
Officer and Foot Soldier, 1485
The Armed Citizen, 1470 - 1500

Bibliography

Each section has text describing the times depicted by each warrior, with more information about their clothing, arms, equipment and their role on the battlefield.

There are some one-hundred and thirty full colour photographs of the re-enactors including full back and front figure portraits mixed with close ups of the gear and other equipment, intermixed with about a half-dozen full colour period examples of artwork that support the look of these men.


If you are the slightest bit interested in painting these early warriors then these books are a goldmine of reference information and if, like me, you have a rather large collection of late medieval types to get stuck into or you're working on those beautiful Footsore Miniature sculpts for the Barons War, then I would definitely recommend checking out the offer from Naval and Military Press in the link above or below.


Next up: More to come on JJ''s as I conclude the posts covering Steve and my fighting of Ardennes'44 with a dramatic battle to end our refight of the first three days of the campaign and work progresses in JJ's Dockyard as the next six ships are fitting out with sails and rigging.

Thursday, 28 January 2021

All at Sea, Naval Support for the British Army during the American Revolutionary War - John Dillon

 

As the saying goes 'Amateurs study tactics while professionals study logistics' and John Dillon's addition to the body of work looking at the the role of the British Royal Navy in what is commonly known as, on this side of the pond, the American War of Independence, adds a very important look at the Cinderella aspect of warfare throughout the ages, namely logistics.

The Oxford English Dictionary defines 'logistics' as 'the branch of military science relating to procuring, maintaining and transporting material, personnel and facilities.'

Simply put, without careful attention to the key aspects covered in the definition of logistics as described, experience tends to show that military expeditions, campaigns and the conduct of a war as a whole is often doomed to failure before the first boot has got onto the ground to use a horrible journalistic cliché, and I promise not to use anymore.

As Dillon's book highlights, the war with her thirteen American colonies coming on the back of a highly expensive but extremely successful conclusion to the Seven Years War in 1763 was for Great Britain a war she neither needed or in the early stages of the dispute believed was a distinct possibility; and as usual following other major conflicts, the savings on military expenditure was well underway, with cutbacks in both the army and navy together with additional taxes designed to pay off the British national debt incurred to fight that war. 

Frederick North, Lord North, and British Prime Minister 1770-1782 - Nathaniel Dance
With frequent requests to the King to be allowed to retire from his position being rejected, Edmund Burke would describe North as 'of admirable parts, of general knowledge, of a versatile understanding, fitted for every sort of business, of infinite wit and pleasantry' but who 'wanted something of the vigilance and spirit of command that the time required.'   

The dispute that erupted in to all out war between the mother country and her colonies, left many on both sides sympathetic to the other, with no clear divide in what was as much a civil war, perhaps the first American Civil War, that left many folks caught up between the warring forces just trying to avoid taking sides one way or the other and with several senior and junior British commanders reluctant to press military action against those they saw as fellow British subjects.

However with a seemingly belligerent attitude from King George III and his determination that the colonies should submit to Parliamentary, and de-facto his authority, the opportunities for concessions and a peaceful resolution quickly and seemingly irrevocably faded with the so called 'Boston Massacre' in 1770, the  burning of HM Customs Schooner Gaspee in 1772, to the arrival in Boston of a British force of four regiments to the one already in garrison along with the boastful Lieutenant General Thomas Gage who had told the King that that would be all he would need to bring the Americans to heel.

Thus military conflict looked more and more likely to be the solution to the impasse, although Gage would soon reel back from his boast, quickly requesting, after his arrival in Boston a force of 20,000 men to get the job done.

Thus we are led through the series of events that led to a war that not many right thinking people at the time were either contemplating or looking for and was probably very avoidable had smarter heads been involved.

The British military authorities and indeed government could not have been less prepared for war than it is possible to imagine and indeed would see British troop numbers increased from 10,000 to nearly a staggering 100,000 men in three to four years as the conflict grew from one of a minor colonial dispute to a full on global war between the Bourbon monarchies of France and Spain, later joined by the Dutch, as European neighbours sort to gain at the expense of British overstretch.

As an historical wargamer interested in this period of British military history and one who has indulged that interest in many a tactical and strategic level game around the war, I found John Dillon's book a fascinating and insightful look at the actual issues faced by the military of all sides but particularly the British, tasked with sending an army overseas with a 3,000 mile long sea journey between it and its supply base, subject to vagaries of enemy ships, wind and tide on a fleet of wooden warships and merchantmen in the era before canned food or any modern method of food preservation, whilst also trying to fight multiple enemies on multiple fronts in an age when communication could be months in the sending and receiving of information, long out of date after its arrival.

The numbers and statistics quoted in terms of supplies, reinforcements, equipment and horses for the British army are truly staggering, with Dillon's analysis for example taking the reader through the requirements for one man's rations over seven days through to what that looks like when supplying provisions for 40,000 men for twelve months, specifically 14,560,000 lbs of flour, 7,280,000 lbs of pork, 1,820,000 lbs of beef, 780,000 lbs of butter etc.

These supplies had to be brought from Britain once the war closed down the opportunity to purchase supplies in America, and note the word 'purchase' as this was not a Napoleonic army living off the land and 'making war pay for itself' to quote a famous French Emperor of later years. Generally British forces sought to purchase provisions locally, in efforts to not antagonise Americans, that is unless they refused to supply the King's forces when force could be used to enforce a request.

In addition to supplying the troops the British authorities would see themselves needing to provide supplies for several thousands of Loyalist civilians forced to evacuate to the safety of British administered coastal areas around places like New York and Charleston.

All this was done, sometimes barely, with the garrison in New York sometimes only several weeks away from running out of key foodstuffs before a relief convoy would arrive to replenish stocks, but this fact alone meant that increasingly British Army commanders were unable to launch major expeditions into the interior through their inability to keep the troops fed once they moved away from their coastal depots.

Dillon describes the lengths gone to, to purchase supplies at home, ensure their preservation and storage over long weeks at sea and thus be still fit for consumption on arrival, with officers charged with identifying poor of bad produce so that reparations could be had from the supplier when traced back, with a surprisingly low failure rate in the good provisioning of foodstuffs.

The stress put on requisitioning enough merchant ships to not only carry supplies but also to move British troops in theatre is described in detail, highlighting the problem for the authorities at home to find enough shipping, particularly exacerbated by the habit of British commanders not releasing merchants to sail home after unloading stocks to be able to pick up and bring out further supplies, but instead being held in American ports to store the supplies carried, through lack of suitable warehousing, or to be used to carry troops on amphibious operations.

Initially this supply operation for the army was carried out by the Treasury who were responsible for putting out tenders to supply contractors such as the marvellously named 'Drummond and Franks' who very soon were advising the government that things would quickly go awry through a combination of the break down in acquiring local supplies from in and around Boston due to 'radical elements' and the nature of the town out on a narrow peninsular with the British troops confined and unable to forage locally.

The fact that the British Army could not conduct operations without the support of the Royal Navy, together with the fact that the navy were a supply and provisioning organisation in their own right, well versed in producing ships and equipment as well as providing provisioning for their ships around the globe, made it an obvious though reluctant decision on the part of the navy, for them to take responsibility for supplying the army as well as their own ships.

The two most prominent figures in the cabinet during the American War of Independence
First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Sandwich (left) and Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for America (right)

Thus after the King and Prime Minister, Lord North  and alongside the much criticised Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for America, whose most prominent failure, among many, was not to have appointed a Supreme Commander of British forces in America and possibly the Caribbean, steps on to the pages of this interesting account the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Sandwich on to whose desk came all the numerous requests for increased supply and troop transport capacity, whilst he busied himself running the naval war with inadequate naval resources and numerous demands on their deployments

In several ways this book splits into two sections that neatly mirrors the changing magnitude of the war as the early chapters focus on the minutia of the British authorities getting their heads around supplying their ever growing forces in America, following the retreat from Boston and the appointment of the Howe brothers to command both land an sea operations as the army commenced operations to capture New York with a view to using it as a base to advance plans to control the Hudson valley up to the borders of Canada and cutting New England off from the wider continent.

The amphibious landings conducted by the Howe brothers at New York, Kipps Bay and Head of Elk stand testament to the ability of the British army and navy to cooperate successfully in combined operations to land and supply large numbers of troops even facing opposed landings and it was in the operations around New York that saw the British opportunity to win the war finally slip away.

The two brothers showed how talented and cooperative command between the two services could bring outstanding results and as Dillon remarks, it is surprising how close Britain came to winning the war in 1776 as the British ran rings around Washington and his outclassed Continental army, only to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory possibly down to the Howe's both being Peace Commissioners, not pressing home their advantage more vigorously, a charge that would cause them both to be recalled home to defend their conduct to Parliament.

With the defeats in the winter of 1776 and the debacle of Burgoyne's invasion as the Howes ignored the original plan to cooperate along the Hudson but decided to evict Congress from Philadelphia instead, the threat of French involvement, at first clandestine, morphed into an outright challenge to British interests and a declaration of war, with the second part of this book changing focus in line with the British military authorities led by Lord Sandwich to shift attention and resources away from America to much more important strategic imperatives such as the defence of Britain's Sugar Islands and the gateway to the Mediterranean, Gibraltar soon to be under siege as the other Bourbon power Spain joined France in 1779.

As the war ramps up with the involvement of Britain's traditional European enemies, Dillon takes more of a focus on the amphibious and naval operations conducted by the various navies, contrasting sharply the brilliantly executed operations at New York, Kipps Bay, and Head of Elk (Philadelphia) by the Howe's, with its precise landing tables for troops reminiscent of D-Day to that of D'Estaing off Savannah and Rhode Island where the lack of experience was painfully exposed.

The Second Battle of Virginia Capes - V Zveg
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:BattleOfVirginiaCapes.jpg
The British inability to secure naval supply line to Cornwallis's army at Yorktown, that alone why Cornwallis was their in the first place was just one of a series of events that predicted how the war in America was likely to end, with supplies and logistics drawing a line under any further British involvement in the thirteen colonies.

However the fact remained that because of a severe lack of supplies, British troops would remain tethered to key coastal towns, supplied by the navy and if poor cooperation between army and navy existed between the commanders, exemplified with the description of Clinton and Arbuthnot, with the Admiral failing to attend a prearranged meeting after Clinton had ridden across the best part of Long Island or with Clinton and Parker off Charleston in 1776 when neither party would join the other for a command meeting on each other's ship, preferring to send letters via a jolly-boat to one another whilst anchored yards apart, then the potential for disaster was only one operation away.

Then if you throw in an Admiral with the worst credentials for such an important command as North America (Arbuthnot) together with the army falling out among itself (Clinton and Cornwallis) then the debacle of Yorktown became the self fulfilling prophecy that the description of previous adventures foretold.

Admiral of the White, Lord George Brydges Rodney - Thomas Gainsborough
Pictured here behind him with the captured ensign of De Grasse's flagship at the Battle of the Saintes,
the Ville de Paris 

In the end the British supply situation was barely holding things together when the peace was finally signed with British garrisons in Charleston and New York having weeks to spare between needing urgent resupply; and Lord Sandwich can take credit for braving the King and many other detractors by insisting on the appointment of a fighting Admiral such as George Brydges Rodney, who for all his many faults knew how to take the war to the enemy at sea and in the end contributed hugely to Britain being able to secure the terms of peace that she did and continue to hold her possessions in the Caribbean and Gibraltar despite the loss of her American colonies.

John Dillon's book is very well focussed on the specifics of what it quite clearly sets out as its brief, namely to look closely at British arrangements around supplying their troops and organising combined operations between the navy and army whilst contending with the other demands of naval warfare during the American War of Independence. 

Thus it is not another book looking purely at the naval operations of that period, and there are plenty of other great books that cover that subject matter, one coming immediately to mind and reviewed here recently on JJ's being  The Struggle for Sea Power, A Naval History of American Independence by Dr Sam Willis and so if you come to this book looking for descriptions of the dramatic naval battles and actions of this period then you might find Dillon's work unsatisfying.

The Battle of the Saintes 9-12th April 1782 - Thomas Whitcombe
The French flagship, Ville de Paris in action at right with HMS Barfleur.
Rodney's victory reasserted British naval dominance and laid the foundation for the further development of British naval tactics exposed during the American War of Independence.

However if you want to get a better understanding of the challenges faced by the British in particular, looking to commit their forces to action in America and elsewhere and the challenges faced in commanding, supplying and maintaining them with the background of the wider war events to give context then this is a great read and I know the next time I am happily moving my forces around the map during a game of Washington's War, my appreciation for what stresses that would have imposed on my logistics chain will be that much better understood.

My only criticism of the book is the poor quality of the maps accompanying the text with the outlines of various land masses barely visible, only really confirmed by the position of dots identifying key coastal towns and cities of the time. However I didn't find myself referring to them that much, being fairly familiar with the places mentioned, but newcomers to the subject might find them slightly irritating.

All at Sea is another really interesting and valuable contribution from Helion & Company and is 293 pages containing the following:

List of Maps

  1. East Coast of America
  2. The English Channel
  3. Boston Harbour
  4. New York area
  5. Philadelphia area
  6. Rhode Island
  7. The Caribbean
  8. Charleston 1780
  9. Yorktown and Chesapeake Bay
Acknowledgements
Introduction
Chapters
  1. Revolt, hostility, and rebellion'
  2. 'Blows must decide'
  3. 'Good, wholesome, and sound'
  4. 'On which the subsistence of the army immediately and entirely depends'
  5. 'Hell is in the forecastle, the devil at the helm'
  6. 'Few people dare to supply us'
  7. 'In bad plight we go to Halifax'
  8. 'Our safety depends on our having a powerful fleet at home'
  9. 'His Majesty's Troops being landed without opposition'
  10. 'The Expectation of war increases here Every Hour'
  11. 'The country that will hazard most will get advantage in this war'
  12. 'Oh God! It is all over'
  13. 'Their Command of the Sea gives them Advantages'
Bibliography
Index

All at Sea is in paperback with a very nicely designed and robust feeling cover, something I immediately noticed when taking it out of the package. At the time of writing it can be purchased from Amazon at £15.51 saving £9.49 on the list price.

Next up: I'm all at sea in the Western Approaches refighting the first naval action of the French Revolutionary War, HMS Scourge versus the French Privateer Brig, Le Sans Culottes as my mate Bob Connor joined me via Zoom to do some remote tabletop wargaming, and much fun it was too.

Wednesday, 6 January 2021

British Frigate vs French Frigate 1793 - 1814 - Mark Lardas/Peter Dennis (Osprey Duel Series)


Let's get 2021 off to a good start with the first book review of the New Year and an Osprey Duel Series book I got for Christmas from my Mother-in-Law, thank you Barb.

I know I have written before how easy it is for those of us who have been in the hobby of historical wargaming for any length of time to take Osprey Publishing somewhat for granted. 

They have always been there, ever since my early days in the hobby back in the mid-seventies, and with improvements in publishing technology and their commitment to recruiting some of the best historians and military artists in the field of military history, have improved their books tremendously since those early first editions, many of which I still treasure, as much for their nostalgia value rather than their content.

Of course with such a large back catalogue of titles to choose from some of these small books are better than others, providing as they do a starter but with lots of pointers to further reading to add to the knowledge and understanding of a given subject.

As mentioned these are small paperbacks usually of just under one-hundred pages with lots of illustrations interspersing the text, providing an introduction to a subject or period and so can be read cover to cover quite quickly, and in this case over two nights during the Xmas break.

A model of the Flore Americaine illustrated in the book, one of the early French frigates from the Seven Years War that pioneered the early development of the new cruiser type of warship.
Photograph by Rama Neko, Wikimedia Commons, Ce-by-sa-2-0-fr

I have to say that I thought this particular title was definitely one of the better ones with a logical progression of chapters looking at the development of the frigate to replace the small 40-44 gun two decker fourth rates that often had difficulties opening their lower tier of gun ports in heavy weather; seeing that lower gun deck given over to crew quarters and storage, which with the increased stores capacity improved the cruising range between stops to re-provision; and, by extending the length of the hull, enabling a longer single gun deck arrangement above it, with slightly fewer guns but all able to operate in all practical weathers, thus increasing the firepower and with the weight saving and longer hull offering improved handling and speed advantages over the old small fourth rates, enabling a very cost and combat effective cruiser.

With the new class of warship finding its niche in the line up of the major world fleets as a cruiser, scout and merchant/transport escort, the race became one of developing the ships into ever larger more powerfully armed units whilst retaining the elements of speed and manoeuvrability that saw a gradual development of first the 20-22 gun 8/9-pdr frigate to the 26-28 gun 12-pdr model with the later 32-36 gun 12-pdr frigate becoming the standard European type of medium frigate superseded in those navies by the 38-44 gun 18-pdr heavy frigate, with the British settling on the 38-gun design after their experience of taking in battle several of the larger French and Spanish 40 gun designs with, to them, little perceived advantage to those respective navies in fighting capability for the extra time and cost involved in building the slightly larger ship.

HMS Endymion was a British built 40-gun frigate seen here exchanging broadsides with USS President in 1815

The British would revaluate this assessment after their experience of encountering the American super-frigates, nearly the length of a third rate with their reinforced hulls of white oak, but often with reduced manoeuvrabilty. The British experimented with a larger 40-gun model with the building of HMS Endymion, but with the development of the carronade and the ability to produce lots of 38-gun Leda Class type heavy frigates with plenty of third rates and medium frigates in support, they saw little need for the more costly American 'Tiger tank' type frigate to police their ever growing world empire.

The frigate concept began as a French idea and they led the world in the eighteenth century in the development of fast sailing and well armed ships, which drew the attention of British designers when they were captured to not only imitate the designs but to adapt them with improvements better suited to British needs.

The access to supplies of suitable oak and pine for hulls and masts favoured the British supply chain and French designers were forced to adapt, using lighter components than in a typical British design, with thinner frames and spaced further apart, leading to long hulls that gave speed through the water but weaker hulls more prone to 'hogging' or bending at the stern and bow with the centre of buoyancy pushing the ship up in the middle, with the weight of any guns on the forecastle and poop making the problem worse.

The Great Guns as illustrated in the book by Peter Dennis illustrating the arrangements for the 8/9, 12 and 18-pdr Long Guns and the British 12, 18 and 32-pdr carronades eventually matched though not very successfully by the French 36-pdr brass obusiers de vaisseaux, later changing to iron carronades similar to British models

As time went by the lead in frigate design shifted from the French to the British, never averse to adopting and adapting French building techniques, something seemingly not copied by French designers and thus with the development of the carronade and coppering of hulls, the British took a distinct lead in the design of these types of ships from the late eighteenth century. 

Thus it would be the French Marine National force of large and medium frigates that posed the greatest threat to British mercantile trade and force projection and against whom the majority of frigate versus frigate engagements would be fought between 1793-1814, although, as the book illustrates, surprisingly fewer that one would imagine, with just forty-five ship to ship engagements illustrated on a great little map of the globe for handy reference.

One of those rare French victories is illustrated by Peter Dennis depicting the moment French boarders 
from MNF 28-gun 8-pdr Baionnaise overwhelmed the upper deck of the British 32-gun 12-pdr frigate HMS Ambuscade off the French Biscay coast, 14th December 1798.

During this time period the Royal Navy enjoyed unrivalled success winning thirty-five of these encounters, with seven described as inconclusive and with three French victories, with the book going on to describe three such encounters in detail, something really handy for those of us messing about developing scenarios to refight on the table.

A section of the map illustrating the positions around the globe of the forty-five Anglo-French frigate actions between 1793 -1814

British Frigate vs French Frigate is 80 pages cover to cover and includes the following chapters:

Introduction
Design and Development
The Strategic Situation
Technical Specifications
The Combatants
Combat
Statistics and Analysis
Conclusion
Further Reading
Index

I really enjoyed this little gem from Osprey, proof of which was that I did indeed read it from cover to cover and yes a significant amount of material was not new to me, but then I have been doing this stuff a long time and have read a few books before coming to this one.

That said Peter Dennis' artwork is as usual worth the cover price alone to inspire my own ideas around this subject and Mark Lardas compliments the ten pieces of colour artwork, diagrams and maps together with forty-nine illustrations, many from his own personal collection that I had not seen before, and with some really interesting stats and comparisons that I know will inform my scenario designs for these type of table-top engagements.

British Frigate vs French Frigate has a cover price of £12.99 but I see Amazon have it listed new for just £8.99 on Prime with free delivery and second hand copies from £5.90 plus postage and packing.

So next up I have the last few Vassal games played before the Xmas break to report on which included a fun campaign game of Rommel in the Desert with Steve and I battling backwards and forwards along the North African coast, followed by a foray into the Wars of the Roses with a game of Columbia's Richard III.

Following that, the French shipyards are at full capacity with six generic third rates on the stocks as I write and I am having fun with the video camera again trying out something new for the new year - more anon.

Tuesday, 22 December 2020

In Pursuit of the Essex - Ben Hughes

 

I have to say that  I came to this book by Ben Hughes with little knowledge of American Captain David Porter and his cruise to the Pacific Ocean other than a top line understanding that his frigate, USS Essex, had severely damaged the British whaling industry in that region off of South America until his cruise was brought to an end by the arrival of HMS Phoebe and Cherub in the bay area off of Valparaiso in Chile on the 28th March 1814.


That together with the fictional account of the cruise by Patrick O'Brian in his account of Captain Jack Aubrey in Master and Commander, The Far Side of the World brought vividly to life in the 2003 film based on the book with Russell Crowe in the role of Jack Aubrey and with the American frigate restyled as an American built French privateer frigate Acheron.

Thus one of the primary reasons for me to get this book was to educate myself about this naval odyssey from the War of 1812 and understand how it was that the war ended up being fought in this part of the world in the first place, not to mention the characters involved in its fighting.

A gorgeous model of the nominally 36-gun USS Essex, with a 128-foot keel of the very tough native White Oak, Essex was heavily up-gunned to 46 guns and armed primarily with 40 x 32-pounder carronades, the other six being 12 pdr long guns mounted on the forecastle and quarterdeck, making the ship a formidable opponent at close range but less so at longer gun range.
https://www.modelships.de/USS-Essex/USS-Essex_eng.htm

The account given by Hughes only proves the point that fact is often more entertaining than fiction and the climax of the book with the battle between the American and British ships and the manoeuvring that led up to it reminded me of the story of another Royal Navy pursuit of another mercantile raider from WWII, namely the Pocket Battleship, Graf Spee that also featured a rather protracted nail biting build up to the final action as that raider was held at bay in another neutral port on the coast of South America looking to break out before other Royal Navy ships appeared over the horizon.

As the great American writer Mark Twain is reputed to have said 'history doesn't repeat itself but it often rhyme's'.

A contemporary model of HMS Phoebe, 36-gun frigate held by the Royal Museums Greenwich depicted in the black and white, rather than yellow ochre chequer board paint scheme that became popular from 1815. Phoebe was not the fastest Royal Navy frigate but carried a formidable armament of 26 x 18-pounder long guns on her main deck together with 12 x 32-pdr carronades on her quarterdeck, 4 x 9-pdrs and 2 x 32-pdr carronades on her forecastle and an 18-pdr and 12-pdr gun mounted on high angle carriages for aimed fire into an enemy's tops. In addition 4 x 2 and 3-pdr swivel-guns were mounted in her tops and two of her launches carried bow mounted carronades. 
https://prints.rmg.co.uk/products/a-full-hull-and-rigged-model-of-the-warship-and-36-gun-frigate-phoebe-1795-l3252-002

Ben Hughes has constructed his account of the cruises of both the Phoebe and Essex from a range of historical records, including primary and secondary sources along with the various ships logs and personal memoirs and journals from those involved and, by alternating his chapters to record the various stages of each sides journey from their home ports to their final meeting off Valparaiso, the book reads very much like an account from an O'Brian novel recording the adventures and dramas that occurred along their way and allowing the reader to gain insights to the similarities and distinct differences between the two navies and the way their men of war operated day to day.

Map from the book illustrating the pursuit of the USS Essex.

Towering over the accounts of both sides forces were the two dominant characters of Captain David Porter of the US Navy and James Hillyar RN and their individual characters along with the way they managed their ships and the missions they were charged with.

Captain David Porter USN - US Naval Academy

Porter comes across as a somewhat typical commander of the early US Navy, impulsive and keen to press his position for promotion by achievement and notoriety and quick to take offense at any challenge with a duel required to settle affairs, be that personal of in a military capacity by bringing his ship along to settle accounts with the enemy.

His management of his ship's company posed challenges in a navy of limited term twelve month volunteers with the motivational benefits associated with volunteer crews in having men serving who wanted to be on the ship eager to earn prize money as recompense for the risks involved, but also with the difficulties of dealing with men close to the end of their sign up period, eager to leave and spend some of that money, sometimes riled up to insolence by other crew members keen to assert their republican rights and not deterred from voicing criticism and complaint.

Captain James Hillyar in a miniature dated between 1808-12
Royal Museums Greenwich 

James Hillyar by comparison makes an interesting contrast, having very strong religious convictions that saw him conducting regular Sunday morning worship with his ships crew, forbidding swearing and bringing a determined discipline aboard ship with resort to the cat where required for occasional acts of drunkenness and insolence to ships officers.

Surrender of the Fort of Tamatave - Thomas Whitcombe

The crew of HMS Phoebe are portrayed for the veterans that they were, with a handful aboard who had been with the ship since 1797 when she had captured the French 36-gun frigate Neride off Brest, the ship having an enviable record of successful engagements which included Trafalgar at which twenty-nine of the crew had served, followed by further cruises to the Baltic and Caribbean with Hillyar taking command in 1809 and with all but a hundred of the crew seeing action against three French frigates on 20th May 1811 at the Battle of Tamatave off Madagascar and the subsequent capture of the island of Java.

After failing to make his planned rendezvous with Captain Bainbridge and the USS Constitution for a joint cruise in the South Atlantic against British commerce, Porter was able to use his discretion and indulge his long held aspirations to be the first American warship to enter the Pacific and a plan he had devised to disrupt British whaling activity and the likely lucrative prize money on offer for not only the captured shipping but also its valuable and highly prized cargo of whale oil.

The British Whaler Britannia leaving Sydney Cove 1798 - Thomas Whitcombe

His activities in an area unprotected by the Royal Navy soon drew the attention of British agents and representatives in the Spanish colonies of the South American mainland as Porter sought to arrange prisoner exchanges and monies for prizes via the Spanish authorities, themselves engaged in the chaotic breakdown of Spain's authority in the region following Napoleon's invasion and occupation of the country and the subsequent Peninsular War.

Alongside the accounts of the captures of the British whalers we are treated to accounts of the wild life encountered by the Essex, and this is definitely not a book for naturalists as the wanton destruction of Galapagos tortoises, seals and other creatures slaughtered by both sides for pleasure or for food makes difficult reading; as does Porter's activities on the Pacific island group known as the Marquesas, renamed in the name of the United States as the Madison Islands where he imposed his will on native islanders using the modern weapons carried by his ships crew to cow opposing tribal groups, whilst supporting others against them who had submitted to his demands.

Meanwhile on orders from the Admiralty to escort a force to evict American fur traders at Fort Astoria on the Pacific mouth of the Columbia River, Hillyar soon found himself under additional orders from the local British naval commander on the South Atlantic station to also use his ships to hunt down and destroy the Essex and the book makes interesting reading as he makes plans to accommodate both sets of orders detaching the 18-gun sloop HMS Racoon to Fort Astoria whilst taking the Phoebe and the Cherub in search of the Essex, culminating with their arrival at Valparaiso on the 8th February 1814.

Both sides seemed equally surprised by the arrival of the other with Porter hastily recalling his shore parties and Hillyar thinking to take the Essex by an immediate attack, ignoring Chilean neutrality, but on closing with the American frigate realising his error, seeing the American at quarters and noting her distinctive carronade armament as he passed close by, coolly hailing Porter with a speaking trumpet and enquiring after his health as the American returned the compliments and held his fire as his enemy turned away whilst presenting a close range bow raking opportunity.

What followed is a fascinating story, as from then until the final action both sides played a game of cat and mouse, setting up lookout positions ashore to watch each others movements, with the two British ships prowling up and down at the mouth of Valparaiso bay eager to be at sail should the Essex attempt to break out, only coming to anchor at nightfall.

During the whole of his cruise Porter had been anxious to fight a British frigate and the opportunity to join the list of US captains that had been victorious in such a fight, issuing a challenge to Hillyar to send Cherub away and that they should meet, ship to ship, outside of neutral waters. 

Hillyar refused the offer to surrender his advantage, despite the protests of his first officer, knowing that with delay the situation would only deteriorate for the American as other Royal Navy ships would arrive in time to seal his fate.

Porter attempted to break out and then, when his attempt failed, set about burning one of the captured whalers to provoke an action, that was technically a breach of the port's neutrality, this followed by nights at anchor with opposing crews singing patriotic songs and calling out insults and political slogans to each other, providing great entertainment to the local townsfolk on shore. 

Eventually the pressure to act was overwhelming and whilst attempting to break out, Essex lost her main topmast and, rather than press on, turned back into the bay only to find Hillyar in no mood to stand off yet again but instead press the action to a resolution and seeing that action brought to a bloody conclusion after a two and a half hour long range bombardment from Phoebe and Cherub that forced the Essex to strike.

The near contemporary illustration of the Essex at bay off Valparaiso with Phoebe and Cherub used for the book cover of Ben Hughes' account.
Beverley Robinson Collection - United States Naval Academy.
The Essex is seen with her main topmast lost whilst trying to escape to open water, flying her banners inscribed ' Free Trade and Sailors' Rights' with HMS Phoebe, supported by the 18-gun ship-sloop Cherub, flying hers inscribed 'God & Country, British Best Rights, Traitors Offend Both'.

Hughes concludes the story with what happened to the personalities, the wounded and the ships after the action and the post war activities of officers and men, putting a full stop to a vivid account of action and adventure.   

I really enjoyed this book and have subsequently picked up an account of the exploits of HMS Racoon that went north to Fort Astoria, with all the implications that eventually had for the establishment of the American-Canadian border on the Pacific west coast.

If you are interested in the naval war of 1812 or warfare in the age of sail generally I think this book is for you and I certainly enjoyed the read.

In Pursuit of the Essex is 242 pages including a very comprehensive index and bibliography list together with four maps, two illustrations of ships of the period, sixteen pages of black and white photos and illustrations together with the following chapters:

Prologue: 'A Prodigious Slaughter'; USS Essex, Valparaiso Bay, 6.30pm, 28th March 1814
Introduction; A Tale of Two Navies

1. 'Yankee Warriors True': Captain David Porter and the Essex 1 September 1812 - 25 January 1813.
2. The South Atlantic: USS Essex, 27 November 1812 - 25 January 1813.
3. 'A finer set of fellows': Captain James Hillyar and the Right Reverend HMS Phoebe, 27 December 1812 - 11 April 1813.
4. Into the Pacific: USS Essex, 26 January 1813 - 11 April 1813.
5. From Tenerife to Rio: HMS Phoebe, 12 April 1813 - 9 July 1813.
6. The Galapagos Islands: USS Essex, 11 April 1813 - 9 July 1813.
7. In the Footsteps of Robinson Crusoe: HMS Phoebe, 10 July 1813 - 6 October 1813.
8. A Matter of Honour: USS Essex, 9 July 1813 - 2 October 1813.
9. Tragedy at Tumbez: HMS Phoebe, 3 October 1813 - 10 December 1813.
10. Death in Paradise: USS Essex, 4 October 1813 - 13 December 1813.
11. The Valley of the Unknown God: HMS Phoebe, 24 November 1813 - 8 February 1814.
12. The Standoff, 13 December 1813 - 28 March 1814.
13. The Battle, 27-28 March 1814.
14. The Aftermath, 29 March 1814 - 25 December 1814.
Epilogue: Loose Ends, 7 July 1814 - 14 August 1870.

Notes
Biliography
Index

In Pursuit of the Essex is hard cover and published by Pen & Sword at a list price of £25 but is available through Amazon for under £10, so might make a nice Xmas present for someone.

Well it's full speed ahead to Christmas and we are trying to make it as normal a festive season as possible given all the travel and mixing of household restrictions the UK is currently going through at the moment. 

Whatever the situation I will be looking to keep on blogging through this situation and will be reporting on games and plans for 2021 in the next few weeks of the holiday, not to mention work continues a pace in JJ's shipyard as six 74-gun third rates have rolled down the slipway to be fitted out for service in His Majesty's Royal Navy - more anon.

Wednesday, 9 December 2020

Admiral Satan, The Life & Campaigns of Suffren - Roderick Cavaliero

 

I first read this book in the early nineties soon after it was published in 1994 and I see from the price tab on the inside of the dust jacket that I paid the princely sum of £29.95 which was 'a few bob' back in those days', which prompted me to see how much a second hand copy would be today, given that it is long out of print and to my astonishment found six second-hand copies on Amazon going from anywhere between £250 to £350.

Of course as a military history fan, and I suspect I'm not alone in this, I don't view my books for the monetary value they may or may not have but enjoy having them for themselves and the information and insights they give into a particular subject and I tend to reread and consult my books many times after the first read to inform my hobby and enjoy the sheer pleasure of reading a good book.

It would seem that books in English about the French naval commander are about as rare as hens teeth which might explain why this particular book, the first biography of Suffren in English, has such a high second-hand value, providing as it does a detailed insight into the character and life of perhaps the best French naval commander of the age of sail, but also one respected and admired not only by his countrymen but also by his enemies as well.

La Chevalier de Suffren - Alexandre Roslin
A rather romanticised image of de Suffren, thought to be seen here in his forties and before he became the very corpulent man displayed in his portraits from his later years.

Pierre Andre de Suffren was born on the 29th July 1729 to one of the oldest French aristocratic families in Aix en Provence, near Marseille in the south of France and like many of the nobility of this part of the world was a member of a very unique aristocratic club, The Knights of Malta, tasked with defending the western Mediterranean from the advance of Islam and more practically the ravages of the Barbary Corsairs; with him beginning his apprenticeship to the sea at the tender age of fourteen and induction into the College for the Gardes Marines in Toulon, King Louis XIV equivalent to the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth, for the training of future naval officers.

Like many of the Great Captains, it was an early experience of how not to command that had its most beneficial effects on the journey to becoming a great leader and Suffren's experiences as a young French naval officer would see him captured twice by the British, an experience that would cause him to develop his talents from his observations and fired by the dispair of being a prisoner and his desire to have revenge for his experience on France's traditional enemy on land and sea.

For me, it was the descriptions of these early pivotal experiences that I found the most interesting, to see what shaped the man and his determination to have the French navy, certainly under his command, move from the passive defence to the aggressive attack and develop his ideas and intent to destroy the enemy fleet. 

The other really interesting point described by Cavaliero is his account of the French navy that Suffren served in, was its very strict code of aristocratic entitlement to command, particularly among the members of the Gardes Marines, which engendered still further a sense of self entitlement based on social rank rather than any form of meritocracy. Thus men of any competence and ability, but coming from outside of this very elite club, found progression within the French navy to senior command difficult if not impossible.

This description stands in bleak contrast to the British Royal Navy that also played host to advancement based on social rank and a case of who you knew rather than what you knew, but advancement in the Royal Navy was never so elitist and men with talent and ability from more humble middle ranking families could with patronage progress to the highest ranks of command based on their ability and could raise their status through the prize system of rewarding success and encouraging an aggressive intent broadly among its commanders and men by sharing the rewards to all involved.

Suffren would also see his first battle as a fourteen year old Garde-Marine, that was to make a deep impression on the young man.

The Battle of Toulon fought in February 1744 during the War of Austrian Succession was regarded as a fiasco in British circles, seeing as it did the engagement of the Spanish Mediterranean squadron, later supported by the neutral Toulon based French squadron, by the British Mediterranean squadron in a disorganised attack that left the latter force badly damaged and forced to retreat back to its base in Minorca surrendering control of the area to Spanish forces who afterwards successfully reinforced their army operating in Italy.

Plan of the Battle of Toulon 11th - 22nd February 1744

The aftermath of this inconclusive battle would see the British court-martial two admirals, ten captains and four lieutenants, with the commander Admiral Sir Thomas Mathews convicted of the charges of poor planning and conducting an ill-tempered and unwise attack and being dismissed from the service

However from Suffren's perspective Mathews had been let down after his van squadron had failed to close on the Spanish centre and when he, leading the attack by example, found himself poorly supported by his junior commander Rear Admiral Richard Lestock who had let his rear van fall back some eight miles and then attacked the neutral French squadron bringing up the rear, so failing to be in position to support his commander who was rightly, in Suffren's opinion, trying to batter his way into the Spanish centre and properly supported could have destroyed his opponents.

The attack made by the British flagship HMS Namur 90-guns running down to attack a ship twenty guns heavier than herself supported by HMS Berwick 70-guns, under the command of a certain Captain Edward Hawke made a great impression on the young Suffren and reinforced his opinion of the defects of the doctrine of the line and the result of not attacking in force and with decision.

It would be a meeting with Rear Admiral Sir Edward Hawke leading his squadron at the Second Battle of Cape Finisterre on the 25th October 1747 and the shock of capture that would be the next significant learning point for the young French officer serving aboard the Monarque 74-guns and confirmation of the principle of attacking in force and with decision.

The Second Battle of Cape Finisterre 25th October 1747 - Pierre Julian Gilbert
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Combat_naval_bataille_cap_finisterre_octobre_1747.jpg 

Admiral Henri-Francois des Herbiers had been ordered to escort 250 transports to Canada and left Rochefort with his squadron of eight ships of the line on the night of the 15th October 1747.

The French force was spotted at dawn on the 25th October by Hawke's squadron which had been patrolling in search of them and he quickly brought his ships over the horizon revealing his force of fourteen ships of the line causing des Herbiers to order the convoy to scatter whilst he put his squadron into line of battle to receive the enemy threat.

To his horror he suddenly saw the British squadron divide and begin to double the French line from the rear to its van and Suffren, aboard the third ship in the line was to experience the 'bitter misery' of being engaged from both sides as des Herbiers 'gave himself up to be crushed' to save his convoy.

Suffren would recount in later years the detail of the action with the Neptune 70-guns, Fougueux 64-guns, Severn 56-guns and Monarque assailed by eleven ships to windward and four to leeward, with action joined at 11.30; Hawke reduced the Severn; at 14.30 Fougueux hauled down her colours; at 15.00 Monarque, with her captain dead, surrendered to the Nottingham and Edinburgh and fifteen minutes later the Neptune also with her captain killed struck to the Yarmouth.

The French rear had collapsed under the attack and within another two hours Hawke had taken the Trident 64-guns and Terrible 74-guns leaving just the flagship Tonnant 80-guns and the Intrepide 74-guns to escape into the darkness with the latter having lost all her topmasts and had her sails cut to ribbons, leaving Suffren captured and on his way to England as a prisoner to await exchange.

The Capture of the Lys and Alcide, 8th June 1755 - Royal Museums Greenwich
HMS Defiance can be seen firing into the Lys, beyond them HMS Dunirk is in action with the Alcide with a British merchantman seen approaching on the left.

The next description we get of the shaping of the young Ensign Suffren is just prior to the start of the Seven Years War, and of him recently back from an Atlantic foray and now under the command of Admiral de Bois de la Motte aboard the Dauphin Royal, part of the eighteen ship expedition to take reinforcements of troops to French Canada in 1755 that evaded the attempts at interception by British Admiral Boscawen apart from three ships that included the Dauphin Royal; which became separated from the fleet in fog and saw two of them, the Lys and the Alcide, taken by Boscawen, leaving the Dauphin Royal and Suffren to return to Brest with news of the action and a following declaration of war by both countries soon after that saw the actual commencement of the Seven Years War.

The disillusioned young ensign wrote soon after to his cousin in Marseilles suggesting he purchase him a vessel for him to ply a privateering voyage off the coast of America, suggesting that privateers were not looked for off the coast and that he could do more useful damage to the enemy.

However Suffren stayed in the service and was promoted to Lieutenant aboard the Orphee 64-guns, part of the French squadron in Toulon under La Galissonniere and part of a surprise attack on Minorca.

The British and French met on the 20th May 1756 and it was from the quarterdeck of the Orphee leading the French rear division that Suffren had a grandstand view of the infamous battle that cost Admiral Byng his life, executed on his own quarterdeck for his perceived failures.

The Departure of the French Fleet for the Expedition to Port Mahon, Minorca 10th April 1756 - Nicolas Ozanne
The French 80-gun ship Foudroyant shown in action as part of the fleet commanded by the Marquis de la Galissonniere which included Suffren aboard Orphee 64-guns

As Caviliero describes, La Galissonniere's sole objective was to protect the Duc de Richelieu's expeditionary force on the island thus seeing him take a lee position to Byng's fleet, presenting, as it soon occurred to Suffren, the perfect opportunity for the British admiral to run down upon the French line against selected targets doing irreparable damage to those French ships before those astern could come to their assistance.

Early copper plate engraving of the Battle of Minorca - First position of the British and French Fleets at 14.00 on 20th May 1756.

However, as Suffren observed, Byng chose to advance obliquely with the wind gauge to engage in a classic line versus line action with his van arriving first into range having its rigging and masts shot to pieces as it advanced on the leading French ships firing on the uproll. Indeed to Suffren's eye it was only the incompetence of La Galissonniere for not taking advantage of the shot up British van by tacking to windward of it and finishing it off, but instead continued his course that allowed Byng to break off to lose not only Minorca but his own life.

As the author highlights 'La Galissonniere had acted with perfect correctness by the book: his fleet was there to escort the expedition to Minorca and protect it while it was there. This could be served by keeping Byng at a distance, not by destroying him.'  going on to point out that; 'A French admiral could say, without fear of reproach, that if, despite every care and precaution I am attacked by the enemy, I shall fight with all glory possible. But I shall do better to avoid action.'
 
Battle of Lagos Bay 18th August 1759 - Richard Paton
HMS Namur, Boscawen's flagship can be seen, third from left as the British squadron closes to contact.

The next action Suffren found himself in only reinforced his opinion of how badly the effects of this passive approach could impact on a naval force's ability to carry out it's missions when faced by an aggressive enemy.

In August 1759 Suffren was serving aboard the Ocean 80-guns and flagship of Admiral Comte de la Clue's Toulon squadron which had spent six months cooped up in the Mediterranean base due to the blockade imposed by British Admiral Sir Edward Boscowan who was finally forced to break off and return to Gibraltar in July to re-supply.

Under orders to join forces with the Brest squadron and escort an urgent convoy to Canada, de la Clue attempted to break out past Gibraltar, hoping to evade Boscawen's observation, but was spotted by a British frigate and the fifteen ship French force, reduced to seven following the rest losing contact the previous night, found itself being chased by Boscawen's eighteen strong squadron.

A  running battle ensued as Boscawen ordered his fastest ships to press on while the others came up as best they could and by 14.30 on the 17th August the Centaur 74-guns was engaged losing half her crew all her topmasts and her hull riddled with shot, in a four hour fight before finally striking.

Her action looked likely to allow the other French ships to break off, all be it with de la Clue, losing his leg in the fighting, forced to move his flag from the Ocean following her battering from HMS Namur, but seeing the surviving French ships make their way into Lagos Bay and the sanctuary of neutral Portuguese waters.


However Boscawen, believing correctly that it would be easier for the British government to apologise for a breach of Portuguese neutrality rather than for France to replace its lost ships pressed his attack and after a few hours fighting had taken two of them and left two others as burning wrecks, including the Ocean and with Suffren taken prisoner by the British for a second time.

Thus we have the formative years of  Pierre-Andre de Suffren mapped out in the first two chapters of part one of the book which then, after covering a period in the wilderness for Suffren as he contemplated a life commanding the Mediterranean galley fleet of Malta against corsairs on the North African coast,  goes on to look at the continued effects of the French approach to naval warfare on and into the American War of Independence; with Suffren rejoining the French navy and seeing the worst of its system continuing under the tutelage of the Comte D'Estaing a former soldier turned sailor for the campaign to Rhode Island and St Lucia in 1778 followed by further failure and recriminations with American allies at Grenada and Charleston the following year.

Dutch Admiral Michiel de Ruter 1667 - Ferdinand Bol (National Maritime Museum)
The great Dutch admiral who caused a lot of problems for the English navy in the Anglo-Dutch wars of the seventeenth century was very much a role model for the young Suffren and inspiration for the campaign he planned to take against the British in the Indian Ocean from 1781.

Desperate for a chance to put into action and demonstrate to the French authorities and wider navy his thoughts of how to take the battle back to the British in a more aggressive approach to naval warfare based on his own experiences and on that of his personal hero Michiel de Ruter, Suffren finally found himself in the right place at the right time.

Comte D'Estang, who on his return home had recommended Suffren to the French command as an officer with great potential and promise for higher command, was replaced as the French revised their naval strategy against Britain under a new regime headed by Naval Secretary of State Castries.

Charles Eugene Gabriel de la Croix, marquis de Castries and Marshal of France - Joseph Boze
Castries was appointed Secretary of State of the Navy on the 13th October 1780 overseeing the reorganisation of the fleet and a new naval strategy to better support the Americans and blockade the bulk of the British Royal Navy in home waters. With Dutch entry into the war and the threat to French possessions in India should the Dutch colony at the Cape fall into British hands, Castries needed a commander to take a French expedition to the Indies.

Appointed by Castries on the 4th of March 1781, leapfrogging thirty-nine captains ahead of him in the lists, Suffren landed the command to take five ships via the Cape with French troop reinforcements for its Dutch garrison, to join the squadron of Comte d'Orves based in Ile de France and would be under his command for operations against the British squadron under Admiral Sir Edward Hughes and in support of French troops fighting in alliance with Haidar Ali Khan against the British held confederacies of Bombay and Madras.  

Events would take a hand with the early death of d'Orves that would see Suffren confirmed as his successor to lead the French expedition, as Cavaliero's book recounts it in great detail covering the battles of Porto Praya, 16th April 1781, Sadras, 17th February 1782, Provedien, 12th April 1782, Negapatam, 6th July 1782, Trincomali, 3rd September 1782, and the final action, Cuddalore, 20th June 1783.

These battles made Suffren famous and are well documented elsewhere, but the detail that Cavaliero brings to the account that links them is Suffren's struggle to master his command as he comes up against the resistance of his captains from the Gardes Marines to simply comply with his instructions but seemingly go out of their way to frustrate his plans almost at every turn; to his energy brought to the problems of being a minor theatre commander working with a lack of supplies, dispatched with poorly fitted out and old ships, against an enemy with a major base for fitting ships out and having their fleet coppered.

Coupled with these issues we see a commander leading from the front and attacking with the wind looking to have his ships mimic the tactics demonstrated to him by Sir Edward Hawke at Cape Finisterre in 1747 by doubling the rear of the British squadron often only to find that these tactics were beyond the capabilities of his captains and their crews used to operating in line ahead and more comfortable mimicking the tactics of Sir Thomas Mathews at Toulon in 1744.

Suffren comes across as a brave commander and an insightful one about naval tactics if not exactly an innovator, with Mahan describing Suffren's view of tactics as 'a veil for timidity'; but although he understood well the Nelsonian principle that the prime task of a naval force was to destroy that of the enemy he was no 'driller of ships',  unable to train his men and lead his subordinates to be able to operate in a way they would know their commander would want them to do in any situation where they were left to their own decision.

The Battle of Sadras 17 February 1782 - Dominique Serres
The first of Suffren's five battles fought against Sir Edward Hughes in the Indian Ocean 

As the title of the book suggests, Suffren could be a hard task master, nicknamed 'Admiral Satan' by his Lascar sailors for his sometimes brutal command of them and with Cavaliero describing him as a bully to his captains, breaking the careers of three of them, and rightly it seems to me, sending them home in disgrace and mentioning an anecdote of his command style at Cuddalore when he moved his flag to the frigate Cleopatre and, when seeing a ship slow to get into her position, bellowed across the water with a speaking trumpet, 

'Get into place! If you are afraid of English bullets, then you will feel some French ones.'

He was not a tactical innovator and was not looking to break the line and bring on a Nelsonian pell-mell battle but often simply to make best use of the wind gauge to attack the weakest part of the enemy line and preferably double it and overcome it before other parts of the enemy line could come to its succour, but it stands as a sad testament to his record that the battle where his squadron performed best was in its final meeting off Cuddalore where he was forced to settle for a straight forward line versus line engagement, something his ships crews were perfectly familiar with and thus able to give a bloody, for them and the enemy, but inconclusive account of themselves.

The Battle of Negapatam, 6 July 1782 - Dominic Serres (Royal Museums Greenwich)
The battles fought between Suffren and Hughes were hard fought with casualties at Negapatam amounting to 77 dead and 233 wounded on the British side to 178 dead and 602 wounded on the French with the carnage reading more like an account of a battle between twenty to thirty ships aside rather than the dozen in each force that fought, with for example Rodney's casualties at the Saintes only amounting to 243 killed and 816 wounded in comparison.

Sadly for Suffren, he was no Nelson and his ships, captains and crews were nowhere near the effective weapon that Nelson would wield at the Nile, Copenhagen or Trafalgar, but it should be no surprise that on the eve of Trafalgar Nelson was rereading his copy of a naval treatise by a Scottish Laird, John Clerk of Eldin illustrating the tactics adopted by Suffren at Sadras and Provedien as the right ones to have adopted and which the British admiral was soon to demonstrate the efficacy of in his own plan of attack.  

However Villeneuve and his Combined Fleet were a poor comparison to Sir Edward Hughes and the British squadron in the Indian Ocean under whose command Suffren faced an equally determined enemy commander with captains, crews and ships often superior to the French in sailing and gunnery ability and able to easily give as good as they got knowing that supplies and reinforcements were more available to them than their enemy, but with Suffren making up the difference and in the end causing a close run thing for the British possessions in India.

The threat that Suffren posed and the scare he caused made sure that India became a priority in British strategy for the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic War and explains the effort made to stop French activity to invade Egypt, an early assault to retake the Cape from the Dutch and the British offensives in India to finally crush the Mysorreans under Haidar Ali's son and successor, Tipu Sultan and later the Maratha Confederacy and the campaigns of a certain young Sir Arthur Wellesley, to ensure no French support for Indian allies against the British colony.

The Battle of Cuddalore 2oth June 1783 - Auguste Jugelet
The last of five furious battles between Suffren and Hughes, fought after the peace had been signed

Likewise the French desperately searched for another Suffren to lead their naval effort in the wars that followed with the French administration and later Napoleon selecting men who had served under him in the Indian campaign; men such as a young frigate captain, Lieutenant Villaret-Joyeuse who would have a brief moment in command against Admiral Howe in the Battle of the Glorious First of June; and the young Charles Alexandre Leon Durand Linois who as an Admiral would be sent back into the Indian Ocean to recreate the effect of Suffren in that theatre for a desperate Napoleon, only to have the French commander plumb new depths of incompetence by snatching defeat from the jaws of victory at the Battle of Pulo Aura in 1804, and his mistaking Indiamen of the British China Fleet for Royal Navy 64-gun third rates; and being driven off before discovering their true identity, which no doubt would have left Suffren turning in his grave had it not been destroyed by a French Revolutionary mob in 1792 (and we think we have problems with statues being pulled down?).

My first encounter with the exploits of Suffren came in the mid eighties with my purchasing of the old Avalon Hill board game 'Iron Men and Wooden Ships' which has a linked campaign of games recreating his battles in the Indian Ocean, and my desire to know more about this French commander prompted me to buy this rather expensive book, but I am very glad I did as it inspired my collection of 1:1200th Langton models based on his campaign and, following this rereading, I am likely to renew that interest later in another scale, so can heartily recommend getting this book should the opportunity arise and the pocket allow.

My 1:1200th Langton Suffren v Hughes collection of models for the refight of Provedien we ran at the Devon Wargames Group in 2014
http://jjwargames.blogspot.com/2014/10/battle-of-providien-devon-wargames-group.html

Admiral Satan, The Life and Campaigns of Suffren is 322 pages from Preface to Index and consists of the following:

List of Illustrations:
Portraits of Suffren, Hughes, Suffren meeting Haidar Ali, Sir Eyre Coote, The Battle of Cuddalore, Indians from the Coast of Malabar by the Mediterranean Shore, Bust of Suffren and a photo of a Letter from Suffren to Grand Master de Rohan 3 January 1777.

List of Maps and Diagrams
Maps
The Carnatic, 1779-83
South India and Ceylon

Diagrams
The Battle of Porto Praya, 16 April 1781
The Battle of Sadras, 17 February 1782
The Battle of Provedien, 12 April 1782
The Battle of Negapatam, 6 July 1782
The Battle of Trincomali, 3 September 1782
Cuddalore, 13-15 June 1783
Cuddalore, 16-17 June 1783

Preface
Prologue

Part I: Apprenticeship to Failure
1. Beginnings, 1729 - 47
2. Malta, Minorca and Lagos Bay, 1747-60 
3. War in the Mediterranean, 1760-78
4. Rhode Island and St Lucia, 1778
5. Grenada and Charleston, 1779
6. Straining at the Leash, 1780-81

Part II: Passage to India
7. Stormclouds in India
8. Porto Praya, 16 April 1781
9. Race to the Cape
10. Onward to India

Part III: The Duel of Giants
11. Admiral Hughes
12. The Battle of Sadras, 17 Fenruary 1782 (1)
13. The Battle of Sadras (2)
14. Haggling with Haidar Ali
15. The Battle of Provedien, 12 April 1782
16. The Marquis de Bussy
17. Keeping the Coast
18. Suffren's Shame
19. The Battle of Negapatam, 6 July 1782
20. Suffren Meets Haidar Ali
21. Trincomali Taken
22. The Battle of Trincomali, 3 September 1782
23. Waiting for Bussy
24. Winter 1782-83
25. Bussy in India
26. The Siege of Cuddalore
27. The Fleet to the Rescue
28. The Battle of Cuddalore, 20 June 1783
29. The War is Over
30. The Last of a Crusader

Epilogue
Appendix: The Battle Squadrons
Gossary
Notes
Bibliography
Index.

Now out of print, you can still pick this book up, but it will cost a bit more than the normal reference work with the cheapest option I've found recently, a copy for £50 on Ebay, but if you are interested in a classic naval campaign in the age of sail then this book is a must read. 

If like me you might be interested in playing the battles or indeed running a miniatures campaign then David Manley's campaign covering Suffren v Hughes in the Indian Ocean is available on PDF from the Naval Wargames Society.


Sources referred to in this post: