Revenge in the Name of Honour ,The Royal Navy's Quest for Vengeance in the Single Ship Actions of the War of 1812 - Nicholas James Kaizer

I recently reviewed another War of 1812 title, 'Lord's of the Lake', covering the naval war on Lake Ontario by the Canadian historian Robert Malcomson, see the link below;

http://jjwargames.blogspot.com/2021/05/lords-of-lake-naval-war-on-lake-ontario.html

In the preamble to that review I remarked about my apprehensions when choosing titles to read covering this early 19th century struggle, between the two great English speaking nations of the world, given the national bias that has been a feature of some of the works in this area and that Canadian historians have brought an interesting and fresh look at the war.

So it was with great interest that when purchasing Lords of the Lake I also picked up another naval history on the theme of 1812 by another Canadian historian, Nick Kaizer, a Halifax based historian from Nova Scotia, a part of the world that took a front seat in the maritime clashes between Britain and the United States with Halifax being home to the British North American Squadron during the war.

https://nicholasjkaizer.ca/revenge-in-the-name-of-honour/

The title, 'Revenge in the Name of Honour' captures one of the key themes of this study of the single ship actions at sea and in particular the actions between the opposing frigates, picking out as it does the peculiar nature of these actions to capture the imaginations of the American and British public at the time, despite the fact that the war as a whole and these small scale battles at sea had little to any worthwhile strategic effects on the outcome of the war or the larger conflict of the Napoleonic war that was the main focus of the British Royal Navy at that time.

As Kaizer points out, this aspect is very difficult for a modern audience interested in these actions to fully comprehend, especially from a British perspective, where the national war aims of defending an independent Canada, denying the American demands on rights of maritime navigation and forcing peace negotiations through blockade, bankruptcy and the defeat of Napoleon were all met.

The USS Constitution, 'Old Ironsides' as she became known after 18-pdr shot from HMS Guerriere was observed to bounce off the American frigate, seen here as the oldest naval warship in commission and still afloat, in Boston harbour in 2006.
 https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:USS_Constitution_Departs.jpg
An anonymous British lieutenant aboard HMS Guerriere commented to the Naval Chronicle after the action with the Constitution;
"No one that has not seen the Constitution would believe that there could be such a ship for a frigate, the nearest ship in the British navy, as to her dimensions and tonnage, is the Orion, of 74-guns...."

The fact of the matter was that despite all those factors, the Royal Navy through its dominant position at sea established in the French Revolutionary War and to the climax of Trafalgar in 1805 had established an aura of invincibility in the minds of the British public and those in its wider empire, particularly Canada, and that invincibility induced a feeling that British ships and particularly frigates should simply win every time, no matter what the opposition.

In addition, the record of success against European navies had seemingly caused that feeling of invincibility to permeate through the ranks of a very large Royal Navy, now engaged in reaping the benefits of its dominance by policing the high seas against small scale incursions by France and her allies and supporting the main British land offensives in the Peninsular War and those of her allies in eastern Europe as the war turned against Napoleon; with it seems many Royal Navy commanders thinking that they only needed to run up their colours to defeat any enemy force encountered no matter what its size in comparison to their own vessel, with no heed to training their crews in competent gunnery or sailing skills.

Kaizer's account of the court-martial of the commander of the 18-gun Cruizer-class brig HMS Epervier, Commander Richard Wales, after loosing his ship in action with the 20-gun sloop USS Peacock, whilst escorting a convoy off the coast of Florida, makes remarkable reading, revealing a captain who, among other facts, never trained his crew on the guns by firing live ammunition, preferring to run through mock drills and thus save money on the cost of expended shot and powder.

The action between the USS Peacock and HMS Epervier reveals how badly commanded and trained some Royal Navy ships had become through complacency after years of victory.

This lack of training by Wales not only meant that his crew was totally unprepared for the shock of firing their guns in anger and not practiced at aiming their fire, but also that the corroded bolts anchoring the guns, after the brig had been raised following its sinking in Halifax during a hurricane, were only revealed once she was in action with the Peacock rather than if she had preacticed with them in the first place!

With this overall picture underpinning the War of 1812, Kaizer sets the scene for the shock delivered to a British government and Royal Navy, unprepared to meet the threat posed by the tiny American naval force of six frigates supported by a handful of smaller sloops, and in particular its squadron of three heavy frigates, Constitution, President and United States.

The book documents the series of naval engagements that occurred through the conflict, detailing each one, the subsequent Royal Navy court martials and enquiries and US reactions that followed each action and the consequences that followed for the commanders involved, whilst capturing the wider public reactions in the press and various naval journals that voiced opinion about them; showing the range of opinion and the differences between those in British and American naval circles and that of the wider British press compared to that circulating in Halifax often forced to rely on early news of a British defeat from American papers and reports mixed with Haligonians concern and pride for crew members serving in the North American Squadron.

Captain James Dacres, commanded HMS Gurriere
in her action with USS Constitution 19th August 1812

Perhaps the most interesting opinions of the first encounters with the US heavy frigates are those of the captains of the British frigates, Gurriere, Macedonia and Java and the conclusions they drew for their respective defeats. Whereas Captain James Dacres of the Guerriere focussed on his misfortune and concluded with a bold claim to look forward to causing a different outcome should he get a similar opportunity, Captain John Carden emphasised the superior dimensions, broadside and crew size of the USS United States and initially the Admiralty concluded that;

'under the right conditions and with the right tactics an 18-pounder frigate had the ability to tackle and defeat a 24-pounder adversary at close action'.

The final testimony of Lieutenant Henry Chads, following the death of Captain Henry Lambert commanding HMS Java, reveals a crew of landsmen worked hard to upgrade their sailing skills and despite only being exercised on the guns once during the voyage out to India managed to put up a good fight when she encountered the USS Constitution off the coast of Brazil on the 29th December 1812; with Java getting the better of her opponent in the early exchanges, cutting away some of the American's rigging and smashing the ships wheel whilst stern raking her with her fire and proving the superior sailor.

USS Consttution vs HMS Java - Patrick O'Brian

Indeed Commodore William Bainbridge was struck down by musketry from the Java as she passed close by, but the damage to Java's rigging eventually caused her to miss a tack whilst attempting to stay on the stern of the American frigate and she was caught whilst attempting to pass through the wind and suffered a devastating stern rake in return.

The respective tracks of HMS Java and USS Constitution.

What comes out from the reactions to the successful American actions, particularly involving the large US frigates is a sense of disbelief, followed by rationalising (rational-lies) the reasons for the defeats, ranging from more guns on the American ships, larger crews, to just plain bad luck that would be reversed on the next occasion.

Once the realisation had sunk in that the American large frigates and sloops were a much more formidable design than first imagined, with the large frigates in particular giving them the structure and strength of a third rate and carrying heavier (24-pdr) and far more guns in general than their frigate rating of 44-guns would seem to suggest, a more practical approach to dealing with the threat emerged; specifically leading to a directive from the British admiralty to avoid tackling these larger vessels one to one with the more common 18-pdr British 38-gun fifth-rates, but to resort to blockade with multiple ships on station supported by the odd third-rate, fast sailing, 74-gunner.

However this more considered approach to managing the American problem, whilst the British/Canadian military successfully dealt with US invasion attempts and Napoleon was driven back behind France's pre-1793 borders, didn't deal with the chivalric code that permeated both American and British naval captains, with a few exceptions, that demanded that the American ships should be met one on one in a so called 'fair-fight', so beloved by wargamers with points systems.

This romantic notion of the bloody business of war reminded me of the similarity of opinion seen in the second 'Great War' as the publics of France, Great Britain and Germany delighted in the adventures of First World War ace pilots, meeting their opponents over the trenches of Flanders.

This despite the fact that meeting the Constitution, President or United States in a 38-gun fifth-rate was anything but a 'fair-fight' with, for example, Constitution's broadside shot weight being 700 pounds in comparison to the Guerriere's at 500 pounds, and with a war to win, what has fairness to do with it anyway!

Likewise the American administration started to realise that despite the propaganda advantages of the victories over British warships, the damage caused to the American ships in these actions often meant their early return to a US port to make repairs and a termination of their principle mission, namely to attack and destroy British maritime trade, and saw them likewise issue guidance and orders to American commanders not to seek out these naval duels.

Kaizer details the manoeuvres made by both American and British commanders such as Captain Philip Broke on board HMS Shannon, issuing challenges to American commanders to come out and meet him one on one, in defiance of Admiralty orders, leading to his eventual action with USS Chesapeake on the 1st June 1813, which was perhaps the most even fight of the conflict and fortunately for Broke ended successfully whilst also ending the run of US successes from 1812 and offsetting his flagrant disregard of orders that engineered the action in the first place.

In fact Broke's actions off Boston stands in stark contrast to those of Captain James Hillyar in his action on board HMS Phoebe 36-guns against the USS Essex 36-guns off Valparaiso on 28th March 1814, with the battle-hardened veteran Hillyar, long past any notions of chivalric one on one actions, determined to complete his orders from the Admiralty to destroy the Essex and bring an end to its cruise against British whalers in the Pacific.

Refusing Captain David Porter's offer to meet in a one on one action, with the American captain keen to garner his career with such laurels, instead bringing the force of his long-gun advantage over the American short range carronades and the support of the sloop HMS Cherub to batter the American frigate and her consort Essex Junior into submission after another violation of neutral waters proved one too many and Hillyar elected to end matters.

As the ability for the American large ships to get to sea decreased, the burden of taking the war to the British fell on the smaller ships of the US navy and the American privateers, more able to slip past the blockade, with the notable cruises of the USS Argus and Wasp in British home waters covered, but noting that the victories of the small ships grabbed little attention in the press when compared to the frigate actions.

Despite the success of blockade on the US coastline and the aggressive counter-attack led by Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, encouraging US slaves to flee servitude and join the Royal Navy in its struggle, and a series of large scale raids that lead to the burning of Washington and its state buildings, the defeats by the US heavy frigates early in the war still caused a feeling of lingering shame to Haligonians and  the North American Squadron determined to put the matter right at the first opportunity by capturing one of the three enemy large ships.

The opportunity finally came on the 15th January 1815 following the delay by the US Congress to ratify the peace treaty signed in Ghent on December 24th 1814, and, with the war continuing, seeing the USS President under Commodore Stephen Decatur attempt to evade the blockade off New York with a planned offensive against the British East India Company and its merchants, brought to bay by the fast sailing British 24-pdr heavy frigate HMS Endymion 40-guns.

HMS Endymion yaws to rake USS President 15th January 1815 - Thomas Butterwoth

Taking full advantage of Decatur's damage to his ship after he had grounded on leaving the harbour and his desire to evade Endymion's consorts of four other frigates including the 56-gun razee, HMS Majestic, which saw the American concentrate on trying to take out the British frigate's rigging and slow her down, whilst Endymion used her heavy guns to fire into the President's hull, eventually yardarm to yardarm, with her 24-pdr main battery causing great damage and casualties and slowing the large American frigate to allow the British squadron to close and capture her.

HMS Endymion was a new class of British heavy frigate but was probably still not a match for a one on one engagement with the USS President and the capture of the latter is most likely down to the fact that Decatur was forced to fight a running battle that allowed Endymion to do the job of so crippling the American frigate that she could not escape.

However the British commodore commanding the squadron was quick to heap praise on Captain Henry Hope commanding Endymion and made it clear in his report that the capture of President was due to to the action fought with Endymion despite the the later drawing off to make repairs as the squadron came up to secure the prize.

I found this book a thoroughly good read, giving an interesting insight to the British reaction to the losses they suffered and the response which developed amid a debate within naval circles as to what that response should be; and Nick Kaiser has really pulled out the differences in opinion between the captains in the Royal Navy's North American squadron, desperate to put the record straight with one on one challenges to the Americans and the senior command, focussed on winning the wider conflict and keen to prevent the American ships from interfering with that wider strategy.

In addition we see a Royal Navy striving to find the balance in its post action court-martial proceedings after each loss to find the lessons to be shared among the fleet whilst not exposing to public scrutiny the weaknesses in practice such enquires could reveal, but often finding a way to punish incompetence through future unemployment if not always meted out in a just way.

As well as providing much in the way of scenario set ups and objectives for wargaming the actions described, particularly if you want to test out the Admiralty's pronouncement;

'under the right conditions and with the right tactics an 18-pounder frigate had the ability to tackle and defeat a 24-pounder adversary at close action'.

the book contains sixteen colour profile plates of the British and American ships discussed, drawn by Florian Richter which was a very nice discovery when I first flicked through the pages of the book 

Florian Richter's gorgeous full colour ship profiles really adds extra value to this book for the naval wargamer

Whilst working my way through the various chapters I found myself recalling two other books I had read previously and reviewed here on JJ's and I would highly recommend getting and reading with this title, namely; 

Broke of the Shannon and the war of 1812 - Tim Voelcker

In Pursuit of the Essex - Ben Hughes

Revenge in the Name of Honour is another great title from Helion & Company and consists of 217 pages which includes the following;

List of Maps 

1. Actions along the Eastern Coastline of British North America and the United States, 1812-1815. 

2.Actions in the West Indies and along the Eastern coastline of South America, 1813-1814.

3. Actions in European and West African Waters, 1812-1815.

4. Operations in the Pacific, 1814.

Preface

Introduction

1. 'A Perfect Unmanageable Wreck': Opening Acts in the Naval War of 1812.

2. 'It is with the deepest regret': The defeats of Frolic, Macedonian and Java.

3. 'The unlooked for revers of the medal': Impact of the losses in Britain and Nova Scotia.

4. 'Very happy to meet any American frigate': Crisis for the Admiralty and the Officers of the North American squadron.

5. 'Hope yet of an honourable encounter': Philip Broke, Thomas Capel, and the blockade of Boston.

6. 'All I request is that both ships may quickly meet': Victory, defeat, and stagnation, 1813-1814.

7. 'Defended so long as she could be with any prospect of success': Lost sloops and elusive frigates, 1814.

8. 'Gallantry and spirit on both sides': Triumph of the Endymion and Constitution in the war's final months, 1815.

Epilogue

Appendices

I      Careers and fates of the British naval officers.

II     Dispositions of Frigates in North American waters, July 1813.

Bibliography

If I were to make one small criticism of the book it is that it doesn't have an index which is a little frustrating for an historical wargamer likely to come back to the book for reference around a particular engagement and it would have been nice to have avoided flicking through pages to find the particular action and ships involved, that said I would have no hesitation in recommending having the book on any Naval War of 1812 book shelf and it makes a welcome addition to my own.

Revenge in the Name of Honour retails through Helion Books for £25 and is in paperback but can be purchased at the time of writing for just under £13 from other retailers.

Next up: More adventures along the Welsh border in Carolyn and my recent trip away, post lockdown and more All at Sea additions with three more Spanish third rates about to be fitted out in JJ's shipyard together with an at anchor version of L'Orient ready for her date with destiny at the Battle of the Nile, more anon.

Lords of the Lake, The Naval War on Lake Ontario 1812-14 - Robert Malcomson

 

The cover of Lords of the Lake is a picture by Peter Rindlisbacher showing the squadron of Commodore Sir James Lucas Yeo consisting of the Royal George, Melville and Sir Sydney Smith becalmed and under tow from their boats whilst under bombardment from the guns of the US squadron, and specifically the Pike and the Sylph under the command of Commodore Isaac Chauncey during the engagement at the Genesee River, 11th September 1813.

Robert Malcomson's account of the struggle for control of Lake Ontario during the War of 1812 more than lives up to the dramatic artwork that adorns the cover of this excellent four-hundred plus page history and I found myself eagerly looking forward to to my usual bedtime read that more than upgraded my, till then, superficial knowledge of the naval war in this part of the Canadian front line during the war.

I always approach histories covering the struggle between Great Britain and the United States in the War of 1812 with a certain apprehension, given the rather jingoistic nature of a lot of the writing that has come out of both camps over the intervening centuries, preferring to get a more nuanced and balanced account looking at the war, if possible from both sides, and realistically appraising the actions and outcomes of both.

One might say that these are high standards for an historical account, from two English speaking peoples, some say separated by a common language, that bring all their misconceptions and bias based on competing accounts of history; but it seems the modern era is starting to produce these more balanced accounts and I have to say that the Canadian historians seem to have led the way in their re-telling of a war that a lot of Americans think they won, that most Canadians know they won and that most Brits have never heard of.

The first history of the war I read was 'The War of 1812 , Land Operations' by George F.G. Stanley, another Canadian historian and apparently the designer of the current Canadian flag, that I picked up from the book shop in the Canadian War Museum in Ottawa whilst touring Canada and the north east states of America whilst on honeymoon in 1988. 

The book is a thoroughly good read with plenty of maps that really brought the conflict to life for me and fired a life long interest in it since. However as its title suggests the coverage of the naval activities only really extended as far as their impact on the land war and the majority of modern titles I've read since have been similarly focussed; thus Lords of the Lake is the first specifically naval history on what was the most strategically important of the Great Lakes, Lake Ontario, that I have read and if you are interested in this war, a book I would be happy to recommend getting.

The book is broken down into six distinct parts encompassing its eighteen chapters charting life on Lake Ontario before the war and the build up to it through the various stages that came to characterise the struggle for its control that passed between the warring factions as both sides raced to gain dominance over the other whilst attempting to support their respective land forces.

Commodore Isaac Chauncey circa 1818 - Gilbert Stuart (US Naval Academy Museum)

The struggle to focus efforts on gaining dominance on the water and giving support to the army would prove to be a difficult balance for both the British and Americans with both Yeo and Chauncey becoming less and less willing to submit to the demands of the armies after experiencing the negative effects on their naval campaigns, whilst the land forces seemingly demanded more and more support to supply and move their forces from one front to another in terrain that was reliant on waterborne traffic to rapidly move armies and their supplies.

Commodore Sir James Lucas Yeo - Miniature in the Sim Comfort Collection
https://www.napoleon-series.org/military-info/Warof1812/2010/Issue13/c_Yeo.html

As the war progresses it seemed that Chauncey became slightly more protective of his fleet than Yeo and the tensions that this caused between the respective naval commanders and their army colleagues together with higher command and other naval commanders on the other lakes is captured well in Malcomson's account as he interweaves them with the military action and helps show how the naval struggle lost sight of its purpose, that of supporting the land war, at the expense of preserving naval bases and ships as a force in being. 

The fact of the matter was that Lake Ontario and its control was vital to both parties war aims in determining who would gain a dominant hold in Canadian North America with Britain on the defence for the most part and its forces under the somewhat cautious leadership of Lieutenant General Sir George Prevost that provoked much frustration among his more aggressive subordinates and managed on several occasions to seemingly snatch defeat from the jaws of victory, to the sometimes seemingly muddled leadership coming from President Maddison, his Naval Secretary, William Jones and Secretary of War, John Armstrong with their often conflicting demands to their respective subordinates only magnified by the military incompetence of the general officers leading the American troops on the Canadian front.

The ship-sloops USS General Pike and Provincial Marine Sloop Wolfe

It seems the Americans, able to focus their whole military and naval efforts on the Great Lakes and the invasion of Canada, particularly as the salt water navy became increasingly land locked under Royal Naval blockade and the crews of laid up frigates together with guns and ammunition were transferred over the relatively short route north to Sackets Harbour, had 1812 and 1813 to really make that advantage tell with Chauncy able to run rings around the Provincial Marine at the start of the war, a force more designed around transport than naval fighting and in 1813 with a fleet of vessels possessing the greater broadside weight of fire, long gun range advantage and the most powerful ship on the lake in the form of the USS General Pike.

The arrival of Yeo and his navy crew contingents helped offset the deficiencies of the Provincial Marine crews and the success of the hard pressed British, Canadian and Indian allied land forces held Chauncy at bay long enough into 1814 to allow the defeat of Napoleon in Europe to have the effect of delivering the much needed focus to the war from Britain, by which time British war weariness, Prevost's caution and the naval arms race to build bigger lake vessels, the 'Carpenters War', combined to end a pointless conflict that left both sides pretty much where they started.

I really appreciated the way the book alternated its chapters to look at the military situation from both sides at each stage of the conflict together with the stresses and strains on both Yeo and Chauncey that was obviously affecting their decisions and the impact that had on the clashes that occurred, intermixed with great descriptions of the large and small actions that took place on the open water and in among the creeks and on the shore.

The account is also well supported with illustrations of the vessels, the characters involved together with strategic and tactical maps and a copious appendix detailing the vessels that made up the opposing squadrons throughout the war on Lake Ontario at its various stages.

Whilst reading this book I picked up a second hand copy of Malcomson's previous work looking specifically at the warships built on the Great Lakes in this period which makes a great addition to the information gleaned from Lords of the Lake.

The Great Lakes in the War of 1812 make for an interesting theatre of naval operations in the age of sail and the small squadrons of small ships in the main make for very easy to build wargame collections with two forces very evenly matched.

My own current interest in 1:700th scale and Warlord Games commitment to add to their current range of Napoleonic age ships, together with a lot of brigs, schooners and cutters makes it very likely that I will build a collection around the Great Lakes theme and these books are a vital addition to my library in support of those ideas.

Lords of the Lake is 429 pages and includes the following:

Foreword

Preface

A Note about Time and Terminology

Part I - The Curtain Rises

1. "On the Banks of the Lake" - Lake Ontario Before The War.

2. "Opposing Force to Force" - War Is Declared: 18 June 1812

Part II - The Importance of Controlling the Lake, July-November 1812

3. "Our Navy... Is Worse Than Nothing" - The Failure Of The Provincial Marine: July-November 1812

4. "The Command of Lake Ontario" - Chauncey's Season Of Success: September-December 1812

5. "Our Prospects are Far... from Flattering" - Winter Projects: December 1812 - March 1813

6. "Everything Shall Be Prepared" - Planning The Campaign: February-April 1813

Part III - Fighting for Supremacy, April-November 1813

7. "Things Would Have Turned Out Better" - The Attack On York: 27 April 1813

8. "They Fought... Like Lions" - Fort George And Sackets Harbour: May 1813

9. "We Have the lake Open to Us" - The Royal Navy At Large: June-July 1813

10. "Deer, She's Gone!" - The Commodores Meet: August 1813

11. "Give the Vapouring Dog a Sound Drubbing" - Engagement At The Genesee: 11 September 1813

12. "All or None" - The Burlington Races: 28 September 1813

13. "A Mere Attendant upon the Army" - The St. Lawrence Campaign: October-November 1813

Part IV - The War of the Dockyards, November 1813 - March 1814

14. "Such a Force... May Save the Country" - British Naval Escalation: November 1813 - March 1814

15. "An Augmentation of our Naval Force" - Preparations For Sackets Harbour: November 1813 - April 1814

Part V - Conflicting Priorities, April - December 1814

16. "Wary Measures and Occasional Daring Enterprises", Actions At Oswego And Sandy Creek: April-June 1814.

17. "For God's Sake Let Me See You" - Strife Among The Senior Officers: July-November 1814.

18. "Returning Peace at Length Is Heard" - Winter Arrives And The War Ends

Appendices

A - Overview of the British and American Squadrons on Lake Ontario, 1812-1814

B - The Opposing Squadrons, Autumn 1812

C - British Gunboat Flotillas during and after 1813

D - The Opposing Squadrons, May and June 1813

E - The Opposing Squadrons, 8-11 August 1813

F - The Opposing Squadrons at the Engagement near the Genesee River, 11 September 1813

G - The Opposing Squadrons at the Burlington Races 28 September 1813

H - The Opposing Squadrons in 1814

Glossary

Endnotes

Bibliography

Index

Robert Malcomson, who sadly passed away in 2009, has written a very readable and fascinating history of this very important theatre of the War of 1812 and together with Warships of the Great Lakes make a very important addition to my library on the naval war of this period.

My copy of Lords of the Lake is the somewhat more affordable paperback edition and is currently available for between £11 to £15 at the time of writing, with the hardback edition retailing for substantially more. 

Next up: Three more Spanish 74-gun third rates join the Cape St. Vincent order of battle and the French launch the L'Orient of 118-120 guns depending on which source you prefer, plus Carolyn and I have been having fun exploring Hay-on-Wye, the Welsh border and Ancient monuments on Anglesey with Roman forts, watchtowers and Neolithic burial tombs on the list of places visited.

Rodney & the Breaking of the Line - Peter Trew

 

Having spent the last six weeks or so indulging in some personal development reading, it was a nice change to get back into feeding the mind with an historical tome and Peter Trew's biography of Admiral Lord George Brydges Rodney (1718 - 1792) made a very pleasant change, and having finished it this week, I thought I would share my impression of this book.

Any understanding of the success achieved in the glory years of the British Royal Navy during the long wars of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic era, 1793 to 1815 has to be seen in the light of the years that immediately preceded them and the pivotal conflicts for Great Britain of the Seven Years War (1756 - 1763) and American War of Independence (1775 - 1783), the former conflict one of great victories and triumphs on land and sea that left the country a naval and colonial superpower but with powerful European neighbours envious of that success and keen to to take advantage of any opportunity to benefit from future conflict leading to British military overstretch.

Admiral of the Fleet Edward Lord Hawke - Francis Cotes (National Maritime Museum)
Hawke and Boscawen were principle architects of British success at sea in the Seven Years War 

That opportunity came sooner than most probably expected, with the outbreak of war between Britain and her American colonies which split the loyalties of not just the colonies to the crown but also those in Britain who sympathised strongly with the colonists and those who took a harder line in support of the King and the Lord North administration; these tensions only adding to British woes as a list of European nations led by Bourbon France sought to threaten much of the gains made in the previous conflict and moved British focus away from her American colonies to her much more financially important possessions in the Caribbean.

The Battle of Quiberon Bay 20th November 1759 - Richard Paton (National Maritime Museum)
Lord Hawkes victory established British naval pre-eminence and put an end to French aspirations of invading Britain in the Seven Years War.

The success of the Seven Years War and the naval dominance established under the aggressive leadership of Admirals Edward Boscawen and Edward Lord Hawke who established the formation of Britain's mainland defence with the Western Squadron seemed likely to be eclipsed during the American War as a succession of poor naval command appointments, based on political favour rather than command and leadership ability led to a decline in the ability of the Royal Navy to give the nation the war defining victory it needed to turn the course of the conflict in her favour and as Spain and, later Holland joined the conflict, and added to a growing threat of invasion at home or the loss of important Caribbean islands, that defining naval victory became more and more pressing.

The historical cliché, 'cometh the hour, cometh the man' would be an equally fitting title to have been given to this book, which as well as describing the character and career forming years of this great British admiral, highlights very well why he deserves his place among the glittering ranks of the Royal Navy's greatest leaders and his role in giving Britain her war defining victory at the Battle of the Saintes in her darkest hour but also what his victory created in terms of its legacy to the glory years that followed.

In the end, with the American War going in the wrong direction, needs overrode political niceties and Rodney, despite having effectively been on the run in France from his creditors was brought back into the service of his king with the aid of a French noble and assurances of his not having final control over spending decisions under his command.

The fact of the matter was that Rodney was a fighting admiral with an unerring aggressive sense to bring his enemy to battle on his terms and moreover was politically on board with a Tory administration determined to bring the American colonies to heel; but it was his lack of judgment in financial matters that were to be a never ending source of concern to the man as he secured his place in history and Britain's position at the negotiating table with the conclusion of the American War.

But perhaps more importantly it was through his aggressive leadership in naval warfare that he was able to influence future generations of British naval commanders that would give the nation dominance at sea for over a hundred years.

I have to say, I had only a superficial awareness of Rodney coming to this book, mainly from previous reading of histories concerning the naval war during the American War of Independence where his name dominates the second half of that conflict at sea and was ignorant of his beginnings and early career; so it was very interesting to read Trew's account of his joining the navy at the tender age of fourteen and a half on the 7th May 1732 as a volunteer or 'king's letter boy' but with influence from his kinsman the Duke of Chandos.

An interesting aspect of Trew's detailing of Rodney's heritage, being a member of an ancient family line, with the Rodney's owning properties in and around Rodney Stoke in Somerset for four centuries, up to the death of his great-grand-father Sir Edward Rodney in 1657, was that his particular line of the family was impoverished; and the young Rodney had to rely on other family connections to 'open doors' for him that might otherwise have been closed, possibly explaining his lifelong concern about personal wealth and the security it brought, that was certainly lacking in his early years.

Line Drawing of HMS Sheerness 1743, Rodney's first command - Royal Museums Greenwich Collection
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:SHEERNESS_1743_RMG_J7000.jpg

However with the 'door opened' to a career in the Royal Navy the young Rodney enjoyed a meteoric rise to post captain eleven years later at the age of twenty-five making him one of the youngest captains in the navy, and eagerly awaiting his new command, the brand new frigate, Sheerness 24-guns, in August 1743 at the height of the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748).

The Young Captain Rodney would learn his profession under the influence of Rear-Admiral Edward Hawke as part of what would become Great Britain's first line of defence against invasion and safe navigation to her home ports, namely the Western Squadron, involved in blockading munition supplies to Jacobite rebels in Scotland, anti-privateer cruising and experiencing his first major action on the 25th October 1747 off Cape Finisterre as Hawke swooped on a French convoy and its eight escorts, bound for Canada, taking six of them and where Rodney's path would cross that of a young French officer captured in the same battle and mentioned in another book review, that of the life of French Admiral Suffren.

Admiral Satan The Life & Campaigns of Suffren

Battle of Cape Finisterre (October 1747) - Pierre-Julien Gilbert (Palais du Luxembourg, Paris)
Battle of the Intrepid against several British Ships, having turned back to help the French flagship Tonnant escape along with herself.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_Cape_Finisterre_(1747)

With the end of the War of Austrian Succession, Rodney was one captain to remain employed in a peace time navy taking up the post of Governor of Newfoundland and flying a commodore's pennant as he patrolled the rich fishing grounds, with his small squadron whilst he set about fulfilling his parliamentary plans to become an MP, a career course that would lead him into debt and threaten his future as a naval officer.

Admiral Lord George Brydges Rodney in Flag Officer's Undress Uniform circa 1759, a 19th century copy of an unknown original - National Maritime Museum
A young Rodney pictured here, likely in his early forties as a Rear Admiral with his own hair.

His interwar naval career continued with appointments to guardships, but with the start of the Seven Years War in 1756 saw him appointed captain of the new class of 74-gun ships which would become the workhorse of the navy, HMS Dublin, which he would command throughout, taking part in the abortive attack on Rochefort under Hawke in 1757, and taking General Amhurst across the Atlantic for the attack on Louisbourg in 1758, where the first accusations were levelled at Rodney for an over-zealous pursuit of prize money over his duty and not for the last time.

On his return to England in 1759 and recuperation from a bout of scurvy Rodney was promoted to flag rank and became a Rear-Admiral of the Blue on the 19th May 1759 and following a few weeks as acting Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth he took command of a small squadron tasked with blockading and bombarding Le Havre at the mouth of the River Seine to deal with a threat of invasion barges being built there.

The Bombardment of Le Havre 5th July 1759 - Joseph-Abel Couture
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vue_generale_du_bombardement_du_Havre_en_1759_par_les_Anglais.jpg

Commanding from the 60-gun Achilles his squadron consisted of four 50-gun ships, six frigates, two sloops and six 'bomb' vessels and following a close reconnaissance of the defences aboard one of the frigates, Rodney had the bombs in position to bombard by 5th July 1759; and there followed a fifty-two hour bombardment of the town without intermission, only stopped when the bombs became unserviceable due to the continuous shock of firing and leaving the town a burning wreck as magazine stores and landing boats caught fire that raged for six hours as Rodney returned to Spithead leaving ships on blockade to prevent further supplies reaching the town by sea.

However Le Havre would continue to be a threat and a place Rodney would revisit, less successfully, following the French adding to their defences with floating batteries, during which time Rodney was re-elected MP for Okehampton in Devon in 1759, only to loose his seat yet again, two years later when not reselected by the government to stand in the 1761 election, forcing him to accept the offer of MP for Penryn in Cornwall which he won and remained a member for until 1768.

In 1761 plans were afoot to launch an invasion of  the French prize island of Martinique in the Caribbean, the richest of the sugar islands and a continual threat to British trade, being a nest of French privateers; and following Rodney's success at Le Havre, he was chosen by First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Anson, over more senior men, to command the expedition, hoisting his flag aboard HMS Marlborough 68-guns at Spithead on the 9th October.

The British attack the Citadel of Martinique, January 1762 - Dominic Serres

British Expeditionary Forces - Martinique 1762

The operation commenced on the 16th of January 1762 when 8,000 British troops under the command of Major-General Robert Monckton who had been second in command to General Wolfe at Quebec were landed unopposed on the southern tip of the island, three miles from the principle town of Fort Royal, supported by two battalions of marines and sailors.

The Capture of Martinique, 11th February 1762 - Dominic Serres

The expedition was a model of close cooperation between the navy and army with Fort Royal surrendering on the 3rd of February and with the rest of the island secured by the 12th and its fall seeing the collapse of French possessions in the Leeward Islands as the neighbouring islands of St Lucia, Grenada and St Vincent were also taken by the 3rd of March, with an account by one of Monkton's officers about his appreciation of the support they received from the navy, concluding his comments;

'We had a thousand of these brave fellows sent to our assistance by the admiral; and the service they did us, both on shore and on the water, is incredible.'

However on the 5th March Rodney's attention had been drawn to a new threat in the area, following his receipt of a letter, dated 26th December 1761 informing him that Britain was now at war with Spain and also that a French squadron of seven ships of the line and five frigates together with 2,000 troops had escaped from Brest and were presumed to be heading his way, causing Rodney to order all his frigates to windward of the chain of Caribbean islands and organise two groups of his heaviest ships in readiness for any French arrival, however on discovering the fall of Martinque and neighbouring islands the French relief force avoided action and headed for the comparative safety of St Domingo.

War with Spain heralded more British reinforcements to the Caribbean with an assault on Havana and other Spanish colonies initiated, requiring a more senior naval commander in the form of Vice Admiral Sir George Pocock to take command, taking the the key Spanish town and naval base on the 14th August 1762, whilst Rodney was ill ashore in Martinique.

However with victory secured in the area, and with Pocock's departure, Rodney took command of a small squadron patrolling the Leeward Islands until wars end and his recall home in 1763, having had a rather 'good war'.

Another period of peace followed which started promisingly with promotion to Vice-Admiral in 1763, a baronetcy in 1764 and appointed Governor of Greenwich Hospital on a salary of £1,000 a year, however with a combination of gambling and a failed bid to be elected MP for Northampton in 1768 which cost Rodney £30,000, Rodney's financial security was in tatters and it seemed so was his naval career as after a short service command in Jamaica in 1770 he was forced on his return to England to run from his creditors, moving to Paris in 1774.

Admiral Lord George Rodney, 1st Baron Rodney - Jean-Laurent Mosnier (National Maritime Museum)

Within a year Britain would be at war again, with its American colonies and it seemed that Rodney had made himself unavailable, but a combination of one of his key supporters, seemingly well aware of his abilities, First Lord of the Admiralty John Montagu, 4th Earl of Sandwich looking for any opportunity to get him back and the offer from Marechal de Biron, Constable of Paris to offer Rodney a loan to clear his debts and allow his return home in May 1778, just as France became emboldened to join the conflict following General Burgoyne's defeat at Saratoga, facilitated Rodney's return to senior command.

The first three chapters in Trew's account covering this early period in Rodney's life really help set the scene in terms of the character of the man and the experiences that shaped him as a naval commander and I found myself comparing his career with that of his contemporary Suffren and drawing out the distinct similarities and differences - two men destined for a career at sea, both hailing from ancient noble families and starting their life afloat at an early age but in navies with very distinct and different approaches to using their fleets to project power. 

Both men come across as determined and impatient with any lack of obedience or initiative in their contemporaries and aggressively intent on grabbing the initiative and taking the battle to their enemy but not always able to impart their intent to their subordinates.

However one aspect that seems to stand out in Rodney's career is his good fortune, and his ability to snatch opportunity when presented that often worked to his and his country's benefit when in action but good fortune seemed to desert him when money and personal fortune were concerned and his latter career more than bears this out.

The capture of the Dutch island of St Eustatius in the Caribbean is an example of the latter opportunity, occurring soon after Dutch entry into the war alongside France and Spain in February 1781, offering Rodney an opportunity for revenge against an island that had saluted the ensign of  American rebel ships arriving at its port and was embroiled in the supply of arms and munitions to Britain's enemies on land and sea; previously protected by neutrality, with a number of those merchants carrying those supplies being British, and making vast profits for their owners, but committing gross acts of treason as far as Rodney and the British government were concerned.

In addition Rodney had suffered directly from this trade which was confirmed after his capture of the place showing the island's role in providing materials for refitting French ships with cordage and timber following previous action with Rodney's fleet, that should have kept them out of action for months.

All these affronts made for a compelling reason for Rodney to want to stamp out this thorn in the side of Britain's and his war effort had it not been for his need to clear his financial woes and his over zealous personal administration of the confiscation of personal property and other valuables that of course offered great wealth in prize money but lead to accusations, perhaps justly, that it caused him to forget his duty to military command in favour of his own personal gain; a charge that would continue to haunt him in later years with his battles in the courts with British merchant owners claiming compensation for mis-appropriated goods during his administration of seizures in the island.

That apart, his ability to take the war to the enemy towers above most of his contemporaries in the Royal Navy of this period with Trew highlighting that out of twenty-one enemy ships (French, Spanish and Dutch) captured or destroyed by the Royal Navy during the American War of Independence, from 1778 to 1783, fifteen are credited to Rodney in the period 1780 -1782 and that on two occasions he captured the opposing enemy admiral.

The moonlight Battle of Cape St Vincent, 16th January 1780 - Francis Holman (National Maritime Museum)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cape_St._Vincent_(1780)
Lord Rodney's flagship, HMS Sandwich 90-guns is seen centre foreground as the Spanish 74-gun Santo Domingo explodes beyond

Of his latter career, two actions stand out exemplifying this aggressive intent, namely the Battle of Cape St Vincent 16th January 1780 that saw Rodney leading his newly coppered fleet of eighteen ships of the line and six frigates escorting a fleet of supply ships to the hard pressed garrison of Gibraltar encountering a Spanish squadron of nine ships of the line and two frigates; and engaging the Spanish in a two hour running battle through the afternoon and into the hours of darkness with only two of the Spanish ships escaping plus the frigates and with Spanish Admiral Langara among the captives as the convoy was safely escorted to its destination.

From a tactical point, Rodney concluded the advantage of attacking from leeward, noting;

'when the British fleet take the lee gage, the enemy cannot escape. This event has proved it, and I am fully convinced that every ship of the enemy would have been taken possession of had the weather permitted.'

In addition the action confirmed to him 'the infinite utility' of copper bottomed ships, without which, he believed the enemy could not have been brought to action, asking Lord Sandwich to add a number of such ships to his West Indies squadron.

The Battle of the Chesapeake 5th September 1781 - V Zveg (Hampton Roads Naval Museum)
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:BattleOfVirginiaCapes.jpg
The naval battle that lost Britain control of her American colonies if often cited to exemplify the sterility of naval tactics at this time with this inconclusive line versus line encounter, but in contrast to de Grasse and Graves, men like Rodney and indeed Suffren were not content to engage in such a way and constantly sought to bring a greater part of their strength against a selected point in the enemy line, often by doubling a part of it. Rodney and his breaking of de Grasse's line in the following year would herald a new way of achieving the same result.

But of course the action that propels Rodney into the list of the greatest Admirals in the age of sail era is of course his victory at the Battle of the Saintes and of course his famous 'breaking of the line' and as well as looking forensically at this famous battle, Trew includes the important lead ups to this climactic battle with a close look at the action with de Guichen off Martinique in May 1780; which stands in stark contrast to the Saintes and reminded me again with a distinct similarity to the issues Suffren had with his captains in the Indian Ocean where the ability of each commander to inculcate his junior officers with his plan of action when in contact with the enemy left a heavy reliance on signalling being understood and acted upon to meet the expectations of the commander especially with a new commander dealing with captains unfamiliar with those expectations.

Needless to say Martinique in 1780 did not end well and recriminations between Rodney and some of his captains followed, highlighting those issues of an unfamiliarity between the commander and his subordinates, with the latter obviously unclear with Rodney's plans when in contact with the enemy.

However the aggressive intent from Rodney, looking to double the French line, when he had the wind gage and opportunity, was a portent for the French when de Grasse would meet the British admiral in 1782, with a group of captains and junior admirals who were now very familiar with the expectations of their commander and showed the initiative to fulfil them with the appropriate actions as required.

Rear-Admiral Sir Samuel Hood, Viscount Hood - James Northcote (National Maritime Museum)
Hood was Rodney's very capable if somewhat 'challenging' subordinate in the West Indies

In addition Trew looks at the actions of Rodney's direct subordinate Rear-Admiral Sir Samuel Hood, not an unaggressive commander in his own right and forced to chafe as he was subordinated to the underwhelming Rear Admiral Thomas Graves at the Battle of the Chesapeake, after Rodney had to return home due to ill-health, and immediately identifying the missed opportunity by Graves as the French fleet under de Grasse hastily left its anchorage off Cape Henry; exposing its van squadron to attack by the whole British line and no doubt defeated in the hour that it took the centre and rear of the French line to close the gap which the inept Graves was happy to allow, with the inconclusive battle that followed and effectively ending British control of her North American colonies.

Battle of St Kitts January 1782 - Thomas Maynard (National Maritime Museum)
Repulse of the French fleet under the Comte de Grasse by Rear Admiral Hood's British fleet in Frigate Bay, St Kitts 26th January 1782.

In addition he illustrates the importance of the action conducted by Hood off St Kitts in January 1782, against de Grasse whilst Rodney was still away on sick leave but due to return within the month, which saw the French capture the island but left the French fleet embarrassed as their anchorage was seized by Hood and defended until hope for the British garrison was exhausted; seeing Hood slip away unmolested with the British fleet's morale boosted by their audacious movement and defence against de Grasse as he attempted unsuccessfully to eject them.

The Battle of the Saintes 12th April 1782, showing the British fleet braking the French line.
By Nicholas Pocock - http://collections.rmg.co.uk/collections/objects/11936, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=62813976

With the return of Rodney to the West Indies, arriving in Barbados on the 19th February 1782, the stage was set for the coming clash between the British and French navies, and the stakes couldn't have been much higher, with the outcome likely to decide dominance in the theatre but also with British defeat at Yorktown, the final negotiating positions at the peace talks to end the American War of Independence, and for Britain in particular, with the future defence of her remaining overseas possessions, her ability to remain a major world power.

Fracois Joseph Paul, comte de Grasse, Lieutenant General des Armees navales (1723 - 1788) - Jean Baptiste Mauzaisse (Palace of Versailles)

Needless to say the build up to and then the actual Battle of the Saintes forms a major part of Trew's account as he takes two chapters to look at the details of this famous action that saw a Franco-Spanish plan to unite their fleets and deliver Lieutenant General Don Galvez together with 32,000 regular and 8,000 irregular troops to Jamaica, with Galvez already being referred to as the Governor of Jamaica.

Reinforcements brought the French and British fleets to near numerical equality with Rodney commanding 36 ships to de Grasse's 33 but with French having individual ships with heavier armaments versus the British superiority in morale and fighting efficiency. 

Sir Charles Douglas - John Jones
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sir_Charles_Douglas,_1st_Baronet

Interestingly Rodney improved his chances further through two key appointments to his team, his Flag Captain Sir Charles Douglas, a noted gunnery expert at the time and able to impart his knowledge to increase the firepower of three of Rodney's ships, the Formidable 98-guns, Arrogant 74-guns and the Duke 98-guns all able to fire through a 90 degree arc of fire instead of just directly abeam, allowing these ships to come into action against a passing enemy ship much sooner and remain firing at it for longer and also to engage two enemy ships in line up to a range of a quarter of a mile if they were two cables (480 yards) or less apart; this improvement only added to the British adoption of upper-deck carronades and goosequill primers with flintlock and lanyards to shorten the time between the laying of the gun to its firing once the gun captain pulled the lanyard to fire.

Dr, Sir Gilbert Blane, Physician to the Fleet from 1780 to 1782 - Martin Archer Shee (Royal College of Physicians - London)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gilbert_Blane

The other key addition to Rodney's team was an earlier appointment by him in the face of some opposition, namely his appointment of Dr Gilbert Blane as Physician to the Fleet from 1780 to 1782, a pioneer in naval medicine who emphasised to the Admiralty several key recommendations following his service with Rodney which included the importance of cleanliness and dryness and the efficacy of organising a ships company into divisions overseen by their own officer, a discretionary arrangement in his time but one that became compulsory after his guidance.

Blane noted the importance of fresh vegetables and fruit in combatting scurvy, that wine was more conducive to good health than rum and the availability of special foods for the sick, hospital ships and 500 feet of space per patient in hospital to improve hygiene. 

However the key testament to Blane's effectiveness were his outcomes recording that in the twelve months to July 1781 there were 12,109 men serving in twenty ships on the Leeward Islands. Of these fifty-nine were killed in battle but another 1,518 (12.5%) died of other causes. During the month of April 1782, the month of the Battle of the Saintes, deaths amounted to just twenty-four out of a total of 21,608 men serving in thirty-six ships, equivalent to a mortality rate over twelve months of only 1.3%, a considerable improvement despite Blane's admission that April had been an exceptionally good month.

With a former professional interest in medicine, all his recommendations and improvements left me very proud to be called a 'limey'.

The three key stages to the 'Breaking of the Line' at the Battle of the Saintes, 12th April 1782
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Battle_of_the_Saintes_plan.jpg
Licenced under Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported License.
The fortuitous change of wind at 09.20 that slowed the French and broke up their line was taken full advantage of as Rodney and his captains, following their admiral's lead, moved through the gaps that opened up.

Trew goes through in detail the respective manoeuvres of the two fleets that saw four French ships of the line captured, including de Grasse's flagship Ville de Paris 104-guns and one French ship destroyed with British casualties amounting to 243 dead and 116 wounded versus French casualties of approximately 3,000, together with 5,000 captured.

The aftermath of the battle is looked at and the reaction in the two countries together with the rewards and approbation or otherwise heaped upon the participants.

However, perhaps the most interesting part of the consideration of this battle were some of the key questions it poses, such as, with a fortuitous change in the wind, did Rodney pass through the line by design or by accident? Was he influenced by the writings of John Clerk the laird of Elgin as suggested by Sir John Jervis, Lord St Vincent? How much did Rodney's tactics influence those of Nelson? What were the merits or otherwise of a vigorous pursuit of the French fleet following the battle as proposed by Rodney's purportedly frustrated second in command Hood?

Many of these questions have been debated by historians and other authorities over the succeeding years and Trew takes an interesting journey through the competing views, however the fundamental result of Rodney's actions at the Saintes was that naval warfare had entered a new era and his influence on a more aggressive approach by British naval commanders from then on was seemingly irreversible and heralded what was to come in the early decades of the next century with Britain's enemies at sea very aware of the capabilities of the British Tar.

I really enjoyed this look at one of the greatest British admirals and have developed an even higher opinion of Lord George Brydges Rodney, 1st Baron Rodney who stands above many of his contemporaries much as Nelson did above his, though both men were very different in the way they commanded their subordinates and as characters, but both men displaying those human foibles that make them seem very contemporary today, where great people are considered in the round, faults and all.

Rodney & the Breaking of the Line is published by Pen & Sword Books 2006 and is 249 pages which include the following;

List of Maps and Diagrams (16 Maps and Diagrams)

Acknowledgements

Note on Money, Measurements and Terminology

Chronology

Introduction

Chapter 1        Early Life

Chapter 2        Flag Rank

Chapter 3        The Moonlight Battle

Chapter 4        De Guichen

Chapter 5        De Grasse

Chapter 6        St Eustatius

Chapter 7        The Chesapeake

Chapter 8        The Saintes - Preliminaries

Chapter 9        The Battle of the Saintes

Chapter 10      Aftermath

Appendix 1    Prizes taken by Rodney in HMS Eagle in the Western Approaches between May 1746                           and June 1747.

Appendix 2    Opposing Fleets at the Battle of Martinique 17 April 1780.

Appendix 3    Battle of Martinique, 17 April 1780 - Signals by Rodney's Flagship.

Appendix 4    Opposing Fleets at the Battle of the Saintes 12 April 1782.

Appendix 5    Battle of the Saintes, 12 April 1782, Signals by de Grasse's Flagship.  

Appendix 6    Battle of the Saintes, 12 April 1782, Principle Signals by Rodney's Flagship. 

Appendix 7    Rodney's Dispositions in August 1781

Appendix 8    Advice from Lord Rodney to his son, Captain John Rodney, on Duties of a Captain.

Notes

Bibliography

Index

The book has a list price of £19.99 but at the time of writing is available new or second hand for about £12.00 

Next up: Well the focus has been on preparing the Trafalgar collection for a roll out should lockdown restrictions relax and I thought I might take a look at the age old wargaming challenge of storage and safe transporting of models and terrain, plus talking of terrain, mats are very much in the ascendancy these days and I thought I would also look at the merits of them for naval games.

I also need to update the Vassal gaming scene as Steve and I continue to unlock the pleasures of Hannibal, Rome v Carthage now into our second game.

More anon

JJ