Napoleon's Maxims - III, Flanks (Principles of War)

"An army which undertakes the conquest of a country has its two wings either resting on neutral territories or upon great natural obstacles, such as rivers or chains of mountains. It happens in some cases that only the wing is so supported, and in others that both are exposed. 

In the first instance cited, viz., where both wings are protected, a general has only to guard against being penetrated in front. In the second, where one wing only is supported, he should rest upon the supported wing. In the the third, where both wings are exposed, he should depend upon a central formation, and never allow the different corps under his command to depart from this; for it be difficult to contend with the disadvantage of having two flanks exposed, the inconvenience is doubled by having four, tripled if their be six; that is to say, if the army is divided into two or three different corps. In the first instance then, as above quoted, the line of operation may tend indifferently to the right or to the left. In the second, it should be directed towards the wing in support. In the third, it should be perpendicular to the centre of the army's line of march. But in all these cases it is necessary every five or six days to have a strong post, or an entrenched position, upon the line of march, in order to collect stores and provisions, to organise convoys, to form a centre of movement, and establish a point of defence, to shorten the line of operations." 

As Chandler points out in his comment on this general principle of operations, the choice of where to position an army's line of communication based on the situation it finds itself in is as important a consideration today as it was in Napoleon's time.

The idea was well illustrated with Napoleon's own invasion of Spain in 1808 where his centre of operations was established at the fortified city of Bayonne, close to the border of Spain in south west France and with the access into Spain flanked by the Bay of Biscay. The area around Bilbao up to the north coast was quickly secured against Blake's Spanish Army of the Left, with the corps of Victor (I Corps), Lefebvre (IV Corps) and Soult (II Corps). Thus  with his wing securely placed, Napoleon was able to manoeuvre against Castanos and his Spanish Army of the Centre, quickly taking Burgos and swinging Ney (VI Corps) in towards Soria and pinning and defeating the Spanish at Tudela (between Zaragoza and Logrono on the River Ebro) with Moncey (III Corps) holding the French side of the Ebro. This opened up the route to Madrid with a new forward base centred on Burgos.

Map illustrating the opening moves of Napoleon's invasion in November - December 1808 - West Point Dept of History Map

http://www.westpoint.edu/history/sitepages/napoleonic%20wars.aspx

With his northern wing securely anchored and Madrid taken Napoleon was very well placed to swing his reserve north from Madrid as he attempted to encircle Sir John Moore as he approached Burgos via Salamanca. Only the fortuitous capture of French orders revealing the plan, obtained from Spanish partisans alerted Moore in good time to enable him to get a days march on the fast approaching French forces and commence his retreat towards Lugo and Corunna. 

Moore was correct in selecting Burgos as a good point to strike, as it was the main bastion on the French line of communication (L.O.C.) back to Bayonne and its taking would have severely embarrassed Napoleon's forces in and around Madrid; however the French forces in the area were the anchor to the whole invasion with the rest of the army "resting" upon its supported wing. In addition when Moore made his move, the Spanish forces he hoped to cooperate with were no longer forces in being and the British army would have been putting their "head in the noose" with a continued advance.

Chandler highlights Napoleon's point that the security of the LOC is only enhanced by having it perpendicular to the armies line of march and clearly Napoleon was operating on this principle with his route from Burgos to Bayonne and on down to Madrid. The principle of placing depots and strong points at regular intervals would also be practised by Wellington during his own counter advances into Spain from Lisbon and Ciudad-Rodrigo, however Wellington took the principle one stage further by utilising the sea power of the Royal Navy to help him relocate his centre of operations from Lisbon to Santander in 1813 as he pursued French forces beyond the Spanish border, illustrating the flexibility of a naval power over a continental power.

Napoleon's Maxims I Frontiers

Napoleons Maxims II Plan of Campaign

The Peninsular War, A New History - Charles Esdaile

Having just finished reading Charles Esdaile's book on the Peninsular War, I thought I would share my thoughts.

This book was first published back in 2002 and my copy is a first edition hard back that I picked up as a second hand copy for a very reasonable price. I certainly got more than my moneys worth.

This excellent book is probably the first of the more modern treatments of the subject to focus more on the socio-political aspects of this war with more of an overview of the battles which have been well covered and detailed in other histories such as Oman and Gates. That is to say that the major battles, important as they are, are not overlooked but very carefully placed in the context of the political situation at that time.

One thing that clearly differentiates this Napoleonic theatre from the others of this period is that we are dealing with a war within a war, with multiple campaigns and shifting alliances throughout the period of 1808-14 and Esdaille is able to capture the tumultuous changes that affected both Portugal and Spain; both absolutist monarchies with a strong influence from the church and an almost serf like relationship between peasants and the ruling elite. The war was to cause a dramatic shift of power in both countries and lead to a popular movement to more liberal inclusive regimes that would sow the seeds for further strife and internal conflict in both countries but particularly Spain, as the army developed a taste for intervening in civil conflict. In addition both countries would lose the control and wealth they originally had coming in from their extensive American colonies, and see the reducing of Spain to a minor power in European affairs.

Into this pot of fermenting conflict the armies of the two most consistent of enemies, Great Britain and France, jousted with each other seeking to take advantage of the shifting initiative as the wider war within Europe allowed for one side or the other to attempt to gain a knock out position.

Esdaile seamlessly develops the narrative of the tension between the allies Britain, Portugal and Spain who fought hard to suppress their dislikes of each other by focusing on their common hatred of Napoleonic France and he describes this tension ebbing and flowing with military success and failure; with the final perverse situation of seeing Wellington grab the ascendancy over French arms with his dramatic victory at Salamanca in 1812 and to see the liberation of vast areas of Spain only to drive an even deeper rift between the British and the Junta in Cadiz as the Spanish government felt more able to focus on the liberal constitutional changes it wished to pursue instead of pursuing the British desire to see them focus on rebuilding a more potent and disciplined Spanish military able to support further military operations.

Wellington began to become more suspicious of Spanish motives as the liberals within the government tried to control his moves by offering him the command of Spanish forces but have his operations subject to their approval. This was resisted but the eventual promoting of Wellington to Generalissimo only caused deep resentment with certain senior general officers in the Spanish army and created more trouble than the benefits such a move would have seemed to have had the potential to offer. This mutual mistrust and dysfunction would see Wellington dispense with the services of his best Spanish troops at the border with France as he decided that the poorly supplied and supported Spanish troops could not be relied upon not to go on the rampage in France, "bringing ruin on us all" as he described.

Esdaile also gives plenty of detail and evidence to reveal the truth behind the two edged sword that was the guerrilla war. There is no doubt that the war of the knife caused much loss and strife to French forces in areas such as the Basque region and in Catalonia where when coordinated with allied action was most advantageous to the common cause. However many of the roving groups turned out to be no more than gangs of ruffians free to commit crimes and atrocities on friend and foe alike for their own personal gain. In addition such irregular forces proved a drain on Spanish manpower for the regular army as soldiers preferred the free and more liberal ways of the partisan and were thus very happy to avoid conscription or simply desert at the first opportunity.

The Spanish authority sought to curb the excesses of the best groups and rid themselves of the worst by carefully issuing army commissions to guerrilla leaders thus bringing them in under regular command, giving them access to supplies, but controlling their numbers and activities in accordance to the national benefit.

Juan Martin Diez - El Empecinado, one of the more successful
and regular guerrilla leaders of the Peninsular War

Juan Martin Diez

The book is a long read covering the whole war in 509 pages, but I found the different perspective it offered the English reader on the war a refreshing insightful experience and would highly recommend it to the serious student of this period. Charles Esdaile even takes a moment at the end to outline other areas not covered in the English studies that warrant further research and although I did not entirely buy in to his analysis and conclusion on the relationship of the Peninsular War to the final outcome of the Napoleonic war as a whole, I would have no hesitation in recommending this history as a thoroughly well researched and presented read.

Napoleon's Maxims - II, Plan of Campaign

II

"In forming the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee everything the enemy may do, and to be prepared with the necessary means to counteract it.

Plans of campaign may be modified ad infinitum according to circumstances, the genius of the general, the character of the troops, and the features of the country."

Perhaps the most classic illustration of this maxim in practice is the memorandum and subsequent plan of campaign as proposed by Sir Arthur Wellesley in 1808 to the British government in which he contradicted Sir John Moore's previous declaration that Portugal could not be held against French invasion, but went further to describe its role as a base to support ongoing operations, building up the Portuguese army and to aid the Spanish in ridding them of French occupation and eventual pursuit of French forces into France itself.

Following Wellesley's return to Portugal in 1809 with his plan accepted by British ministers he immediately set its principles into action by a fast campaign that ejected Soult from Oporto causing him to lose all his baggage and guns in the process, and then to turn south to link up with the Spanish Army of Estremadura to attack and destroy the next potential threat, namely, Victor's I Corps in the Tagus valley.

Whilst pursuing the objective of securing Portugal as a base of operations he had already predicted the likely victory of Napoleon over Austrian forces in the Danube campaign of that year and had given orders for work to commence on the construction of the lines of Torres Vedras, predicting that the Emperor would return in 1810 to deal with the British in Portugal once and for all.

The Lines of Torres Vedras - A master stroke in campaign planning

Of course Napoleon didn't lead the force, selecting Massena to command the army of 65,000 men later to be reinforced by a further 10,000 men as he methodically manoeuvred his force to and over the Portuguese border. The unlucky fall of Almeida was counteracted by the surprise ambush at Bussaco ridge which allowed his new Portuguese formations to gain confidence and battle experience whilst severely denting the morale of the enemy. Wellesley confidently predicted he could hold the line against 100,000 French troops but that with a maximum of 360,000 troops in the whole peninsula, the French would find it impossible to hold their gains whilst prosecuting their invasion.

The defence of Portugal in 1810-11 would become a model that was studied by the Russian General Staff and used to define their own plans to overcome a French invasion the following year, on a much larger scale. The campaign of 1812 would prove the turning point and directly influence events in the peninsula

All the points described in this maxim, foresight, preparatory counteractions, modifications due to circumstances, genius in the commanding general, making full use of the character of the troops and features of the country shine out in Wellesley's, later Wellington's plan of campaign and is a classic exemplar of why he ranks as one of the great captains

Napoleon's maxims I Frontiers

The Birds and Bees - Garden Wildlife

It took Carolyn several blurred attempts to finally catch one of these guys in action

Following the recent visit from our local dragonfly catching flying ants on the wing, Carolyn decided to grab some pictures of our other regular garden visitors this summer.

I think the laws of flight still suggest that the bumble bee being able to fly is impossible, so this picture of the humble bumble bee defying science only adds to the wonder of these amazing insects. We have had some lovely garden blooms this year and the bees have had a feast among the various blossoms.

This chap on the other hand was more than happy to have his picture taken

The USA may have its bald eagle, and the Australians their Emu, but in a recent poll of the British public choice for a national bird, as we don't have one too date, the favourite response was the plucky little Robin (Erithacus rubecula). These little chaps and chapesses, as both male and female look the same and only the Robin knows the difference, are very bold little birds and will land at your feet when working in the garden, walking close to as if they own the place and you are the visitor.

In their flashy red waistcoats, they are instantly recognisable and the affection they hold with the British public defies the protests of others who proclaim more larger powerful looking examples of British bird life. Personally I love this little redcoat and delight when he or she fearlessly lands close by as if to say "you do know whose place this is?"

Carolyn's fine study of Britain's favourite bird

1/8e Regiment de Ligne

The 8e Regiment de Ligne was the most senior French line infantry regiment at Talavera.

The 8e Ligne could trace its lineage back to 1776 and the 1er and 3e battalions of the Regiment de Champagne.

In 1791 it was retitled the 8e Regiment d'Infanterie soon to be retitled during the turbulent times of the revolution, 8e demi-brigade d'Infanterie de Ligne in 1796, formed from the following units:

3e demi-brigade de Bataille (1er Battalion, 2e Regt. d'Inf, 5e Bat Vol. de l'Aisne and 5e Bat Vol de la Cote d'Or

1er, 2e and 3e Bataillons Volontaires de Lille

1er Bataillon auxillaire de l'Eure

1er Bataillon auxillaire de l'Aisne

In 1803 with the rise of Napoleon the regiment was retitled 8e Regiment d'Infanterie de Ligne under the command of Colonel Jean-Francois-Etienne Autie.

The 8e Ligne could boast a record second to none when it entered Spain with the battle honours of Austerlitz, Jena and Friedland to its credit and Colonel Autie at its head.

Interesting illustration of the 4e bataillon fanion, this battalion was sent
to join the forces operating along the Danube during the Austrian 1809 campaign

The uniform characteristics of the 8e Ligne appear to be a standard look of French infantry, pre 1812 with various forms of cuff flap illustrated from red in the Otto manuscript to white as seen in the Bucquoy plates illustrated here. The Otto depiction shows the voltigeur in 1807, with plain green plumes and epaulettes but with a unique green and yellow shako chord. The plate above would suggest otherwise by 1809. As with all this stuff you end up making an educated choice on what to depict.

Perhaps the most distinctive part of the uniform was the shako plate of the 8th which is consistent with all the depictions showing an Eagle of various designs.

I can find no references to the look of the musicians other than Rousselots  interpretation of the Drum Major in 1809 showing a pink crimson facing to the lapels, so will opt for that colour on my drummers

http://www.napoleon-series.org/military/organization/c_frenchinf1.html#8th

http://www.8eme.de/Regimentsgeschichte_Offiziere_der_8eme.php

Other sources used in this post;
Napoleon's Line Infantry, Osprey Men at Arms - Philip Haythornthwaite, Bryan Fosten
French Napoleonic Line Infantry - Emir Bukhari
Napoleon's Soldiers, The Grande Armee of 1807 (The Otto Manuscript) - Guy C Dempsey Jr.
Napoleonic Armies, A Wargamers Campaign Directory - Ray Johnson
Talavera, Wellington's First Victory in Spain - Andrew W. Field

French Infantry Painting Tutorial - PDF

Just a short note to let you know that I have pulled together all the pictures together with a few notes on the techniques of the recent series of posts covering how I paint French line infantry.

It's all in a pdf and much more handy for keeping digitally on an IPad or printing out for reference.

Just look in the right hand column under My Resources and Downloads.

Hope that is useful

Painting War - Napoleonic British Army

Last July I reviewed the Painting War - French Army publication featuring the work of Rafa Perez which made a welcome addition to the painters guide library for Napoleonic enthusiasts.

 http://jjwargames.blogspot.co.uk/2014/07/painting-war-napoleonic-french-army.html

So it was with a certain amount of anticipation that I felt when I immediately ordered my copy of the follow up edition looking at the British, KGL and Portuguese troops of the period featuring the work of Jose Antonio Bustamente.

The book layout follows the format of the previous title, with sections covering a general painting guide to standard parts of the uniforms and equipment, painting horses, doing base work and rank insignia. These are then followed with individual sections looking at particular subjects and the peculiarities involved in painting them.

Subjects covered include:
Centre Company Fusilier 27th Foot 1806
Centre Company Fusilier 36th Foot 1808
Captain 95th Rifles 1808
Sergeant Centre Company 2nd KGL in Great Coat 1811
Sergeant Light Company 3rd Guards 1809
Standard Bearer (Ensign) 43rd Foot 1809
Portuguese Cacador 6th Regt 1810
Brunswick Oel Jager 1813
Portuguese Grenadier Sergeant 23rd Infantry 1814
Fusilier Grenadier Company 92nd Highlanders 1815
Gunner Royal Artillery 1811
Gunner Royal Horse Artillery 1811
British Artillery Cannon 1811
Portuguese Trooper 8th Cavalry Regt 1810
Dragoon 5th Dragoon Guards 1812
Trumpeter, 2nd Life Guards 1812
Lieutenant 16th Light Dragoons 1815
Officer, 1st KGL Hussars 1815
Sir Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington 1812
Aide de Camp, Captain 7th Royal Fusiliers 1814
Sir Thomas Picton 1815
Sapper, 7th Royal Fusiliers 1811
Drummer 2/39th Foot 1811
Drummer 92nd Highlanders 1815
Lieutenant Royal Navy 1805
Royal Marine 1812
Surgeon 57th Foot 1813

I think you will agree a fairly extensive selection which gives a good spectrum of different uniform types, and is good stuff.

An improvement I noticed is that this title has a credit for an English proof reader, Major Michael Koznarsky, which seems to have removed some of the interesting prose of the previous title and makes it an easier read.

I have to say though that I was a little underwhelmed by this follow up title for a few key reasons.

I can't say I was taken with Jose Bustamante's painting style or basing technique. I know this is a personal view and others may find it great, but it didn't have a "wow" factor for me and I feel that is important to grab the reader and get them wanting to dive in and find out more. I flicked through the book and being slightly disappointed put it down and came back to it later to see if I was missing something.

The other issue for me is that British uniforms of this period may seem familiar to the general Napoleonic enthusiast, but there are, as with the other nations, peculiarities, that in 28mm and to an extent 18mm can and, to my mind, should be illustrated.

Firstly, Jose uses a Vallejo base of Burnt Cadmium Red, mid coat Carmine Red/white mix and scarlet highlight for what is described in the general section as the coat. However British infantry officers and soldiers wore different quality coats, with the better off officer version being a more scarlet hue and the common soldier having a more faded orange based cheaper tunic, that faded even more in the peninsula. In 28mm this is easily replicated with the officers and sergeants standing out from the common soldiers with their more deeper scarlet tunics.

The illustration of the 27th Inniskilling fusilier, is ok but fails to show a soldier from a buff faced battalion with his more typical buff coloured cross belts. In fact all belts are described as white, which they were not.

The illustration of the Portuguese Grenadier Sergeant of the 23rd Infantry has him still wearing the early war barretina shako, depicting a soldier of this type in 1814, when the Portuguese stove pipe shako would have been more likely.

I was a bit surprised at the colour shade for the British cannon which looks a bit strange in the light grey and bright gunmetal finish depicted. I would have expected a more bluer grey choice.

The choice of the blue for the water canteen seemed a bit to purple in hue for my taste with a more lighter blue being the colour used on the real examples I have seen

The section on insignia could have covered off the variation in British battalions around their headdress for example. There are lots of various illustration of shakos with small bugle horns above or below the standard Line Infantry shako plate denoting a light company man, or the 28th Foot with the badge at the back in recognition of their stand at Alexandria, or the red hackle carried by highlanders of the 42nd Foot (Black Watch), or the elite company wings carried by all companies of fusiliers.

And finally, with a book covering the British and Allied troops in the Peninsular War, where was the Spanish brown cloth worn by all sides in the conflict? Other than the standard brown Cacadore, not one subject was shown in an item of brown  replacement clothing.

So in conclusion, this new title is ok to a point but I think you will need to look at other material to get a more complete idea of the look of these troops.