Saturday, 18 July 2026

The World Turned Upside Down - His Majesty's 1st Light Infantry Composite Battalion, 1777.


British light infantry, whether in companies or composite battalions, fought in every major battle and many minor engagements during the AWI, generally able to match rebel irregulars and militia in skirmishing and “Indian fighting,” but also frequently called upon to act as crack shock troops in special operations, with the so-called “Light Bobs” earning a reputation among both friends and foes as the ruthless elite of the British Army. 

It was back in May last year that I showcased my new look British Combined Light Infantry unit based on figures I had worked on for my Mohawk collection and sporting their usual pattern 1775-76 Light Infantry caps with which they would likely originally have been seen in in the early battles of the war, and perhaps still worn for a time in the northern theatre on the border with Canada.

JJ's Wargames: British Light Infantry for the American War of Independence.

However for most of the war and very likely with units in the British main army under Howe and later Clinton. the combined battalions of British Light Infantry were more likely to have taken the field in the short coats and round hats adopted by the 'hatmen' battalions; this following the retraining of the British army in Halifax, after the withdrawal from Boston in March 1776, by the former light infantryman General Sir William Howe, a veteran of the Seven Years War and an officer very familiar with the special needs of conducting operations in the broken country of North America.

General Sir William Howe, 5th Viscount Howe

During the Seven Years' War Howe's service first brought him to America, and did much to raise his reputation, seeing him promoted to the rank of major in 1756, and joining the newly formed 58th (Rutlandshire) Regiment of Foot in February 1757, later promoted to lieutenant colonel in December of that year.

William Howe was certainly in the 'thick of it' during his service in North America, taking part in amphibious operations such as Louisbourg in 1758 and the Battle of Beauport on the 31st July, 1759, where British forces under Major General James Wolfe attempted an amphibious assault on French positions along the Beauport shore, approximately three miles east of Quebec City. The French, commanded by Louis-Joseph de Montcalm, had fortified the area with entrenchments, redoubts, and floating batteries, making it a strong defensive line; the British were unable to break the line, and Wolfe ordered a retreat at dusk, with British casualties totalling approximately 443 men, while French losses were comparatively light, at around 70.

He commanded the regiment at the Siege of Louisbourg in 1758, leading an amphibious landing under heavy enemy fire, and earning him a commendation from Wolfe, and it would be under Wolfe that he would command a light infantry battalion during the 1759 Siege of Quebec; seeing action in the Battle of Beauport, and chosen by Wolfe to lead the ascent from the Saint Lawrence River up to the Plains of Abraham that led to the British victory in the Battle of the Plains of Abraham on 13th September 1759.

British Light Infantry circa 1759
Gerry Embleton

After spending the winter in the defence of Quebec City, his regiment fought in the April 1760 Battle of Sainte-Foy and subsequent siege of Quebec; he then lead a brigade in the decisive Montreal Campaign under Jeffery Amherst before returning to England.

The practice of having light companies in regular regiments was ended in 1763, and regiments which had specialized in light tactics were either disbanded or reverted to standard regulations, but despite this, British officers such as Lieutenant-Colonel William Howe, who had served in the light formations during the war, retained an interest in the potential of light infantry on the regular establishments.

British Light Infantry 1756 to 1792 - British Infantry Uniforms, L&F Funcken
1. Lt. Company, 46th Foot, 1778, 2. Lt. Company, 5th Foot, 1771, 3. Light Infantry in 1758, 4. Light Infantry in 1761, 5. Officer about 1756, 6. Lt. Company about 1765, 7. Lt. Company of the 2nd Foot Guards in 1794, 8- 12 Examples of Light Infantry. 

In 1771, light-infantry companies were reintroduced into the line regiments of the British Army, and interest in just how the light infantry would function in future conflicts was exemplified by Howe when, in 1774, he formed a training camp for light troops at Salisbury, Wiltshire and demonstrated their abilities in front of King George III. 

Sketch of a Glamorgan light infantryman c.1778 by Philip James de Loutherbourg (1740–1812).
The Glamorgan Regiment was one of a number of militia regiments raised in
1778, following France’s entry into the war on the side of the Patriots. While not regulars, the
British militia were equipped in an almost identical fashion to the standing Army. 
(Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library)

At annual regimental reviews in Britain and Ireland during the 1770's it was common for the light company (sometimes augmented by the grenadier company) to deploy as skirmishers, operating as a screen for the battalion's front or flanks.

No other role was practical since infantry regiments rarely exercised together or in collaboration with other service arms, and British light infantry received no army-wide operational or tactical discipline until the appearance of Dundas' 1792 Rules and Regulations, however the expertise gained in the Seven Years War was somewhat codified in two semi-official sources, 'the instructions of Lieutenant-General Lord George Townshend, issued in May 1772 to regiments serving in Ireland on the subject of the training of the new light-companies; and Major-General Howe's light infantry drill of 1774.


Townshend's instructions covered matters such as;
  • Responsibilities of light infantry in the field.
  • Adoption of specific equipment.
  • Mastering of certain fieldcrafts and skills.
  • Tactics to enable the light company to skirmish in 'strong' terrain like woodlands, whether operating independently, in cooperation with its parent regiment or with other light companies as part of a composite battalion.
  • Manoeuvring by files.
  • Employment of new command methods to enable officers to maintain control over the loosely deployed light infantrymen in action.
  • Officers commanding companies or battalions of light infantry were required to establish particular signals via whistle or horn for particular manoeuvres such as advancing, retiring, or extending or contracting the frontage.
  • Giving fire in pairs rather than in volleys, requiring each file to work together so that one man remained loaded at all times. Ideally the two men were expected to share a tree from behind which they would alternately fire and retire a few feet to reload.
  • Soldiers recommended, through target shooting, to discover the best measure of powder for his firelock and to make up his own cartridges accordingly.
While Townshend's tactical instructions focussed principally on how a single light company might operate in action, Howe's 'Salisbury Drill' was by contrast designed for manoeuvring a number of light companies in concert as a composite light battalion, with the only manoeuvre divisions utilised being wings, companies and platoons, and with most manoeuvres designed to enable the battalion to change its formation and/or facing, with troops manoeuvring and forming by files instead of marching and wheeling by ranks.

British light Infantryman 4th Regiment of Foot 1775 - Don Troiani

Howe did not prescribe exact cadences, but instead distinguished three different paces, 'slow', 'quick' and 'run', and it is apparent that Howe, in his demonstration exercise on the 3rd October 1774 before the King at Richmond Park in London*, expected individual companies to detach themselves from the light battalion during combat to act semi-independently, whilst also expecting the battalion to manoeuvre and alter its formation and/or facing faster than its opponents so that it could, for example roll up an enemy line.

* Howe held a training camp on Salisbury Plain between 6th August and 22nd September 1774 where the assembled light companies of the 3rd, 11th, 21st, 29th, 32nd, 36th, and 70th Regiments practised his manoeuvres. Among the officers at the demonstration performed before the King, was Lieutenant Patrick Furguson of the 70th Regiment's light company, whom Howe particularly commended to the King, with the demonstration hailed at the time as one of the most realistic exercises staged anywhere in the later eighteenth century.


The outbreak of the American War of Independence, AWI (1775–83) accelerated the reintroduction of light-infantry formations and doctrines into the British Army, manifesting itself in the operational brigading of light companies into composite battalions and practical Army-wide changes, such as the use of open-order tactics and modifications that made uniforms more practical for campaigning in North America. 

While initially ill-equipped to deal with the revolutionary movement in America, by mid 1776 British forces stood poised for the counterstrike that would reclaim New York for the Crown and nearly destroy General George Washington’s recently formed Continental Army.

A Light Company man from the 40th Foot in the more practical campaign dress of 1776.
Operational brigading of light companies into composite battalions and practical Army-wide changes, that included the use of open-order tactics and modifications, as illustrated here, that made uniforms more practical for campaigning in North America. 

Their success on the battlefield was mirrored not only by the light companies of the American Loyalist Provincial regiments, but also by the Continental Army, which established its own permanent light-infantry corps in 1777, and by the time of the siege of Yorktown (September 28–October 19, 1781), the Continental Army’s light infantry regiments comprised an entire division. 

Though the light infantry were highly active during the AWI, many of the light-infantry lessons learned by the British Army were once again forgotten at the end of the conflict, and British forces initially found themselves struggling to deal with the massed skirmishers deployed by Revolutionary France in the 1790s, and it would take the efforts of AWI veterans, such as Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, to champion light-infantry tactics in time for success against Napoleon.

A portrait of Captain Thomas Hewitt, 10th Regiment of Foot, 1781, by William Tate (1747–1806). Hewitt received his commission in 1772, becoming a lieutenant in 1775 and a captain in 1777. A year later he was given command of the 10th Foot’s light-infantry company. His portrait gives a good indication of the uniform changes adopted by the light infantry, including the black belts, shoulder wings, red waistcoat, the small buttons used on the jacket, his light infantry cap, and the short officer’s fusil and bayonet. The red cord over the belt on his left shoulder is doubtless attached to a powder horn slung under his right arm. (Image courtesy of the National Army Museum, London)

When General Howe organised his forces in preparation for the New York Campaign (August - November 1776) he had three composite light infantry battalions under Brigadier General Alexander Leslie.

  • 1st Battalion Light Infantry, Major Thomas Musgrave 415 men all ranks comprising men from the 4th, 5th, 10th, 17th, 22nd, 23rd, 27th, 35th and 38th Foot.
  • 2nd Battalion Light Infantry, Major John Maitland 416 men all ranks comprising men from the 40th, 43rd, 44th, 45th, 49th, 52nd, 55th, 63rd and 64th Foot.
  • 3rd Battalion Light Infantry, Major Henry Johnson 284 men all ranks comprising men from the 15th, 28th, 33rd, 37th, 46th, 54th and 57th Foot.

By the following year for the Philadelphia Campaign, Howe had reorganised his light battalions into just two battalions as part of the army reserve and vanguard that included the Light Dragoons, two battalions of Grenadiers and two battalions of Guards, Queens Rangers and Ferguson's Rifles;
  • 1st Battalion Light Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Abercromby, comprising men from the 4th, 5th, 10th, 15th, 17th, 22nd, 23rd, 27th, 28th, 33rd, 35th, 38th and 44th Foot.
  • 2nd Battalion Light Infantry, Major John Maitland, comprising men from the 37th, 40th, 43rd, 45th, 46th, 49th, 52nd, 55th, 57th, 63rd, 64th  and 71st Foot.
The total men for the two battalions 74 officers, and 1,052 men or 1,126 men all ranks, so about 560 men in each.

Colonel Robert Abercrombie in 1788, 
as British Commander in Chief in India,
Painting by George Romney.
Abercrombie commanded the 1st Light Infantry in the Philadelphia campaign of 1777

My light infantry battalion represents the 1st Battalion Light Infantry under Lieutenant Colonel Robert Abercromby as they might have looked during the Philadelphia Campaign.


On August 25th 1777 the British army landed at Head of Elk, covered by two sloops and four rowing galleys with Lord Cornwallis and Colonel von Donop coming ashore at Turkey Point to command the Jaegers, British Light Infantry, Grenadier and Guards battalions moving forward to secure the area.

Over the next days the Jaegers and Light Infantry, some 1,500 men, would spend the next nine days screening, patrolling and gathering intelligence on terrain and enemy movements, until the army commenced its movement out of their bridgehead on the 3rd September east along the Old King's Road to Aiken Tavern, before turning north towards Iron Hill and Cooch's Bridge over the Christiana Creek.

A period military map depicting the preliminary British movements in the 1777 Philadelphia campaign in Maryland and Delaware, including the site (near Iron Hill) of the Battle of Cooch's Bridge - Library of Congress.

Their advance was monitored by a light infantry corps of Continental Army and militia forces under Brigadier General William Maxwell, with a force of about 800 to 1000 men (6-800 Light Infantry and 200 men of the Chester County Militia), that had based itself at Cooch's Bridge, near Newark, Delaware, a force created by General Washington after he had sent Colonel Daniel Morgan and his Rifle Corps north to join the American forces contesting General Burgoyne's advance on Albany.


The small force of mounted Jaeger leading the British advance were ambushed by the American light infantry in the woods on either side of the road leading toward Cooch's Bridge and calling up reinforcements from the rest of the Jaegers, 1st and 2nd Light Infantry, they flushed the Americans out and drove them across the bridge in a running fight, with the 1st Light Infantry attempting to turn the right flank of the rebel force and cut off their retreat route north.

Map of the battle at Cooch's Bridge on September 3, 1777.
File:Battle of Cooch's Bridge.jpg - Wikimedia Commons

As the 2nd Light Infantry and Jaegers pushed the rebels beyond the bridge, the 1st Light Infantry found themselves bogged down in a swamp near the Muddy Run creek and were thus unable to close the trap on Maxwell's force, the skirmish leaving about 20 to 30 killed and wounded on both sides.

With Washington determined to make a stand to defend Philadelphia, the British received intelligence that the American army had crossed the Brandywine Creek on September 9th, and was preparing for its defence at Chads Ford, with the deep narrow creek valley offering a natural obstacle to contest the British advance. 

Ensign William Augustus West, Viscount Cantelupe c 1778, 3rd Guards.
Contemporary eyewitness and artist at the Battle of Brandywine.

On September 10th after careful reconnaissance of the American positions, the British army split into two divisions, with the left division under Lord Cornwallis, that included Hessian Mounted and Foot Jaegers, British Light Infantry, Grenadier and Foot Guard battalions, the 3rd and 4th Brigades, the Hessian Grenadiers, two squadrons of the 16th Light Dragoons, Black Pioneers and artillery attached to each brigade, with Sir William Howe accompanying the division on the march.


A battery of Rebels opened on Brandywine Heights the 11th of September 1777 in the county of Birmingham - Watercolour painted by Ensign William Augustus West, Viscount Cantelupe, 1777.
British Ensign William Augustus West, Viscount Cantelupe, fought at the Battle of Brandywine and sketched this scene in his journal. It is the only known eyewitness sketch of the battle to survive. In the foreground, the British Guards Brigade is formed in a battle line along a fence, with the artillery attached to them upon the road to their rear. In the background, to the left, can be seen the Light Companies of the Guards attacking the flanks of the 1st Maryland Brigade, while they attempt to form up. The rising smoke at the centre of the scene is from the firing of three Continental Army cannons on the hill top. Details such as various farm buildings and fences are visible in this sketch. To the left of the Guards, the Light Infantry were similarly deployed ready to advance along the Birmingham Road.

The Right Division was commanded by Lieutenant General Wilhelm von Knyphausen, commanding Ferguson's Rifles, the Queen's Rangers, 1st and 2nd Brigades, Stirn's Hessian Brigade, two battalions of the 71st Highland Regiment, a squadron of 16th Light Dragoons and attached artillery.


Von Knyphausen would make a show of force upon the American front at Chad's Ford, while Cornwallis would lead the Left Division across the overlooked Jeffrie's Ford, far outflanking the American position.

In the van of one of Cornwallis' columns were the two composite light infantry battalions, who fighting through the streets of Birmingham, eventually came under fire from the guns of Stirling's Division on the hill above them.

The 1st Battalion Light Infantry at the Battle of Brandywine, September 11th, 1777 - Stephen Walsh (Osprey).

The crest of the hill was held by Brigadier General Thomas Conway's 3rd Pennsylvania Brigade, who through their repeated advances to deliver heavy fire, forced the 1st Light Infantry to take a prone position at the base of the hill and hold their position.

Eventually with the support of two nearby grenadier companies, five companies of the 1st Light Infantry charged forward up the hill, driving the Pennsylvanians back, and capturing five artillery pieces in the process.


The American right flank was eventually overrun, and Knyphausen’s forces crushed the left wing at Chadds Ford, and despite fierce resistance, including a rear-guard action by General Nathanael Greene and the defence of Washington’s retreat by Polish General Casimir Pulaski, the Continental Army was forced to withdraw northeast toward Philadelphia, which thanks to the Marquis de Lafayette, though wounded, helped ensure an organized retreat.

The morning after Brandywine, Howe appears to have displayed his somewhat characteristic lethargy in the aftermath of a victory by not immediately ordering a pursuit of the beaten foe, and it would not be until the 15th September, on receipt of news that the Americans were still within striking distance on the Lancaster Road in the Great Valley, that the the two British columns set off from Dilworth, Cornwallis that evening, and Von Knyphausen on the morning of the 16th, aiming to rendezvous at Goshen.

Detail from a 1777 map of the environs around Philadelphia, showing Goshen at left centre, with White Horse to the north along the Lancaster Pike. Howell’s Tavern was located near Truduffrin (Tredyffrin). Valley Forge is at top centre. (Library of Congress)

Washington had originally planned to protect both the capital and the vital supply areas to the west from behind the River Schuylkill, but then changed his plan and recrossed the river to face the British, who had remained stationary around Dilworth for four days, gathering supplies, transport and ministering to their wounded.

Washington learned of Howe's plans and prepared for battle, but before the two armies could fully engage, a torrential downpour ensued. Significantly outnumbered, and with tens of thousands of cartridges ruined by the rain, Washington opted to retreat, and bogged down by rain and mud, the British allowed Washington and his army to withdraw.


In the short action that became known as the Battle of the Clouds, the Jaegers advanced towards Boot Tavern at the head of Von Knyphausen's column to attack American skirmishers in a nearby wood, only to find their muskets fouled and their cartridges soaked in the sudden thunderstorm and carried out their attack with hunting swords in hand and even managed to carry off 34 prisoners.


The 1st Light Infantry at the head of Cornwallis' column blundered into General Wayne's Pennsylvania militia on another road heading north out of Goshen at around 3:00, who gave way in a panicked retreat, suffering 10 killed and wounded, before 'rain stopped play', with total casualties to both sides amounting to no more than about 100 on each, but with the likelihood that the torrential downpour had saved the American army from almost certain defeat.

Howe captured Philadelphia, the seat of the Continental Congress, on September 26th, leaving a garrison of about 3,000 troops in the city and stationing the bulk of his 9,000-strong force in nearby Germantown, Pennsylvania.

Sir William Howe captured Philadelphia, the seat of the Continental Congress, on September 26th 1777.

Washington, commanding roughly 8,000 Continental soldiers and 3,000 militia, saw an opportunity to strike the divided British forces and planned a surprise attack using a complex four-column approach.

After dusk on October 3rd, the American force began the 16-mile march southward toward Germantown in complete darkness. To differentiate friend from foe in the darkness, the troops were instructed to put a piece of white paper in their hats to mark them out, and the Americans remained undetected by the Jaeger pickets, and the main British camp was subsequently unaware of the American advance.

Interestingly early on the morning of the 4th October, the 1st Light Infantry captured an American scout and learned of the impending attack, but incredibly this information was not relayed.

The Battle of Germantown 4th October 1777, illustrating the movements of the 1st Light Infantry battalion on the right flank of the British line.

A dense morning fog caused confusion among the American troops, and around 120 British soldiers, commanded by Colonel Thomas Musgrave of the 40th Foot, fortified themselves in the stone Chew House (Cliveden), which became a focal point of heavy fighting. Repeated American assaults on the house failed, and some American units became disoriented, even firing on their own columns, whilst other divisions, including one under General Anthony Wayne, became separated in the fog.

The British counterattacked, exploiting the confusion and regrouping effectively, and despite initial gains, the Americans were forced to retreat, leaving the British in control of Germantown and Philadelphia.

The last stand of the 9th Virginia Regiment at Germantown as depicted by Don Troiani.
A combination of running out of ammunition, and the collapse of the American left flank at Germantown saw the capture of the 9th Virginia Regiment to British units counterattacking, including the 1st Light Infantry.

The 1st Light Infantry were positioned on the right of the British line and it was their pickets who opposed and were driven back on to their supports with the arrival of Greene's Division along the Limekiln Road towards Luken's Mill. The 5th and 55th Regiments had initially been ordered to support the 40th in Chew House, but with the arrival of Greene's men were drawn off to support the right flank, followed by the 15th and 37th Regiments; and together with the reformed 1st Light's counterattacked Weedon's and McDougal's Brigades, as the American's started to run short of ammunition, effectively breaking the American left and seeing the capture of the entire 9th Virginia Regiment en masse.


The 1st Light Infantry may have thought that after Germantown their busy year was concluded, but they still had one more action to contest before the year was out.

In the aftermath of the Battle of Germantown, General Howe abandoned his camp near Germantown and withdrew the British army behind a newly constructed line of redoubts closer to Philadelphia and anchored on the Rivers Delaware and Schuykill.


Washington moved his army to Whitpain, 5 miles closer to Philadelphia, on October 20th, observing the construction of the British defences, with an army numbering 8,313 Continentals and 2,717 militia, although the terms of enlistment of many soldiers from Maryland and Virginia were due to expire, dispatching a brigade to assist with the defence of Forts Mifflin and Mercer, on the Delaware River. 

On November 2nd, at the recommendation of his council of war, Washington marched his forces to White Marsh, approximately 13 miles  northwest of Philadelphia, and over a period of four weeks the army began to build redoubts and defensive works, including abatis in front of their encampment.


The evacuation of Forts Mercer and Mifflin in mid-November, after British siege operations finally forced a withdrawal, saw the opening up the Delaware River for British shipping, supplies and reinforcements, whilst Washington also received reinforcements of four brigades in the wake of the Northern Army's victory at Saratoga, and with the close proximity of both armies minor skirmishes between light troops increased in intensity throughout November, with almost daily losses being incurred by both the British and the Americans.

By early December, Howe decided, despite having written to Colonial Secretary Lord George Germain requesting to be relieved of his command, that he was in a position to make one last attempt to destroy Washington's army before the onset of winter, and he began preparations for an attack on the American forces.

Howe marched the larger part of his army out of Philadelphia on the night of December 4th, with the advanced guard, including the 1st Light Infantry, commanded by Lord Cornwallis, and the main body by von Knyphausen, marching to the right of the American positions via the Germantown road.

The Battle of Whitemarsh, fought December 5th–8th, 1777 - Osprey Campaign (Philadelphia 1777)

Just after midnight on December 5th, Cornwallis' vanguard, which consisted of two British light infantry battalions, skirmished with an American cavalry patrol under the command of Capt. Allen McLane near Three Mile Run on Skippack Road, McLane sending a messenger to Washington, alerting him of the British movements. The British halted on Chestnut Hill, just south of the American defences, and waited for daybreak.

In response Washington sent out a force to skirmish with them, and Brig. Gen. James Irvine of the Pennsylvania militia took 600 men through the Wissahickon Valley toward Chestnut Hill, with Brig. Gen. James Potter's brigade of about 1,000 Pennsylvania militia and Webb's 2nd Connecticut Regiment of 200 men moved to screen Irvine's right.


Around noon, Irvine's detachment encountered the British light infantry on the north side of Chestnut Hill, with the Pennsylvania militia getting off the first volley, but were soon routed by the British, and it was while attempting to rally his fleeing troops, Irvine had three fingers shot off, and was taken prisoner when he fell from his horse. Potter's brigade immediately fled, despite orders to advance and skirmish with the British light infantry, whilst the 2nd Connecticut made a brief stand, killing three and wounding eleven, including British Capt. Sir James Murray-Pulteney, shot through the thigh.

Lt. Col. Robert Abercromby decided to push his advantage after scattering Irvine's troops, and pushed north to capture St. Thomas Episcopal Church, located on a hillock. Howe arrived a short while later, and ascended to the top of the church's bell tower in an attempt to view the American positions, and deciding the American defences were too strong to attack with his present force, he opted to shell them with artillery fire; however, his guns didn't have the range and he camped on Chestnut Hill that night, and planned a new way of attack for the following day.

Sometime after 1:00 am on December 7th, Howe marched the British Army back through Germantown, and then to Jenkintown (see the map above to follow these movements), where they remained until noon. As the British movements were concealed by a ridge on Chestnut Hill, Washington did not become aware of Howe's manoeuvring until 8:00 am immediately moving Morgan's Rifle Corps and Col. Mordecai Gist's Maryland militia eastward to cover his left flank.


Marching to the base of Edge Hill, situated about a mile from the American left wing and occupied by about 1,000 men of the Maryland militia and Morgan's Rifles, Howe redeployed his troops so that his left faced the American centre and his right facing the enemy's left, and just after noon ordered his forces to advance.

A confused fight developed in the thick woodland below Edge Hill, with each side ultimately withdrawing from the field, but not before the Maryland militia were attacked on their flanks as they attempted to retire, seeing them suffer heavy casualties, whilst Abercromby's 1st Light Infantry drove back Morgan's riflemen, content to let them withdraw back to their lines, with Howe deciding the following day that no further gain could be made with his expedition and ordering a return march to Philadelphia, marking an end to British campaigning in 1777.


The British Crown light troops in Howe's army, principally the Queen's Rangers, Hessian Jaegers and British Light Infantry were perhaps the most heavily engaged of all the units during the Philadelphia campaign, being in the vanguard of the army during marches, occupied with the duties of outposts and skirmishers, and in the case of the Light Infantry expected to serve as elite shock troops at the spearhead of a major attack.


My 1st Light Infantry are composed of the AW52 - (British Infantry in slouch hats and roundabout jackets, firing line, plus command, and a few charging figures for variety) from Perry Miniatures, slightly adapted to capture the look of light infantry rather than 'hatmen' by the addition of some spare powder horns and shoulder wings, and black cross belts.

By using the 'firing line' pose I can readily rebase these figures to depict the battalion in skirmish formation, but in time I intend to add some other skirmish poses to better represent that type of formation as well as the traditional open order line as depicted here.



The unit is 24-figures strong to better represent the battalion at about full strength, of about 500 men, with the arrangement of unit facings that composed the 1st Combined Grenadiers and 1st Light Infantry battalions in the Philadelphia campaign illustrated above together with the units providing their respective companies which I used to simply work out a percentage of the unit to be seen in the appropriate facings.

Next up, work turns to the 4th Virginia Continental Regiment, so as usual, more anon.

JJ

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