All at Sea - Spanish Third Rates of Renown (Argonauta)

Finisterre - Carlos Parrilla Penagos
https://www.carlosparrillapenagos.es/pintura-naval/
The 80-gun Argonauta, flying the pennant of Admiral Gravina at her mizzen, and leading the van of the Combined Fleet, exchanges broadsides with HMS Hero in the van of Vice Admiral Sir Robert Calder's squadron during the Battle of Cape Finisterre 22nd July 1805

The final ship to present in the series looking at the Third Rates of Renown is a great one to finish on and described in her time, along with her sister Neptuno, as one of the best ships in Europe, namely the Spanish 80-gun ship of the line, Argonauta designed by Julian Martin de Rematosa and built in El Ferrol, launching there on the 28th June 1798.

However the launch of the Argonauta also signalled a significant point in the trajectory of the Spanish navy and Spain's future role as a European power at that time, in that the years of war and decline had started to take effect and the ship would be the last Spanish warship to be launched until after Trafalgar with the previous rhythm of three to four warships built a year now no longer possible with King Charles IV treasury unable to fund that level of investment as well as maintaining the fleet as it was.

On the 28th April 1799 the Argonauta together with two frigates and a brig departed El Ferrol under her new commander Captain Juan Herrera Davila, bound for Roquefort to join a French squadron as part of a plan to join the French in an invasion of Ireland.

Captain Juan Herrera Davila, Argonauta's first commander
https://todoavante.es/index.php?title=Herrera_Davila_y_Raffaelini,_Juan_Maria_de_Biografia

During their time there waiting for the French to complete their preparations, the port was attacked by a British naval squadron on the 2nd July under Rear Admiral Charles Morice Pole, supported by bomb ships, with the affair ending with the British ships being driven off by a combination of fire from a French mortar battery outranging the bombs and French gunboats that succeeded in driving them away.

Rear Admiral Sir Charles Morice Pole

The British maintained their blockade of Rochefort but in September the Spanish squadron managed to put to sea, attempting to join the Spanish and French ships under Admirals Bruix and Mazarredo in Brest, but on finding that port blockaded by forty British ships decided to abort their mission and return to El Ferrol.

Rear Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, seen here in a picture from 1799,
led the abortive raid on El Ferrol on the 25th-26th August 1800

With a Spanish squadron of six ships of the line, four frigates and two brigs in El Ferrol, the port also soon found itself under British blockade by a detachment from the British Channel fleet under Rear-Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren who initiated a landing on August 25th-26th 1800 with troops under the command of Lieutenant General Sir James Pultney who succeeded in silencing a nearby fort overlooking the bay in which they were landed and reaching the heights above the port, which it seems was completely open to attack, but with Pultney convinced that he was facing stiffer defences than anticipated, misled by reports from captured prisoners, he withdrew the force the next day, leaving Argonauta and her sister ships to fight another day.

On the 20th April 1801 in company with San Fernando 98-guns, Real Carlos 112-guns, San Hermenegildo 112-guns, San Augustin 74-guns the Argonauta left Ferrol bound for Cadiz to join the Spanish squadron under Admiral Don Jose de Mazzaredo.

On the 6th July French Rear-Admiral Charles Linois squadron of three ships and a frigate had been attacked on route to Cadiz by Rear-Admiral Sir James Saumarez at the First Battle of Algeciras, and with the British beaten off and withdrawing across the bay to Gibraltar to make repairs, Linois requested support from the Spanish in Cadiz to escort his equally battered ships to the Spanish port.

Thus on the 9th July the El Ferrol squadron now under Mazzeredo's command accompanied by the French 74-gun Saint Antoine, recently purchased by France from Spain and the frigates Santa Sabina and Perla each of 34-guns left Cadiz to join their beleaguered French allies, before escorting them back to Cadiz via the Gibraltar Straits on the 12th July, triggering the Second Battle of Algeciras as Saumarez set off in pursuit from Gibraltar with the evening sky darkening as both squadrons moved to the horizon.

The Second Battle of Algeciras - Thomas Whitcombe
The two Spanish 112-gun first rates, Real Carlos and San Hermenegildo blast each other into blazing wrecks as HMS Superb who caused the Spanish confusion has progressed to attack the French San Antoine, seen beyond the two Spanish men of war, as the following British ships make best speed to catch up in her wake.

The battle that followed was a confusing night action that allowed the fastest of the British ships HMS Superb to close with the Franco-Spanish rear and provoke the two confused Spanish first rates into firing into each other, resulting in their joint destruction as seen in Thomas Whitcombe's picture above.

Following that exchange of fire Superb would encounter the newly minted French 74-gun Saint Antoine, taking her in a short sharp thirty minute fight that left her captain wounded upon his own quarterdeck.

Some honour was restored by a creditable rearguard fought by the French Formidable under her new commander Captain Troude who beat off an attack by HMS Venerable, leaving the British 74 dismasted with 105 casualties and in need of assistance from her comrades as the Frenchman made his escape

However the final casualty bill tells its own tale with overall Allied casualties amounting to more than 2,000 men in killed, wounded and captured with the British force suffering 119 killed and wounded in return.

Argonauta, for her part avoided combat and arrived in Cadiz the next morning with no casualties or damage.

The Argonauta would continue to operate from Cadiz for the rest of the war escorting mercury and gold convoys between Vera Cruz and Havana and her home port before being laid up there in ordinary in 1803 following the Peace of Amiens,

With the recommencement of war Argonauta was recommissioned in December 1804 and with the evolving Napoleonic plan for the invasion of Britain the following year, newly coppered and careened in January 1805,  joined what would become the Trafalgar campaign in April of that year with the arrival of Villeneuve's French fleet from Toulon, having evaded the attentions of Vice-Admiral Nelson's Mediterranean squadron and prompting high praise from the normally pessimistic French Admiral, describing the Argonauta as 'excellent'.

Spanish Admiral Frederico Gravina

On the 9th of April, the Combined fleet set sail from Cadiz heading to the Caribbean with Admiral Frederico Gravina hoisting his pennant aboard the Argonauta under the command of Flag-Captain Rafael de Hore, arriving in Fort de France Bay, Martinique on the 14th May.

Following the taking of the British held Diamond Rock off Martinique, Villeneuve set in motion the next stage of his orders, to head back to Europe with his twenty ships of the line on the 11th June only to be intercepted by Vice Admiral Sir Robert Calder's Rochefort squadron directed to their station off Cape Finisterre by the insightful command of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Barham, guessing the intent of the Combined Fleet to get into the Bay of Biscay and raise the blockades on the French and Spanish ports along the coast.

Sir Robert Calder, pictured here in 1797 as a Rear Admiral - Lemuel Francis Abbott (National Maritime Museum)
History to my mind has been rather harsh on Sir Robert Calder who failed to gain the crushing victory the nation desired, that job left to Nelson, but who did prevent a very serious threat of invasion by forcing Admiral Villeneuve to abandon his orders to bring a forty plus ship fleet into the Channel

In what would turn out to be a controversial battle that would put paid to Napoleon's plan of mustering a large Franco-Spanish fleet in the Channel, Sir Robert Calder spotted the Combined Fleet in foggy conditions at about 12.00 p.m. on the 22nd July 1805 and brought on an action that succeeded in forcing Villeneuve to turn south eventually ending back in Cadiz, but failed to destroy a significant number of his ships to remove the the threat his fleet posed, once and for all.

Admiral Sir Robert Calder's Action off Cape Finisterre 23rd July 1805 - William Anderson
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Admiral_Sir_Robert_Calder%27s_Action_off_Cape_Finisterre,_23_July_1805_RMG_BHC0540.tiff
Calder's flagship Prince of Wales is depicted in the centre foreground with the misty conditions, made worse by clouds of gun smoke that characterised the battle making it extremely difficult for both sides to conduct accurate gunnery.

The two fleets manoeuvred themselves close enough to exchange broadsides through the murk at about 5.30 p.m. as Captain Alan Gardner of HMS Hero on his own initiative and responding to Calder's signal to 'Engage More Closely' turned to port (larboard) and led the British van on a parallel course with the lead ship in the Allied van, Argonauta; being raked by the Spanish flagship as she turned, but escaping serious damage, apparently because Argonauta was listing to port due to unbalanced stowage in her hold, preventing her lower gun deck from opening fire.

This antique plan of the Battle of Cape Finisterre, gives an idea of how the action unfolded in three movements from the preparation to turn and engage at about 4.30 p.m. to the close of the action at just after 9.00 p.m. leaving two Spanish third rates as prizes. I have added my summary of each movement and highlighted the respective flagships in red blue and yellow together with the position of the two captured ships in black.

Once the turn was completed Gardner opened return fire and the action became general as each opposing ship came up with the fleets swinging onto a south-westerly course.

The mass firing of multiple cannon only added to the foggy murk forcing opposing ships to concentrate the return fire on muzzle flashes in the growing gloom and with the scene becoming more chaotic, Calder signalled to call off the action at about 8.30 p.m.; but with most ships failing to see her signal, the action continued on to past 9 p.m. with the longer line of the Combined Fleet being led by the Spanish seeing them suffer the worst from the exchange of fire and two of their number, San Rafael 80-guns and Firme 74-guns left dismasted to be captured at the close.

Argonauta is reported to have suffered her mizzen and foremast knocked down together with six killed and five wounded after her battle with Hero who in turn had serious damage to her foremast and forespars together with the loss of one killed and four wounded. Overall, as well as losing the two ships, Villeneuve's fleet had lost 476 men killed and wounded and he reported another 800 men laid low from sickness, whilst Calder's squadron lost 39 killed and 159 wounded with most of the damage caused to the ships rigging, masts and spars.

Arogonauta sports her metal deck with two bow chasers mounted on the forecastle adding to the ferocity of her figurehead.

Of course both sides claimed a victory, with Calder going so far to describe it as 

'A very decisive action which lasted upward of four hours, when I found it necessary to bring up the squadron to cover the captured ships.'

However Villeneuve had a completely different impression of matters when he conveniently ignored his losses stating;

'The enemy then made off. He had several vessels crippled aloft and the field of battle remained ours. Cries of joy and victory were heard from all our ships.' (except, no doubt, from Firme and San Rafeal!)

Who said 'Fake News' was anything new? It takes me back to the good old days of the First Gulf War with Radio Baghdad telling everyone about how well they were all doing with bomb explosions going off in the background of their broadcasts!

San Rafael in the thick of the action at the Battle of Cape Finisterre 23rd July 1805, before finally striking, dismasted to Sir Robert Calder's squadron.

Either way, Napoleon's invasion was off and he made plans to march on Austria, as the Combined Fleet happily sailed into El Ferrol for repairs and recuperation before heading south to Cadiz in August, whilst Calder was apparently not fooling anyone and would look forward to a court-martial to clear his name and reputation, for actually doing a reasonable job at a strategic level in conditions that did not allow for a much better result probably.

The metal deck seen from her starboard stern quarter displays realigned signal lockers on her poop and a unique spar deck arrangement for her boat stowage.

When the Argonauta left Cadiz with the Combined Fleet on the 20th October she sailed as part of Admiral Gravina's Squadron of Observation, the largest formation in the Combined Fleet with twelve ships of the line and two frigates with Gravina, second in command, flying his pennant aboard the Principe Asturias 112-guns and with Argonauta under a new commander Captain Antonio Pareja y Serrano de Leon, who had previous combat experience of a fleet action having commanded the frigate Perla at the Battle of Cape St Vincent in 1797.

Captain Antonio Pareja y Serrano de Leon - Naval Museum of Madrid

At just after midday when action commenced as HMS Royal Sovereign broke through the Allied line, the Argonauta was sailing slightly behind the lee quarter of her French namesake Argonaute 74-guns and to the lee of the San Ildefonso 74-guns, engaging ships in Admiral Collingwood's lee column as they closed.

The seventh British ship to penetrate the Allied line was the Achille 74-guns under Captain Richard King who passed astern of Montanes 74-guns at about 12.45 p.m. and raking her before luffing up on her rear starboard quarter and pouring in several pistol shot range broadsides that would cause the death of her commander Captain Don Jose Alcedo  and the wounding of his second in command together with 20 killed and 29 wounded.

My interpretation of the Montanes, the first Spanish ship engaged by HMS Achille

After this half hour exchange of fire, the Achille turned away to go to the aid of the hard pressed HMS Belleisle 74-guns but before he could make headway, the Argonauta appeared out of the smoke on the starboard side and Captain King ordered the Achille hove to on the Argonauta's larboard bow to commence an hour long exchange of broadsides, with Captain Pareja leaving a report of his experience of being on the receiving end of such a lengthy cannonade;

'At this hour my ship had all the guns on the quarter-deck and the poop dismounted, a great number of guns in the batteries were out of action, as much on account of the pieces (being damaged) as from want of crews, the result of the numerous dead and wounded among them. . . . 

The whole rigging was utterly destroyed. so there were no shrouds left to the masts - save one to the main-mast - and they were threatening to fall at any minute, being shot through. In this situation it was very evident that the ship could make but slight and feeble resistance. . . 

With these inexpressible feelings I was taken below to have my wounds dressed. . . my second having sent half an hour later to inform me that over and above the injuries we had already sustained, the ship was making much water . . . and had lost her rudder . . .

At this point Pareja gave his second-in-command authority to strike, with Argonauta shutting her lower gun decks and ceasing firing with the battered ship finally being boarded by 1st Lieutenant Owen Royal Marines from HMS Belleisle after the Achille having demolished Montanes and Argonauta found herself embroiled in yet another close range scrap with the French Berwick 74-guns taking another half hour exchange to demolish the French ship as well leaving her with 75 dead including her captain and 125 wounded.

Argonauta had suffered in a similar fashion with 100 killed and 203 men wounded, and it seems her damage below the waterline was severe as she foundered on the 26th October after being taken in tow by HMS Polyphemus.

At Trafalgar Argonauta would have been armed with 30 x 36 pounder long guns on her lower deck, 32 x 18-pdrs on her upper deck 16 x 8-pdrs on her quarterdeck and forecastle together with 12 x 30-pdr howitzers, some of which were mounted on the poop.

Her crew was over compliment with 798 men aboard composed of 458 naval personnel, 279 infantry and 61 marine artillery, 43 percent being soldiers.

Sources consulted for this post:

The Trafalgar Companion - Mark Adkins

The Battle of Trafalgar - Geoffrey Bennett

https://threedecks.org/index.php?display_type=show_ship&id=2660

https://www.todoababor.es/listado/navio-argonauta.htm

https://www.todoababor.es/articulos/epilogo-parteargonauta.htm

https://www.todoababor.es/listado/navio-montanes.htm

That concludes this series of posts looking at the Third Rates of Renown and next in the All at Sea project I will show the results of the recently completed work on the gunboats, 64-gun and 80-gun third rate conversions. In addition I have another book review and I plan to take a look at a recent Kickstarter I supported a few months ago, Terrain Essentials by Mel Bose, the Terrain Tutor and his book about making Wargames Terrain.

Unhappy King Charles - Vassal

 

Steve and my adventures into the fun world of Vassal remote interactive boardgaming has continued following the fun we had with Mr Madison's War to take a look at another Card Driven Game (CDG) from GMT, this time focussing on the dramatic events of the English Civil War in the Charles Vasey designed game, Unhappy King Charles (UKC).

As in previous 'getting to grips with a new module process' we spent the first few turns of play working our way through setting up the game, made somewhat easier in Vassal, with the module allowing the card decks to be easily arranged at the click of a button and with units already in position on the map at start of play.

We have now got into a very well practiced modus operandi when starting to play a module which we are unfamiliar with, by doing a bit of warm up reading of the rules and various playbooks, sharing the knowledge on a pre-game chat online, with us then following the step by step of the sequence of play, very often trying things out just to see how to follow the rules, for example in this case, running a siege or playing a field battle, whilst feeling out what the game is offering in terms of victory conditions that drive the opposing strategies of play.

Usually as here, the end result is not really the objective, but rather both of us getting a feel for the way the game plays and trying out things recommended in the playbook guidance to gradually develop our own sense of the mechanics and work out our own strategies.

The UKC map as depicted on Vassal shows the position of our game at the end of 1642 as both sides have staked out their respective territory and the likely areas of battle in the midlands and north to secure political control and securing of vital national assets that will reward one side at the expense of the other.

Of course knowing the rules of play is one thing, but, as with all CDG's, the core of the action is very much determined with the cards one holds versus that of the enemy and very often the ability to play a poor hand just as well as when the poker face is driven to the extreme hiding an unbelievable one.

As with all CDG's the cards really create the historical flavour that underpins all the on map activity and the decision points to play for the event described or use the action points for movement and other such activity.

So for our playtest Steve took the role of the King, whilst I ran the clippers around the fringe to assume the role of a Godly Puritan Parliamentary Grandee.

Being very familiar with games like Washington's War, a close relative in many ways to UKC, Steve and I were well versed in the placing of political control markers and looking to strangle enemy areas by cutting them off with a PC marker at an important node or junction.

The map key illustrates the key features that keep the map equally functional and attractive to the eye

Equally the role of field armies to protect and police those areas was also very familiar, all be it with several differences that make the English Civil War quite different from the American War of Independence.

In UKC the players soon start to appreciate that their respective armies are a lot more unwieldy and problematic in keeping them in the field, so no marching between towns dropping off brigades enroute, a continual loss of manpower through desertion checks at the end of each turn and small armies of two to four brigades moving further than the larger gathering of troops, with battle casualties often limited to a brigade at most and two in the worst cases, making battles for less decisive than in other horse and musket eras, but with casualties suffered being taken off the order of battle permanently and thus irrevocably reducing the manpower available in an area for future recruitment.

Late 1643 and the war tilts slightly in favour of Parliament as the Navy increases their support and vital areas in the North and Midlands go blue as the the Earl of Essex takes Reading in the south after a siege and field battle, driving off a relief force from Oxford. 

As well as difficulties raising, maintaining and moving armies, the commanders on each side present different issues, with Field Army Commanders such as Rupert able to command and move without hindrance across the country, whilst local regional commanders, Waller and Hopton for example, tend to perform best when fighting in their home regions, and then another group of minor commanders donated as local notables who fortify their domain and are able to raid enemy areas and convert them rapidly to the cause as well as providing secure strongpoints to raise army's in.

The difference in the quality of the various commanders is captured with their command stats carried on the counter with better commanders adding to the combat effectiveness of their force and usually being able to activate for less activation cost. In addition the better commanders are more able at intercepting and avoiding the enemy, which proved very useful to the Fairfaxes in their battles with the King and Rupert in the north. 

Late 1643 and the Scots have arrived in the north, tying up Newcastle, whilst the Fairfaxes keep Rupert and the King busy as London keeps on turning out soldiers for Parliament as the south goes orange.

Steve and I played our game over two sessions to get to the Late 1643 position as illustrated, but decided to stop at that point, so why?

Well I have to say, for various reasons, that UKC didn't quite grab the love that the other CDG's we have played managed to do despite some very clever design ideas that really capture what the English Civil War was all about, namely a war of attrition with both sides desperate to knock the other over before they ran out of money and troops.

That model is very appealing from a history nerd perspective at it seems to really create a great feel for the war, but can leave players feeling just as worn down and battered as their historical counterparts by the grinding war of attrition created and facing yet another hand of cards where sixty percent of them are events for the opposing side, thus leaving the options for your side quite limited, something that seemed to happen quite regularly for both of us.

In addition I speak as someone who loves this period of history as opposed to Steve who probably at best can be described as one who has a passing interest.

Thus I would still be happy to play UKC again but I think it would have to be with another ECW aficionado who would appreciate the effort Charles Vasey has put into the game in terms of period feel as compensation for the effort to learn and develop the best play approaches needed to make this game come alive, something Steve and I didn't manage in our single unfinished game.

I am starting to appreciate more that there are some game periods that require the players to be really into the history and get the design to fully enjoy and for me UKC is in that category and one I will no doubt come back to.

So putting UKC to one side, Steve and I decided to shift period yet again and return to an old favourite, not played for quite a while, Rommel in the Desert, the block game by Columbia.

More anon.

Next up, the Spanish Third Rates of Renown end on a high point with a look at, as it was described at the time, one of the most perfect ships in Europe, Argonaute of 80-guns, plus I have another book review to do before moving on to look at some completed conversion work on the Warlord generic third rate ships.

All at Sea - Spanish Third Rates of Renown (San Justo)

As with the French 74-gun Argonaute previously covered, it seems to me that the choice of the San Justo as a Spanish 'Third Rate of Renown' is an interesting one on the part of Warlord Games. 

I suppose the definition of renown being 'known about' or 'fame' might be stretched a bit to cover the service career of the San Justo, but when included as part of a group of ships that include Bellerophon, Tonnant and Formidable, it becomes challenging to imagine what the criteria was for this title and in certain cases I started to wonder if Warlord were stretching the definition to include 'infamous' as well.

Anyway, whatever the criteria for her inclusion, the San Justo enjoyed a long service career in the Armada Espanola from her launch on the 11th November 1779 at the Cartagena naval yard as the last of the five ships of the San Joaquin class, all built in the same yard and designed by Francisco Gautier.

Commissioning and joining the fleet on the 16th November under her first commander Captain Francisco Urreiztieta she joined the squadron under the command of Admiral Don Juan de Langara operating from Cartagena as part of Spanish efforts to block British access to Gibraltar, as Spain sought to take advantage of the Royal Navy's overstretched resources committed to the American War of Independence; the fortress rock was under siege by Spanish forces and it would be the cause of San Justo's initiation into battle when she formed part of Langara's squadron that met Admiral Sir George Rodney's fleet escorting a British relief convoy to the beleaguered British fortress in The First Battle of Cape St Vincent, otherwise known as the 'Moonlight Battle' fought on the 16th January 1780.

   

The Moonlight Battle of Cape St Vincent 16th January 1780 - Richard Paton
Admiral Rodney's fleet in 'general chase' as Spanish Admiral Langara attempted to break contact off Cape St Vincent, showing the moment the Santo Domingo exploded during the early stages of the battle, with the lack of any formation that a chase brings about clearly visible in this picture. 

With the two groups spotting each other at about 13.00 on the 16th January just south of Cape St Vincent and preparing to offer battle, Langara suddenly realised the size of Rodney's fleet, eighteen ships of the line against nine Spanish, and decided to attempt to break contact making use of the hazy weather accompanied by occasional squalls. 

However Rodney ordered a general chase, with ships pursuing at the best speed they could make irrespective of formation and after two hours managed to engage the rearmost Spanish ship, the Santo Domingo, at 16.00 which blew up after a forty minute engagement with HMS Edgar, Marlborough and Ajax with the loss of all but one of her crew.

Admiral Juan de Langara y Huarte

The chase would continue into the night and see a further four Spanish ships captured and another two captured and lost, with one of them being destroyed by the British after finding it to be too heavily damaged and the other retaken by its Spanish crew and sailing into Cadiz, with the Spanish force suffering the loss of 2,500 men killed, wounded or captured to the the British losing just 134 killed, wounded and captured and the supply convoy safely escorted into Gibraltar on the 19th January.

The San Justo, although not listed in Langara's order of battle, is reported in Beatson's Naval and Military Memoirs as escaping with light damage from the action and entered Cadiz with the other survivors of Langara's squadron.

Following repairs to the ship, San Justo she was assigned to the Spanish main fleet under Admiral Luis de Cordova and would be under his command for the rest of the American War of Independence seeing action on the 9th of August 1780 as the British overstretch finally paid dividends and Cordova's fleet was able to capture the majority of ships in a British outbound convoy from Portsmouth of sixty-three merchant ships carrying supplies and stores together with troops bound for the West Indies.

The British convoy of sixty-three ships is taken by Cordova's Spanish fleet 9th August 1780 losing fifty-five captured.

Driving off the small British escort of one 74-gun ship and two frigates, Cordova's thirty-one ships and six frigates easily rounded up the stricken convoy with just five of the merchantmen and the three warships getting away.

Admiral Luis de Cordova y Cordova
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:LuisDeC%C3%B3rdovaYC%C3%B3rdovaCapit%C3%A1nGeneralDeLaRealArmada.jpg

Following a period of escort work herself, the San Justo together with the Spanish fleet headed north and a year later in August 1781 was operating in consort with the French fleet under Admiral Luc Urbain de Bouexic Comte de Guichon in the English Channel as the Bourbon alliance threatened to initiate an invasion of the British Isles, but with those plans coming to nought, was back in Cadiz a year later.

By 1782 the American War on land was drawing to a close but the naval war between the European powers was reaching a climax as the Royal Navy gradually gained ascendancy in its struggle to maintain a strong British negotiating position at the upcoming peace talks.

Relief of Gibraltar by Earl Howe 11th October 1782 - Richard Paton
HMS Victory is seen at centre, Lord Howe's flagship, escorting the British relief convoy into Gibraltar with the Franco Spanish fleet at anchor in the background in Algeciras Bay.

For Spain that struggle was still very much focussed around the repossession of Gibraltar and its efforts to starve the British garrison into submission, leading to San Justo and the thirty-four ship Spanish fleet under Cordova clash with yet another British relief convoy escorted by an equally sized British fleet under Admiral Richard Howe and the ensuing Battle of Cape Spartel.

Howe wishing to avoid battle and making best use of his newest advantage over his enemies, namely coppered ships was able to dictate the terms of the limited fighting as his ships were able to outrun Cordova's, despite the Spanish having the wind gauge, thus enabling the convoy to get under the protective guns of the Rock and allowing the British fleet to disengage the next day to return to British waters.

No precise details of specific ships casualties are recorded for the Spanish but with just 276 killed and wounded on the British side and 360 on the Spanish from the long range gunnery exchanges, San Justo and her comrades were very likely lightly affected.

With the end of the American War in 1783, San Justo was sent to El Ferrol where she was disarmed and put in ordinary but was hastily rearmed and made ready for possible conflict in 1790 with the Nootka Sound Crisis and the Anglo-Spanish dispute over trading and navigation rights on the Pacific West Coast of North America, that saw both countries organise their naval forces for a possible conflict over the issue and thus seeing the respective fleets already in an advanced state of readiness with the events in France that would culminate in the French Revolutionary War of 1793.

With Britain and Spain in alliance at the start of the war, San Justo under Captain Francisco Ordonez was part of the Anglo-Spanish fleet that entered Toulon in November 1793, back under the command of Admiral Langara operating with the Spanish Mediterranean squadron..

The chaos of the Allied retreat from Toulon in 1793 is well illustrated in this picture with the Allied fleet that included the San Justo preparing to depart from the bay in the background

The San Justo would continue her assignment with the Spanish Mediterranean Squadron throughout the French Revolutionary War and a change of alliance from Britain to France, operating from Cartagena and Cadiz, until sent back to El Ferrol in 1802 after the Peace of Amiens, to be put back in ordinary.

With the resumption of war in 1803, Spain was preparing to re-join the conflict with Britain and rearming her navy, which would see the San Justo back in Cadiz in January 1805 being careened and coppered and from where she would join Admiral Pierre Villeneuve's Combined Fleet that sailed the following October prior to the Battle of Trafalgar.

The approximate position of the San Justo at the Battle of Trafalgar at just after midday on the 21st October 1805

At Trafalgar the San Justo would be under the command of Captain Don Miguel Gaston who was born in 1776 in Cartagena de Indias, in the modern day Republic of Columbia,  and had previously served aboard the San Isidro 74-guns in the early 1790's as well as being a former student of hydrographcs at Cadiz.

Hold the Line - Anthony Cowland
https://www.argc-art.com/sail-and-tall-ships
 HMS Victory and Temeraire race each other towards the Allied line at Trafalgar, with the latter reportedly taking fire from San Justo as she closed.

During the battle, the San Justo was part of the Allied Centre and at one point directly astern and leeward of Admiral Villeneuve's flagship Redoutable, opening fire on HMS Temeraire as she bore down on the Allied line, however the Spanish ship's involvement in the later exchanges seems to have been very limited as, despite being at the centre of the action, she would escape the battle with slight damage to her hull and masts and just seven wounded, the lowest number of casualties in the Combined Fleet and with only two ships in the British fleet, Polyphemus and Prince having fewer losses.

Admiral Frederic Gravina author of the after battle report below that makes mention of the
San Justo, among others of the Allied fleet that 'drove off the Enemy'

The state of the San Justo seems rather to cast doubt on the after-battle report from Spanish Admiral Gravina who appears to have missed the report of San Justo's casualties and damage when he describes her role in the battle;

'It wanted eight minutes to noon when an English three-decker broke through the centre of our line, being seconded in this manoeuvre by the Vessels which followed in its wake. The other leading ships of the enemy's columns did the same. One of them passed down our rear, a third laid herself between the Achille and the Ildefonso, and from this moment the action was nothing but so many sanguinary single combats within pistol-shot: the greater part of them being between the whole of the Enemy's Fleet and half of ours; several boardings necessarily took place. 

I do not possess the data requisite for giving your Highness a detailed and particular account of these single fights, nor can I speak with certainty of the movements of the Van, which, I am informed, tacked at the commencement of the battle in order to support those who were assailed. I can, however, confidently assure you that every ship, French as well as Spanish, which fought in my sight, performed its duty to the untmost, and that this Ship, after a terrific contest of four hours with three or four of the Enemy's Vessels, its rigging destroyed, its sails shot through , its masts and topmasts riddled, and every respect in a most deplorable condition, was most seasonably relieved by the San Justo, a Spanish, and the Neptune, a French ship, which junction drove off the Enemy, and enabled the Rayo, the Montanes, the Asis, and the San Leandro, all of which had suffered severely, to unite with the other French ships, that were just as bad a plight.

As soon as this vessel found itself free of the Enemy, it directed the ships which had joined company to assist such vessels as were in need of their aid, and at nightfall, the cannonade having ceased on both sides, the Themis frigate was ordered to tow us towards Cadiz bay.'

It would appear that Captain Gaston may have sought to set the record a little straighter over the performance of his ship at Trafalgar, going to great efforts after the battle to stress his crew's lack of training which might explain the discretion implied by the damage and casualties his ship suffered.

Indeed the state of preparedness of the San Justo might also be gauged by the comment from Admiral Villeneuve on the 8th of October when he had inspected the ship, stating it was one of three Spanish ships that 'were barely out of the dockyard'.

Following Trafalgar and the subsequent estrangement of the Franco-Spanish alliance in 1808, San Justo would continue to serve throughout the remainder of the Napoleonic War taking part in the defence of Cadiz during the French siege of 1809 and escorting and moving supplies and specie from the Spanish colonies in support of the war effort against Napoleon, with the ship ending her service in the breakers yard in 1824.

At Trafalgar San Justo was armed with 28 x 24-pounder long guns on her lower deck, 30 x 18-pdrs on her upper deck, 12 x 8-pdrs on her quarterdeck and 6 x 8-pdrs on her forecastle, together with 1 x 32-pdr howitzer and 6 x 28-pdr carronades.

Her crew numbers were above compliment with 694 men of which 427 were naval personnel, 207 infantry and 60 marine artillerymen.

Sources consulted for this post:

The Trafalgar Companion - Mark Adkins

The Battle of Trafalgar - Geoffrey Bennett

https://threedecks.org/index.php?display_type=show_ship&id=2694
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/21533369.2005.9668343
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cape_St._Vincent_(1780)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cape_Spartel
https://www.napoleon.org/en/history-of-the-two-empires/articles/the-trafalgar-report-by-the-spanish-admiral-the-duke-of-gravina/
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/21533369.2005.9668343
https://www.todoababor.es/datos_docum/arm_nav_traf_vent.htm

Next up: Steve and I finished our most recent game of Unhappy King Charles on Vassal and I have a post covering our thoughts about the game, another book review covering the Battle of Copenhagen in 1801 and the final Third Rate of Renown, looking at the Spanish 80-gun Argonauta.

A History of the Royal Navy, The Napoleonic Wars - Martin Robson

 

The Royal Navy of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars has not been front and centre of my focus with my previous collections of age of sail models, with my attention more drawn to the American War of Independence and particularly the interesting naval campaign fought between Hughes and Suffren, a period I will no doubt come back to in time.

Thus with my attention very much on the later period, with this current collection of 1:700th models, I have featured many recent book reviews that have been important in my reading to better inform the collection and the games I plan to run with it.

Perhaps the most fundamental understanding for anyone interested in sea warfare in this period is a solid grounding in the history of the most powerful naval force in history that came to pre-eminence at this time with a wealth of leadership talent and the ability to win and keep on winning even in the face of the occasional defeat and, at a time when great land powers were vying for the control of Europe, the Royal Navy was establishing Great Britain as the preeminent power at sea, paving the way for the largest empire the world has ever seen.

The British East Indiaman Warley  - Robert Salmon
The Warley is seen here in 1804 the same year she participated in the Battle of Pulo Aura taking part in the action of the 15th February that year when Commodore Dance bluffed Admiral Linois with his French raiding squadron in the Straits of Malacca that he faced British naval ships of the line rather than Indiamen. As well as defending the home island from invasion being its primary directive, protecting British trade, an imperative for a maritime nation was a key role for the Royal Navy

Dr Martin Robson is a specialist in British grand strategy, maritime global conflict and the Royal Navy during the age of sail, being a member of the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies, Defence Studies Department, Kings College London at the Joint Services Command and Staff College and is also a friend of mine who likes to roll a few bones with the Devon Wargames Group when time permits and is a thoroughly nice chap.

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Martin-Robson/e/B00J06VCN4/ref=dp_byline_cont_pop_book_1

I have to say that before reading this history, I had a reasonable grounding in most of the campaigns, battles and personalities involved in this remarkable time in history, but my motive to reacquaint myself with much of the content was to get a clearer understanding of some the lesser known actions and campaigns in the post Trafalgar period as Napoleon sought to interfere with British trade whilst seeking new opportunities to acquire ships to contest the control of the Royal Navy again in open battle. 

In addition, to really grasp what the Royal Navy was about in this period I wanted to better understand the strategic imperatives put upon the force and what the numbers say about the outcome in terms of ships and men lost to themselves and the various enemies encountered and the effects of war on British maritime trade alongside that of her enemies.

Thus it was surprising to find this remarkable little book produced in association with the National Museum of the Royal Navy and part of a chronological series covering the history of the force from 1660 which as Martin Robson observes in his acknowledgements was a significant challenge to put 22 years of conflict into 70,000 words, but I was very impressed with the level of detail achieved in the face of that challenging remit. 

The brig-sloop HMS Childers is fired at and hit by shore guns on the approach to Brest 2nd January 1793 - National Maritime Museum.

In his 'Introduction' to the book the author explains that the period of warfare that characterised the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars is neatly encapsulated, with the shots fired at and hitting brig-sloop HMS Childers from a land battery commanding the entrance to Brest on the 2nd January 1793, followed by a declaration of war on Britain a month later by the French Revolutionary government on the 1st February; to its end twenty-two years later between 6 and 7 am on the 15th July 1815 as a barge came alongside HMS Bellerophon off the French port of Rochefort to deliver the Emperor Napoleon with his formal surrender to Captain Frederick Lewis Maitland, later declaring; 

'If it had not been for you English, I should have been Emperor of the East. But wherever there is water to float a ship, we are sure to find you in our way.'

The Emperor Napoleon's barge comes alongside HMS Bellerophon off Rochefort 15th July 1815.

The quote from Napoleon is highlighted for the nugget of truth it reveals in that the Royal Navy was primarily responsible for Napoleon's downfall in that it facilitated Britain's ultimate success in the wars and that to judge success or failure you need to carefully compare the outcomes with British war aims.

First and foremost, Britain had a primarily defensive objective in Europe that did not include occupation of territory, the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy or the defeat of France militarily and a restoration of order in that country.

The simple British war objective was driven by the French occupation and control of the Low Countries, modern day Belgium and Holland and the ports of Antwerp and Flushing which was a 'standing menace to England's safety' in terms of proximity for any French invasion fleet and negated the effectiveness of the fleet in the Western Approaches, which points to the attention this area was given by British military expeditions in 1809 and 1813-15 and why the independence of the Low Countries was the principle British war aim in Europe, and would continue to be so in the next global conflict of World War One against a different dominant European power.

The two other key areas of interest to Britain in Europe concerned free trade and access to European ports primarily in the Baltic, a major source of naval stores and a place to offer support to one of her principle allies, Russia, whilst also looking to control French influence in southern Europe and being able to support her other key ally, Austria, as well as Russia via the Mediterranean.

As the Introduction chapter highlights, Britain was on the periphery and not part of the European system and thus with her small professional army she would need to utilize diplomacy and money to organize her Continental allies to help secure her interests which involved her development as an Atlantic empire based on maritime commerce with her possessions in Canada, the West Indies and the East protected by the Royal Navy.

Thus, as the author points out, it was the Royal Navy that prevented a French invasion and it was the Royal Navy that negated French and Spanish naval power to facilitate the maritime trade and economic strength needed to subsidise allies in pursuit of Britain's interests on land.

From this succinct analysis the chapter closes with the proposition that the Royal Navy's war can be seen in two distinct phases, namely that between 1793 and 1805, characterised principally with blockade duties intermixed with occasional large fleet battles that allowed the Royal Navy to gain command of the seas and allowing Britain to sustain her own maritime trade whilst attacking that of her enemies, thus keeping Britain in the war.

The Battle of Trafalgar, 21st October 1805 - Nicholas Pocock.
 Trafalgar a pivotal battle in naval history in so many ways, but also in terms of clearly delineating the shift to the second stage of the Royal Navy's war between 1795 to 1815. 

Following Trafalgar, the naval war was more about reaping the rewards that control of the sea gave in terms of maintaining a close blockade whilst projecting British power around the globe that would allow Britain to shape her demands in the inevitable peace talks that would form a post war settlement.

Thus the book sets out its stall to assess the contribution made by the Royal Navy to Britain's rise to global superpower status in 1815 and what follows in the nine chapters covering the history of the period is a neatly segmented walk through the key events, battles and personalities involved always looking at the contribution made to the guiding war aims outlined in the introduction.

The summary to the walk through of the battles and actions of the period, which I found pacey and informative, is then pulled back to the original set up, namely to consider the success of the Royal Navy in terms of those national war aims with some fascinating statistics outlining the results of twenty-two years of warfare.

Thus in conclusion, in those twenty-two years the Royal Navy fought and won six major battlefleet actions, and in among the dozen or so squadron and multiple single ship and cutting out actions, escorted thousands of British merchant ships, attacked enemy commerce and facilitated at least sixty-eight major amphibious operations, hauling guns overland, and putting supplies and ammunition ashore.

In the process it suffered the loss of 6,500 men in combat, 13,000 to shipwreck and fire, and between 70-80,000 men lost to sickness, disease and accidents on board.

By 1815 the Royal Navy was at its zenith in terms of strength and power with 884 warships, possessing in tonnage 609,300 tons more than the rest of the world's warship tonnage put together.

During the war the Royal Navy lost 166 warships to enemy action, but in return captured or destroyed 712 French, 196 Spanish, 172 Dutch, 85 Danish, 17 American, 15 Turkish and 4 Russian ships amounting to a grand total of 1,201 enemy warships.

In terms of British trade, in 1793 British exports and re-exports amounted to £20.4 million and imports to £19.3 million, which by 1814 had grown to £70.3 million and £80.8 million respectively, with trade to the British West Indies doubling in that period and with the British merchant fleet becoming the carrier of choice rising from 18,068 ships registered at 1,986,000 tons in 1793 to 21,869 ships at 2,478,000 tons in 1814.

When the American government declared war in 1812, the Royal Navy had to respond to yet another demand on its power to allow Britain to maintain the status quo in terms of her territorial possessions in North America whilst defending her maritime interests in support of her European war aims. The statistics again are compelling with regard to the Royal Navy's success with British merchant tonnage protected against the attentions of the American cruisers and privateers rising from 20,637 ships, 2,263,000 tons in 1812 to 21,449 ships, 2,414,000 tons in 1814, this accompanied by the destruction of the American merchant fleet on the global shipping routes reduced from its high point in 1812 with a tonnage of 667,999 involved in foreign trade to just 56,626 tons by 1814, leaping back to 700,000 tons in 1815. 

The Bombardment of Algiers, 27th August 1816 - George Chambers senior
The attack on Algiers by Sir Edward Pellew, then Lord Exmouth, was unfinished business left over from the 'Great War' and underlined the role of the Royal Navy post war for the next one-hundred years, of securing British overseas trade and clearing the seas of marauders and pirates rather than engaging in major fleet actions. 

The naval war effectively bankrupted the American economy with its stranglehold on American trade seeing American imports declining from $78,778,540 in 1812 to just $12,967,849 in 1814, to bounce back in 1815 and the peace to $85,356,680 and thus responsible for the collapse in tax revenue raised on import duties and thus allowing Britain to shape the war and control its outcome.

Britain's trade balance also contributed to her war aims of supporting her allies in spite of spiralling war costs that saw her provide £60 million to her allies during the wars with £2,156,513 to Prussia that made sure Blucher's army was able and ready to make its timely appearance at Waterloo (Lucy Worsley, please note), all due to maritime security through British sea power.

This book is a great reference source of all the campaigns conducted by the Royal Navy in this period  and liberally sprinkled with clear maps together with period illustrations to support the text leads the reader through, chronologically the various actions.

However as the author points out in the Introduction, this volume can in no way encompass all the aspects of such a dense period of activity and thus he makes clear he does not include detail on developments in ship design, social conditions and administrative reform, highlighting 'A History of the Royal Navy: The Age of Sail' by Andrew Baines for a deeper look at those subjects and I would echo that in terms of looking in more detail at the individual campaigns covered, that specific books on them will only add to the outline of events given here, for example the Grey-Jervis expedition of 1794 has all the key statistics and principle events covered in two pages, but for students of that specific campaign I would also recommend 'By Fire and Bayonet' by Steve Brown as highlighted in my review of his book back in February

https://jjwargames.blogspot.com/2020/02/by-fire-and-bayonet-greys-west-indies.html

Martin Robson's book is a great reference work covering the activities of the Royal Navy's war at sea from 1793 to 1815 in a very readable way and I really enjoyed it and the pointers it gives to further research into lesser known campaigns of the period plus loads of background to any campaign ideas for the age of sail naval wargamer.

A History of the Royal Navy, The Napoleonic Wars by Martin Robson is 273 pages containing the following:

Introduction: 'Wherever there is water to float a ship, we are sure to find you in our way.'

Chapter 1: Home Waters, 1793-1802

Chapter 2: The Mediterranean, 1793-1802

Chapter 3: The Global War, 1793-1802

Chapter 4: The Invasion Threat, 1802-1805

Chapter 5: The Battle of Trafalgar, 1805

Chapter 6: Home Waters and the Baltic, 1805-15

Chapter 7: The Mediterranean and the Peninsular War, 1805-15

Chapter 8: Economic Warfare, 1805-15

Chapter 9: The War of 1812

Epilogue: Algiers 1816

Conclusion: 'Lords of the Sea'

Notes

Biliography

Index

Additionally there are two tables detailing the number of ships at specific times, fifty six illustrations and battle maps plus eight colour plates.

There are five strategic maps covering the Atlantic, Caribbean, Europe, the Mediterranean and the Far East

The book is hard cover and has a recommended retail price of £30 and at the time of writing Amazon have it on for £28.50 including delivery costs.

All at Sea - Spanish Third Rates of Renown (Monarca)

Monarca, in the foreground, strikes her colours at Trafalgar to HMS Tonnant - Nicholas Pocock

The Monarca 74-gun ship of the line begins this series of posts looking at the Spanish third rates of renown.

Another design by the Spanish naval architect, Romero Landa, as part of the four ship Montanes class, and covered in my posts looking at the Montanes and Neptuno.

Montanes
http://jjwargames.blogspot.com/2020/07/all-at-sea-on-stocks-in-jjs-dockyard_15.html

Neptuno
http://jjwargames.blogspot.com/2020/07/all-at-sea-on-stocks-in-jjs-dockyard_31.html

Monarca was ordered in 1791 and built and launched at El Ferrol on the 17th March 1794, undergoing proving trials in the autumn of that year alongside her sister ship Montanes under her first commander Captain Don Jose Justo Salcedo y Arauco who took command of the ship in July.

Captain Don Jose Justo Salcedo y Arauco

The trial comparison cruises conducted with Montanes between the Azores and Cadiz, escorting Atlantic convoys would see Monarca refitted with new masts and sails before joining Admiral Juan de Langara's squadron in December 1794 in support of the fortified Catalan town of Roses on the Costa Brava then under siege by the French, until it surrendered the following February but not before the garrison of three-hundred men were successfully evacuated by the Spanish navy, with the Peace of Basle ending the war with France signed in July 1795.

With war declared against Britain on the 19th August 1795 and the signing of the Treaty of San Ildefonso allying herself with France, Monarca would be assigned to escorting treasure convoys from Havana and Vera Cruz to Cadiz, until returning to El Ferrol in 1798 for much needed repairs.

Sunset in Ferrol - Carlos Parilla Penagos
https://www.carlosparrillapenagos.es/pintura-naval/
With the castle of San Felipe seen on the right, a Spanish 3rd rate ship enters El Ferol, the port where the similarly rated Monarca was launched and from where she operated from for much of the time from 1798.

El Ferrol would become the base of operations for Monarca from 1798 to the Peace of Amiens in 1802 coperating with the French squadrons operating out of Rochefort and Brest when able to avoid the British blockade and with the peace, Monarca would end the French Revolutionary War in the port, careened and disarmed, not returning to operations until November 1804 with the declaration of war against Britain on the 14th December.

On the 13th August 1805, Monarca left El Ferrol bound for Cadiz as part of Vice Admiral Pierre Villeneuve's Combined fleet and under the command of Captain Don Teodoro de Argumosa, who had seen action at the Battle of Cape St Vincent in command of the San Isidro 74-guns, where he had exchanged fire with Captains Nelson and Collingwood commanding HMS Captain and Excellent respectively.

Thus it was that after a short stay in Cadiz, Monarca sailed with the Combined fleet on the 20th October in spite of enemy frigates seen the previous day as half the fleet struggled to get out of the harbour leaving the other half to exit the next morning in worsening weather, heavy seas, rain squalls and a wind veering to south-south-west, rising to almost gale force as the fleet headed into the Straits of Gibraltar.

Originally part of the van squadron under Vice Admiral Alava in the flagship Santa Anna 112-guns along with Indomptable 80-guns, Forgeux  and Pluton 74-guns, the squadron would be the rear as Villeneuve reversed the course of the fleet back to Cadiz as the British bore down on his line of battle ensuring she would be in the centre of the action with Vice Admiral Collingwood's lee column.

The Battle of Trafalgar 1805, just after noon, showing the approximate position of Monarca in rear squadron.

The first British ship to engage the Monarca was HMS Mars under Captain George Duff who attempted to pass between her and the stern of the French 74-gun Forgueux, but soon found the gap closed by the French 74-gun Pluton, that had increased sail to pass Monarca and close the gap on Mars not before the British ship fired a close range broadside into the Monarca  which bore away under the fire

HMS Mars covered in my post from April
http://jjwargames.blogspot.com/2020/04/all-at-sea-on-stocks-in-jjs-dockyard_19.html

The next British ship to come up behind HMS Mars was Captain Charles Tyler's HMS Tonnant which managed to pass the Monarca and pour in her double shotted port broadside before stern raking the Pluton and bow raking the 74-gun Algeciras.

HMS Tonnant covered in my post from October
http://jjwargames.blogspot.com/2020/10/all-at-sea-british-third-rates-of_10.html

The first broadside from Tonnant was quickly followed by a second and appears to have been a crippling blow, badly damaging her fore and crossjack yards, bringing down her mizzenmast and causing Captain Argumosa to order his crew to cease fire and to haul down his colours earning the dubious honour of being the first Allied ship to surrender at Trafalgar.

However as the Tonnant sailed on and no attempt was made to board Monarca and take possession of her, Argumosa raised his colours again, but it seems likely that, with the extensive damage and heavy casualties suffered, the fight had been knocked out of Monarca and she surrendered later in the battle after receiving further hits from HMS Bellrophon which sent across a party of Royal Marines to take control of the ship.

HMS Bellerophon, centre exchanges broadsides with the already battered Monarca to left and the Montanes, to right as the French Aigle hoves into range ahead.

The Monaraca had suffered one of the highest total fatalities of any ship in the Combined Fleet with 101 killed together with a further 154 wounded, one of only eight ships to have fatalities into three digits, but it was perhaps the extensive damage caused to her hull and rigging that convinced Vice Admiral Collingwood that the ship could not be saved as a prize and she was thus burnt and deliberately wrecked on the 26th October.

At Trafalgar, the Monarca was armed with 28 x 24-pounder long guns on the lower deck, 30 x 18-pdrs on the upper deck, 12 x 8-pdrs on the quarterdeck and 4 x 8-pdrs on her forecastle.

She had an over strength crew of 667 men which included 370 naval personnel, 253 infantry (45% of the men onboard) and 54 marine artillery.

Sources consulted for this post:

The Trafalgar Companion - Mark Adkins

The Battle of Trafalgar - Geoffrey Bennett

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish_ship_Monarca_(1794)

https://threedecks.org/index.php?display_type=show_ship&id=2711

Next up: I have a review of A History of the Royal Navy in the Napoleonic Wars by Martin Robson, the next Spanish third rate of renown, San Justo and a look at Unhappy King Charles the most recent game Steve M and I have been playing on Vassal.